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Central Eurasia
SUPPLEMENT

FBIS-SOV-95-036-S *23 February 1995*

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Plans To Share Space Technology With U.S.

954Q0129A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Valeriy Baberdin: "Russian Space Technologies at the Center of Attention of NASA Expert Commission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] So a start has been made in the joint flights of Russian cosmonauts and American astronauts. New steps lie ahead. These include the flight of an American specialist in our "Soyuz-TM" spacecraft, orbiting of two new modules for "Mir"—"Spektr" and "Priroda"—which are also equipped with American apparatus, and the docking of the "Atlantis" with our station. And in the future, the construction of the "Alpha" orbital station through our joint efforts.

The work of the NASA expert commission, headed by the well-known astronaut Thomas Stafford, has been organized precisely from this perspective. You may recall that he was the commander of the American crew of the first joint "Apolla - Soyuz" program, whose twentieth anniversary we will mark in July of this year. The commission includes astronauts and specialists in spaceflight control and safety, in astronaut training, and in medical support.

Joint activity in space is not all that simple. It requires a common ideology, a common normative and juridical basis, common standards. It is necessary to seek not just points but whole areas of contact in this sphere of human activity, and to do so in a specific, purely practical context. There should be complete openness here, complete trust. If the commission is able to achieve that, success is assured.

The work plan of the commission is a hard one. American specialists visited the State Space Scientific-Production Center imeni M.V. Khrunichev, the "Energiya" Scientific Production Association, and the Flight Control Center, and today are flying to Baykonur. The most diverse questions were asked. Naturally they are interested in plant conditions, the state of affairs with regard to cooperation between the production associations of the countries of the near abroad, and the situation at the cosmodrome and around it.

The "Spektr" and "Priroda" modules, which this year are supposed to be sent into orbit, are of particular interest at this stage. The NASA specialists have many scientific experiments planned for the "Mir" in coming years using the apparatus mounted in them.

It must be said that both "Spektr" and "Priroda" were essentially ready to be sent to the "Mir" four years ago. But the economic situation in the country did not allow their launch. Now it was necessary to return both modules to the manufacturing plant, to the Khrunichev center. Enhancements were done, and new apparatus proposed by the American side was mounted. A whole group of electrical experiments were performed over again. In August of last year, "Spektr" was transferred to the "Energiya" Scientific Production Association for final readiness testing. On February 22 it was sent to Baykonur. The launch is planned for May 10.

The second module was returned to the Khrunichev Center in December and is now undergoing a test cycle. Plans are to launch it into orbit in October. Incidentally, our industrialists have expressed their concern at the delay in deliveries of American apparatus for it. They have urged NASA representatives to hurry the parties involved. Otherwise the production time limit will be used up, and in the final stage it will be necessary to rush the work, something that is not very good for equipment reliability.

It remains only to add that an analogous Russian expert commission headed by the General Director of TsNIIMASh [Central Scientific Research Institute of Machine-Building], Academician Vladimir Utkin, has already visited the U.S., during the launch of the "Discovery."

Outlook for Future Space Shuttle Missions

954Q0129B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Raman Shchedrov under the rubric "Military-Technical Survey", "The Shuttles Continue To Take Off"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The flight of the American spacecraft "Discovery," whose crew included the Russian cosmonaut Vladimir Titov, was recently concluded within the framework of the joint "Shuttle " - "Mir" program. This flight once again drew public attention to the program of space exploration being implemented in the U.S. Its basic features are the subject of the article below, written by a specialist.**

The U.S. continues to implement a program of space exploration using the "space shuttle" multiple-use transport spacecraft. Last year there were seven shuttle flights. From the eastern missile and space center at Cape Canaveral, the "Columbia," "Discovery" and "Endeavor" spacecraft were each launched into orbit two times, and the "Atlantis" once. The total time spent by the astronauts in space amounted to a little more than 80 days. As a rule officers are commanders and pilots, while in addition to Americans, the Russian cosmonaut Sergey Krikalev, a female Japanese civilian and a French astronaut, a representative of the European Space Agency (EKA), acted as payload specialists.

Groups of diverse applied-science experiments in the program of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the U.S. (NASA), and also in the joint programs of NASA, the European Space Agency and other organizations were carried out on board the American space shuttles.

For instance, a series of experiments were conducted to study micro-gravitation during the flights of the "Columbia" in March and July. Toward this end, its cargo bay

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was loaded with scientific equipment in whose development and construction NASA and the European Space Agency, the National Center for Space Research of France, the National Scientific Research Council of Canada, the Japanese Space Agency and the Administration for Scientific Space Research Work of Germany had participated. A total of around one hundred experiments in various fields of science were conducted under conditions of micro-gravitation.

During shuttle flights, great attention is paid to the growing of super-pure substances and materials in orbit. The basic task of the February "Discovery" flight was to orbit an autonomous module, especially designed for growing semiconductors under vacuum conditions, and return it in the cargo bay of the ship. However there were some glitches in the control systems of the module. For this reason it was not released into independent flight. The module was secured on the remote-controlled manipulator, and then returned to the cargo bay. Incidentally, these operations were assigned to the Russian crew member, Krikalev.

In the course of orbital research, an integrated study of the Earth, the sun and space is carried out. In particular they study the influence of solar radiation on the earth's climate. The "Atlantis," which flew in October, carried the international space laboratory "Atlas." This made it possible to obtain data on the physical status and chemical composition of the earth's atmosphere, on the ozone layer, as well as on the quantity and distribution of energy reaching the Earth from the sun. It is interesting that in the course of the preceding repair and modernization of "Atlantis," a docking assembly manufactured in Russia and designed for docking with our orbiting "Mir" station was mounted on the ship.

In order to study the Earth and sun, in two shuttle flights returnable scientific-research satellite-platforms were put into orbit from the cargo bay. To record the parameters of the solar wind, NASA's satellite platform "Spartan" was put into orbit in September. Infrared radiation was measured using instruments mounted on the "Krista" satellite-platform during the last shuttle flight of last year. Developed jointly by specialists of NASA and the National Space Agency of Germany, the "Krista" satellite was in independent flight for around eight days.

In the course of three flights last year, the Americans remotely probed the earth's surface using optical and radar instruments. A powerful radar laboratory with a total mass of more than 10 tonnes was mounted on board the "Endeavor." During the April flight of the "Endeavor," they studied the possibility of improving the radar imaging of the earth's surface through simultaneous use of radio emissions in several frequency ranges. And in October they performed radar imaging of volcanoes in Hawaii, Sicily, and the Russian Far East, and also of earthquake areas in the Kurilles and the northern Japan. Along with this, they obtained images of mountain ranges and forest tracts of the American continent, the deserts of Africa and waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In the opinion of American experts, this laboratory, developed for civilian purposes, is a great step forward in comparison with American and Russian military satellites for radar reconnaissance.

In 1994 the Americans walked in space only one time. This was in September, when for seven hours two astronauts tested new suits equipped with portable motors.

Back in the early 80s, the U.S. Defense Department had planned wide use of shuttle flights in its own interests, in particular for the launch of military satellites. However the "Challenger" disaster and the significant increase in the cost of the flights forced the Pentagon to revise its initial plans. They calculated that the use of single-use booster rockets for these purposes was more reliable and advantageous. Nonetheless the interest of the American military in the shuttles was not extinguished, and in virtually every flight experiments are conducted for the Defense Department.

The conduct of photographic reconnaissance of various areas and individual installations on the earth's surface is considered one of the most important aspects of military use of the shuttles. The press reports that in October the crew of the "Endeavor" conducted reconnaissance of the Iraq-Kuwait border. Using special instruments, experiments are done to study cosmic radiation and its influence on the onboard electronic devices of space apparatus, to develop new space technologies and to do studies in the field of materials science. On board the shuttle spacecraft they calibrate the opto-electronic and radar means of space-monitoring of the U.S. Air Force.

A five-rear program of special research in the interests of the Pentagon was begun in April of last year. Its purpose was to develop apparatus to detect seagoing vessels and determine their coordinates under cloudy conditions from space. In the event of a successful outcome of the research, such apparatus will probably be mounted on future American satellites for all-weather reconnaissance of oceans and seas.

The research carried out on board the shuttles will be continued. In 1995, there are plans for eight flights of the multiple-use spacecraft with the purpose of further experiments in the fields of medicine, biology, micro-gravitation, study of the earth from space and in promising technologies.

Nonetheless, the joint flights of the Russian cosmonauts and American astronauts, and the docking of the American space shuttle with the Russian orbiting space station "Mir" will be the high points.

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Political Issues

Luzhkov on Yeltsin, 'Most-Group,' President's Security Service

954F1298A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 4, 26 Jan 95 p 8

[Introduction by L. Karpinskiy, Letter from Yu. Luzhkov: "To Whom Is Moscow Mayor Objectionable?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The desire to address a letter to OBSHCHAYA GAZETA was dictated not so much by the continual attacks directed against the mayor of Moscow, Yuriy Mikhaylovich Luzhkov, as much as what is really behind recent events and the overt sources of the attacks. At a recent meeting of the Moscow government the results of last year's work were summed up. They bore witness to the continuous and steady development of the capital region. The latter, however, is in sharp contradiction with the activity of many state structures, in which everything is poorly handled and administrative ineptitude is constantly being demonstrated. This is why the desire is so great to discredit everything being done in Moscow. It is a desire based on the aspiration for self-exoneration. For this reason, those involved stop at no slanderous accusations in order to conjure up a lot of nonsense about those who have made progress in the field of administration. Conscientiousness has always made unconscientious workers nervous - it is as old as the earth. There are, however, contemporary aspects to the current conflict as well, to include the difference in approaches toward privatization. Moscow's approach implies start-up capital and excludes the possibility of acquiring property for next to nothing. The state approach, on the other hand, opens the way before civil servants to an economic nomenclature, allowing for seizure of property by virtue of one's functions of authority. And as far as the property dispute goes, it is no laughing matter. If one were to ask in what manner the dispute is being conducted, one could without a doubt, look to our special services, which even today are loyal to past traditions. Lacking purpose in their work, they are, as before, creating intrigues in the name of self-development and self-affirmation.

Faces Familiar, One Can Only Guess Reasons: Yuriy Luzhkov Responds to Len Karpinskiy's Letter

The letter written by Len Vyacheslavovich Karpinskiy, with whom I am bound by many years of good relations, was, unfortunately no new news. Not only he, but other Moscovites are expressing their bewilderment at the fact that the government publication ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA has been publishing articles one after another accusing me of every mortal wrongdoing. It goes without saying that it is not a matter of me personally. The public is worried about the return of the time of denunciations, unsubstantiated accusations, and slander, all of which have brought us so much misfortune. I assert that it was this consideration that guided the actions of the chief editor of IZVESTIYA, Igor Golembiovskiy, who during a meeting between journalists and the leadership of the Soviet of the Federation, admitted that he was seriously alarmed at the spectre of 1937 looming on the horizon.

In recent days my name has been mentioned frequently, truly to the point of astonishment, in the press. Of course, not all of these are worth paying any mind. For example, I am not preoccupied by the eccentric statement, as always, in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA concerning the fact that Luzhkov was so frightened by the "figure in the cashmere coat," who directed the massacre of people before the mayor's doors, that all that remains of his appearance, usually the picture of health, is a mannequin, the appearance of dark days in his eyes. Nothing else could appear in my eyes if I had just buried my mother, who was to me the image of dignity, living composure, and good will. To the end of her days she remained one of the workers who since time immemorial has upheld Russia - not one of those who are great, who make mistakes and take rash steps, but those who are simple and little known...

As concerns ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, having familiarized myself with publications like "Padayet sneg [Snow is falling]," I feel only sincere astonishment. Incidentally, I wrote a letter to Victor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin, asking him to explain to what degree the statements made by this newspaper correspond with the views of the government concerning the activity of the mayor of Moscow. I admit, I did not receive a response. However, having thought it over I decided that the prime minister, in all likelihood, had no answer because the fabrications, denunciations, and slander, which have become commonplace on the pages of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, were not initiated by him and are not being circulated at his command.

More and more the criminal accusations against Luzhkov are becoming a salable good for ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. The logic of the newspaper's publications coincides with the well known Russian proverb: "You are a fool with a hat, and a fool without." At first I was defiled because the money in the Moscow budget was kept in commercial bank accounts. As soon as I started to create a municipal bank, the revenues from which are to go only toward Moscow's needs, I was reproached because I was "moving around Moscow's trillions."

Three aspects of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's activity are plain to me: First, it has set as its goal to slander Luzhkov at any price. Second, I am convinced, and Karpinskiy's letter strengthens this conviction, that those who think independently, who have not been deprived of their analytical abilities, do not believe this publication. Third, it is clear to me that the paper's chief editor and editorial board are not free to form their own point of view. They are diligently carrying out an order, the goal of which is to counterpose the mayor of Moscow to the president.

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I can say that I am very close to the president - close in my way of thinking, my philosophy on life, and the way I regard current political events, for example, regarding Chechnya. During the most difficult periods of his life and mine, I have always remained with the president. Our relations are based on the fact that I have never imposed anything on him, and I have not acted as his adviser at those times when he alone had to make the decision. I have my own work which keeps me entirely occupied. As concerns the games in the Kremlin, they are of no interest to me, they are in opposition to my views on life.

However, no matter how clear and normal my relations with the president, they always seem to be under suspicion, someone is always trying to make them more complex than they indeed are.

During much of the recent past the president's security service has been expanding with new subdivisions. Analysts, political scientists, and even astrologists are being employed in the latter. At times I ask myself why this service needs an analytical center, a press center, a legal center and many others? Only for the purpose of better protecting the president? I know why - these centers are diligently creating a negative image of the mayor of Moscow. He, they say, is extending his own interests beyond the capital. If, for example, he drives to Chuvash, it is not for potatoes, but to establish ties with Nikolay Fedorov. He heads for Sevastopol to appear as a patriot and complicate relations between Russia and Ukraine. His visits to Dagestan are hardly for economic reasons, but for the sake of politics. If Luzhkov supports philanthropy he does it for populist reasons. His involvement with commercial banks signifies that he is forming a financial group. By giving attention to the militia, he is subordinating power-wielding structures. In short, Luzhkov is dangerous. And if so, it is necessary to put him in his place. Who has a vested interest in this "anti-Luzhkov campaign?" Not the president, in any case. Boris Yeltsin has neither in the past, nor in the present seen anything other than good from me. As concerns the upcoming elections, I want to support Yeltsin's candidacy. I do not intend to announce my own. It will be another matter, however, when it comes time for the mayoral elections. I will make my claim to this post and will compete with those who announce their candidacies.

I have stated all of this publicly more than once. Nevertheless, among those surrounding the president a group has formed which is acting against Luzhkov no matter what he does, no matter what he says. They have their own line, their own objectives. The most simple logical conclusions lead one to the fact that these people are not acting in the interests of the president. They are also incidentally fighting with others close to the president. As they keep those faithful to the president under suspicion, and begin a witch hunt among his compatriots - whether unconsciously or with intent - they weaken the stability of the system and undermine the authority of Boris Nikolayevich himself.

Unfortunately, the investigation being conducted by the military prosecutor is still not complete concerning the facts of the ridicule directed against the MOST-bank workers. I think that a lot depends upon this investigation being conducted honestly and out in the open. It is of particular significance during this day and age, when more and more unsubstantiated accusation are being circulated, like those set forth by General Korzhakov on the pages of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. He asserts, for example, that the workers of the MOST-bank illegally carried weapons, although this is entirely untrue. Moreover, in a civilized society where there exists some kind of guarantee for the safety of its citizens, the general of the special service should not be acknowledging his love for goose hunting, while having in mind the last name of a well known banker [Gusinskiy].

Street talk is penetrating our speech more and more today. For example, I had the occasion to hear conversations that Luzhkov should "lose" the MOST-bank, and "lose" Kobzon, otherwise he himself will be "pulled under." I admit, it is difficult for me to respond to such language. I have had no particular friendship with Mr. Gusinskiy. He has not been a guest in my home. However, I did and still do maintain business relations with him that have never been hidden. I have good relations with Kobzon, that is also no secret. Never have I done an ill to someone or betrayed them, a point that I value greatly. I always proceed on the principle that I am prepared to suffer before my friends. I assert that such forthrightness and stability in relations with those around us is at the core of all of our lives. Those who want me to break off relations with Gusinskiy, who are trying to force me to give up friendly relations with Kobzon, are trying to drive me to betrayal. They do not think about the fact that he who betrays a man today, may betray another tomorrow - the president, for example. We live in times when the strongest of people are being broken. I will most likely also be broken - yes, broken, but bend I will not!

It would be beneficial for our newspaper people, who are so disposed to analytical matters, to give some thought today to how the specific tasks of the executive power are changing. It is well known who the lawful bearers of this power are: the president, the prime minister, and the government. However, some kind of secondary growth has suddenly appeared. The executive power is becoming deformed, and is starting to develop in some different direction. One must look to see if this is some historical, objective unavoidability, or are there subjective motives or personal interests at work?

If this is a result of factors operating objectively, it signifies that the country is headed straight for an iron dictatorship. None of us need be told what a dictatorship in the land of the Rus is. There is only one recourse: All that is decent and worthy in our society must take a stand against this offshoot of reform. If personal factors are at work, of course, all will be much simpler. The president is obligated by his authority to define the

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functions of his own guard, and in doing so, he will have calmed our alarmed society. In any case, the decision should be made immediately, as what is currently taking place is inconsistent with the ideals of a law-governed state.

Newly Appointed Officials Profiled

954F1337A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 2

[Unattributed article: "New Appointments"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By edict of the RF President Sergey Belyayev has been appointed chairman of the RF State Committee on the Administration of State Property [Goskomimushchestvo].

Sergey Belyayev was born in Gatchina, Leningrad Oblast, in 1953. He graduated from the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute in 1977. He is a candidate of technical sciences and a specialist in hydro energy installations.

In 1991-1993 he held the post of deputy mayor of St. Petersburg.

In 1993-1994 he was deputy chairman of RF Goskomimushchestvo as well as general director of the Federal Bankruptcy Administration of RF Goskomimushchestvo.

In 1994 he became first deputy chairman of RF Goskomimushchestvo.

As early as October of last year Mr. Belyayev was the main claimant to the position of chairman of Goskomimushchestvo, but at that time the position went to Mr. Polevanov.

In the opinion of observers, the rapid ascent of Mr. Belyayev is explained, above all, by his launching of the mechanism of enterprise reorganization and bankruptcy and his identification of the main initiators of nonpayments.

By edict of the RF President Mikhail Krasnov has been appointed assistant to the president for legal matters.

Mikhail Aleksandrovich Krasnov was born in Moscow in 1949. In 1972 he graduated from the school of law at Moscow State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov. He is a doctor of juridical sciences.

At various times he has held the positions of docent at a legal institute and sector head at the Institute of State and the Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

In 1993 he became an associate in the administration of the RF President and consultant to the RF President's assistant for national security.

Mikhail Krasnov was presented as a candidate for the position of judge of the RF Constitutional Court, but his candidacy was not ratified.

Rybkin on Political Issues, Duma's Activities

954F1362A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 4

[Article by Ivan Rybkin, Chairman of the RF State Duma: "Ivan Rybkin: I Have Made the Decision To Run for the Duma Again"; followed by commentary by Sergey Tsekhmistrenko]

[FBIS Translated Text] **KOMMERSANT is continuing to acquaint its readers with the views of Russia's leading politicians on the country's most important current domestic policy issues (the first interview in this series, with Vladimir Shumeyko, speaker of the Federation Council, was published on 26 January). Interest in their positions is rising as the next election marathon approaches—according to transitional provisions of the Constitution, elections to the State Duma will occur in December of this year, and the presidential election will occur in June of next year. And although the election campaign has not yet been officially announced, it is already impossible to avoid certain issues: many actions of the present political elite, regardless of the intentions of the persons belonging to it, are viewed through the prism of the coming events. Today KOMMERSANT acquaints its readers with the viewpoint of Ivan Rybkin, chairman of Russia's State Duma.**

From the Preface to Ivan Rybkin's Book, *My Obrecheny na soglasiye* [We Are Doomed to Reach Accord]

Ivan Petrovich Rybkin was born 20 October 1946 in the village of Semigorovka, Ternovskiy Rayon, Voronezh Oblast. He is a Russian.

In 1968 he graduated from the Volgograd Agricultural Institute with distinction as a mechanical engineer. He worked as senior engineer on a kolkhoz. He served in the army. He taught for 17 years at the Volgograd Agricultural Institute. In 1974 he defended a dissertation and became a candidate of technical sciences.

From 1987-1994 he was first secretary of the Sovetskiy Rayon CPSU Committee in Volgograd, second secretary of the Volgograd Oblast CPSU Committee, head of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee's Department for Relations with Soviets of Peoples Deputies, and deputy chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the RF Communist Party. Since January 1994 he has been chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma.

I. Rybkin is firmly convinced of the fruitfulness of centralism for Russia's sociopolitical development. He has consistently worked to bring about lasting civil peace and accord in our fatherland. He relies on the historical continuity of Russian parliamentary government and favors an effective State Duma with a definite separation of powers and close cooperation among all branches of government. His ideal is a strong, great and democratic Russia.

A Little About Myself

[KOMMERSANT] You write in your book, *My obrecheny na soglasiye*, that you love farming. Do you have your own land now?

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[Rybkin] From 1979 until this year I had a parcel of six hundredths in Volgograd. I loved to work it, but this year I had to give it up: it had become overgrown with thistles and other weeds. I think that I will definitely have a piece of land outside Moscow.

[KOMMERSANT] It is said that you like chess.

[Rybkin] Yes, I have a second ranking. As for big-time chess, I have great respect for both Karpov and Kasparov. I think that two great masters should finally find accord, although their different views have done a lot to attract the interest of the chess world.

[KOMMERSANT] Cars are another hobby of yours. What sort of car do you have?

[Rybkin] A "Niner"—a VAZ-21091 with a "three" engine. Only I haven't had a chance to take it out in the past few years, although I have been driving since 1967. My deputy's duties have gotten in the way. I most likely can't even dream of another car.

[KOMMERSANT] Do you prefer to vacation in Russia or abroad?

[Rybkin] I'm accustomed to vacationing in Russia, in my native region. In my own—on the picturesque banks of the Khoper. And my wife's—just outside of Moscow. Incidentally, we do plant potatoes there and have supplied ourselves with them during the whole time I've been a deputy.

The Duma Has Done Much More in a Year Than Many People Think

No matter what you say, the State Duma today is the sole lawmaking institution in the country. We seek consent on literally every draft law, and that is no easy matter. In a year of work we succeeded in passing the first part of the Civil Code—incidentally, many of the world's parliaments have convened solely to draft such a code, and therefore one may consider that the year of the Duma's work has been justified by that alone. Other codes—Land, Water, Air, Criminal and Criminal Procedural—either have been passed in first reading, or the drafting of them has been completed. Particular mention should be made of the Code of Labor Laws—its passage is urgently needed if only because previously in the country there was only one employer, the state, and today the picture is entirely different. Election legislation is also in the works: key laws—on the election of State Duma deputies and of the president, and on referendums—have been passed in first reading. The law on local self-government will be discussed at an all-Russian conference to be held 17 February.

We have managed to develop an entirely new approach to the budget. It happened that our predecessors were unable to cope with that, with that "untamed horse." Consequently, certain guideposts were lost, and state bureaucrats found themselves simply without oversight. This year we have not simply been working with the budget since October, but today we are closer to adopting it than ever before. Let it be unpopular and tough, but it will be in keeping with the state of the country's economy on both the federal and regional levels.

I see our only sin to be that we have still not drafted a law on the formation of the Federation Council. There are different interpretations here. Some people propose seeking the solution outside the framework of the Constitution, but I believe that we must stay in its channel. Specifically, I think that the Federation Council should meet on a nonstanding basis, exercising the eight powers that the Constitution defines: naming the procurator general, choosing the deputy chairman of the Accounting Chamber and the judges of the Constitutional Court, and considering issues pertaining to the budget, war and peace and states of emergency. To deal with these matters, the Federation Council can meet on an irregular basis, like, say, the German Bundesrat: in translation from the German, its name means, precisely, "Federation Council." In my opinion it is the German experience—the Bundestag and the Bundesrat—rather than the American experience that is better.

The Duma Has More Than Enough Oversight Functions

It is often pointed out to me that the parliament has too few oversight functions. I do not think so. Albeit belatedly, we have begun to form an extremely important State Duma oversight institution—the RF Accounting Chamber. Its primary purpose is strict, comprehensive oversight over the fulfillment of the budget—both over the sources from which expenditure items are derived and over the expenditures themselves. The Accounting Chamber's oversight will be extremely thorough. And the reasoning based on the results of the Accounting Chamber's work will be extremely persuasive. Both for any government and for the president.

A second oversight institution is the human rights commissioner. Here matters are much more complicated. We elected such a commissioner, Sergey Adamovich Kovalev, a year ago. But we simply cannot get the corresponding law through the Duma—the personality factor has left its mark on the effort. I myself have voted for the adoption of that law. I have known Kovalev for five years now, and I find it fairly easy to work with him, although, in my view, his position on the Chechen crisis is somewhat one-sided, which I have told him repeatedly. Most likely we have something to reproach one another for—after all, we were members of the previous parliament, and the whole tragedy began back in September 1991, when militants broke into the Chechen parliament and beat up the deputies with metal bars, breaking their hands, legs, forearms, shoulders and collarbones. Both the Chechen parliament and president were elected illegitimately. That is the basis of the present conflict.

In general, back at the stage of adopting the present Constitution, the question arose as to which kind of

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Russia we would have—presidential or parliamentary. This question was decided by the Constitutional Conference in favor of a presidential government. This is only the second year now that we have been living under the Constitution. As for the recent attempts by a certain part of the Duma deputies to initiate a process of revising the Constitution, I would not hurry that. The Duma has the right to give its consent to the appointment of the premier or to his dismissal. And that is fairly strict control. I would not speak of the weakness of the parliament's control functions. I have already seen the desire to oversee everything and answer for everything here in Moscow, in the previous parliament. And we know how all that ended. I think that the separation of powers that we have today does not mean a confrontation among the branches of government. Opposition—yes, unquestionably. But other types of behavior—that purely Russian, irresistible urge just to do something for the sake of doing it—that desire has to be curbed. We must all act together. And I envision this "sleigh of cooperation" as a troika—the shaft horse, which is straining to pull the load, and the two outrunners, which can turn their heads to the side but, being harnessed in a single team known as Russia, ought to pull forward, along the path of progress.

It Is Not to Russia's Advantage to Hold Frequent Elections

The new series of elections is not far off. And here something must be said first and foremost, I believe, about the level of the components of the federation. The process of electing the legislative assemblies of the federation's components has dragged out for more than a year and a half. To this day, four of Russia's regions simply have no legislative bodies. And it is perfectly obvious that in December 1995 the components' legislative assemblies will simply not call elections, as was assumed from the outset. That is the first point.

Second, the president says: "The heads of administration whom I have appointed are working with me during the transitional period and together with me they will step down." But a new president will not be elected until June 1996. Consequently, in December the State Duma will, for all practical purposes, have to stand for election alone. And a situation may arise in which a State Duma is elected but the Federation Council is not. And the new Duma will have to have spend a half year, until June, "at pasture" in the legislative field.

That is what prompted my fears last fall, when I proposed combining elections of the president and the Duma and holding them in June 1996. And today I believe that if only the Duma deputies are elected, it will be extremely difficult to arouse a wave of voter participation. I think that the idea of combining the elections has not gone away of its own accord, but we, that is the deputies, will finish it off by passing the block of election laws. And I believe, in general, that it is not to Russia's advantage to hold elections too often: we spend immense amounts of money doing so—billions, trillions.

If We Had Been Admitted to the Council of Europe Two Years Ago, We Could Have Avoided the Chechen Tragedy

In characterizing Russia's present status in the world community, I would like to note that the Chechen events have not been used by the West as a pretext for crowding Russia out of the general stream of civilization. Although some deputies and part of the Russian public think and feel that they have. On the other hand, I will not conceal the fact that it has been difficult for the Soviet Union to have felt itself a "preparatory-class student" for admission to the Council of Europe for a year and a half, and then for Russia to have been in that position for two years now. It is always possible to find a pretext to "not admit," while the Council of Europe's own members are not without sin: Great Britain has Northern Ireland and the Falklands, France has New Caledonia, Turkey has the Kurds, and Germany has discrimination against guest workers. I want to be frank: if we had been admitted to the council of Europe after Ambartsumov and Kozyrev requested it in an official application on 6 May 1992, the Chechen events would not have occurred. If a European commission had come to Chechnya at that stage, it would have been able to suggest a solution—after all, a prophet is never honored in his own land. And we in many respects find ourselves in a situation of autarky. At the same time, the Baltics are being admitted to the Council of Europe. I would like to call attention to the fact that nationalism must not be allowed to have its way. The double standard is a reality, but the idea of creating a mono-ethnic state is fallacious and bloody.

A Tricky Question

[KOMMERSANT] Many people are saying today that the speaker of the lower chamber has totally subordinated his activities to the interests of the Kremlin.

[Rybkin] Maybe some people do say that. First one is criticized for one thing, then for another, but the truth, as always, lies somewhere in the middle.

[KOMMERSANT] During your year of presiding in the Duma, haven't you expected it to be dissolved? Haven't you feared, and don't you fear that today?

[Rybkin] I have not expected it, have not feared it, and do not expect it now. I know for an absolute certainty that all three branches of government have a vital stake in cooperation. Otherwise it will be impossible to pull such a country as Russia out of the mire of crisis.

[KOMMERSANT] Recently rumors have come up about an alleged agreement between the heads of the country's legislative and executive branches to cancel or postpone elections of the president and parliament. What can you report about this?

[Rybkin] The components of the federation may choose to do so. According to the transitional provisions of the Constitution, if two-thirds of the components, with their legislative and executive branches in agreement, express

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such a view and propose that the State Duma and Federation Council consider it, it will be considered. I would not call that a contract or a pact—it is all within the framework of the Constitution. Most likely, holding frequent elections is not to Russia's advantage, either.

[KOMMERSANT] Will you take part in parliamentary elections? If so, from which party, or as a single candidate in a single-seat district?

[Rybkin] I will take part in elections to the State Duma. Since I am thoroughly associated with faction of the Agrarian Party of Russia—the party of social democracy, partnership and peace—my future actions will depend on its decision. As we get closer to the time, I will make up my mind, too.

[KOMMERSANT] But you haven't given any thought to more, to the presidential election?

[Rybkin] It is premature to start the presidential race at this time, when another 18 months remains until the election of the head of state, and the president himself has not yet made a decision on this matter.

[KOMMERSANT] Does Rybkin have a team? If so, who are those people—Volgograders, Muscovites, or others?

[Rybkin] He does have. They are people from all of Russia.

Commentary by Sergey Tsekhmistrenko

Many experts are for some reason inclined today to see precisely Ivan Rybkin as the favorite in the future presidential campaign. And it is, generally speaking, understandable why—that is their profession. But Ivan Rybkin himself prefers to avoid candid comments on that subject right now. Goodness knows what could happen—anything is possible in Russia. After all, who would have suggested a year ago that a hitherto little-known leader of the Communists of Russia faction in the Supreme Soviet would become speaker of the new parliament? Then it was generally said that the chairman of the State Duma lacked not only any clear charisma, like Boris Yeltsin, say, but even any of the purely superficial qualities possessed by politicians of the most diverse caliber—from Vladimir Shumeyko to Vladimir Zhirinovskiy. But with the passage of just a little time, it suddenly turned out that the qualities Rybkin possesses—reasonableness, calm and the ability to find compromise solutions—were precisely what the others lacked. Rybkin imperceptibly entered every conceivable popularity rating of politicians, firmly establishing himself there on the upper levels. And in the Duma he simply has no equal: the latest February survey by the Center for the Study of Russia's Political Culture put him in first place without qualification, and far ahead of the rest.

Consequently, back last summer people started talking about Rybkin as a possible candidate for the top office in the state. The speaker himself put a stop to and continues to put a stop to (and possibly will put a stop to in the future, as well) these proposals, which, generally speaking, is understandable. First of all, to openly declare one's decision to run for president today means to automatically sign one's own political death warrant. Second, for some reason it occurs to no one that the speaker may quite sincerely not yearn to occupy the main Kremlin office and may not yearn to in the future. However, regardless of his present position, politicians from all camps are taking a look at his candidacy and will continue to take a look at it. Under certain circumstances the centrist Rybkin would please both leftists and rightists and both parliamentary and nonparliamentary forces as a compromise figure at the helm of state.

Granted, probably no one should hope to be able to control Rybkin: in recent years he has repeatedly demonstrated that when it is to his advantage he will stick to his guns to the end, preferring to make concessions only on small points. Take, for example, the question of postponing the parliamentary elections and combining them with the presidential election. Put forward last autumn, this initiative of Rybkin's was for all practical purposes rejected by the Kremlin. But he has not backed away from it to this day. Just as he has not backed away from the idea that the components of the Federation are capable of deciding this question by submitting a proposal on the matter to the supreme bodies of representative power. And his motif has remained unchanged: Russia cannot afford too frequent elections.

At the same time, upon close examination the speaker's outwardly strong qualities are also his weakness from the standpoint of an election campaign. Rybkin is not a fighter; he is a "workhorse." It would be hard for him to win in an open clash with flashier rivals. He lacks the sort of weight on a statewide scale that the current president has. He is not a populist, and therefore he will never win Zhirinovskiy's laurels. He is not a defender of the "insulted and the injured," and therefore he will not win the votes of Zyuganov's supporters. And today he does not have the sort of support in the regions that Shumeyko, for example, has. The only path that could lead him to the summit of the political Olympus is the slow and painstaking inculcation in the electorate of the notion that precisely his candidacy is the optimal one. But that could be done only if two conditions are fulfilled. First of all, if that inculcation takes place under the "sterile conditions" of a moratorium (in one form or another) on political fighting. That might be achieved only by cancelling or postponing the 1996 elections (by persistently arguing for that postponement, Rybkin, whether deliberately or not, has been confirming, as it were, the feasibility of such proposals). And second, if precisely he is chosen then by Yeltsin as a successor. But all this is nothing more than a hypothesis, and a relatively improbable one, at that. What is more probable is something entirely different: Rybkin will continue to put his stakes on working in the parliament.

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Pre-Election State of Political Parties, Movements Surveyed

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[Article by Gleb Cherkasov: "Political Parties and Movements 10 Months Before the Elections—Many-Sided Opposition Organized Against the President and the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The statement of the deputy chairman of Tsentrizbirkom [Central Electoral Commission], Aleksandr Ivanchenko, that parliamentary and presidential elections will take place at the times stipulated by the Constitution became a de facto announcement of the pre-election campaign in Russia. However, preparations for it have been in full swing for a long time: new political parties and movements were and are being created, while representatives of the formations which already exist were and are conducting talks on possible pre-election blocs. However, the time for striking final and irrevocable alliances is still ahead.

The list of political parties, movements, and associations offered for readers' attention does not claim to be exhaustively complete. Changes in political life frequently create the oddest alliances and destroy the strongest coalitions.

Communists and Agrarians

The most powerful communist organization in Russia is the KPRF [Russian Federation Communist Party] (leader, Gennadiy Zyuganov), which has a large Duma faction and a far-flung network of powerful regional organizations. Moreover, success in local elections followed the communists in a number of regions. The party diligently avoids any revelation of internal disagreements.

In speaking of the KPRF, we must certainly mention the Agrarian Party of Russia (leader, Mikhail Lapshin), one of the closest, oldest allies of the communists. Despite certain disagreements which have arisen and do arise between the Duma factions of the agrarians and the communists, the soundness of their political bloc is beyond question.

Besides the KPRF, there are other communist organizations too: the RKRP [Russian Communist Workers' Party] (Viktor Anpilov—Sergey Tyulkin), Working Russia (Viktor Burdyugov), the SKP-KPSS [Union of Communist Parties-CPSU] (Oleg Shenin), and so forth. It is difficult to talk of their influence among the masses—these political formations have not yet gone through the baptism of elections.

Patriotic Parties and Movements

At the present time, the most active organizations in this part of the political spectrum are the following: the Russian National Union (ROS) headed by State Duma [GD] deputy Sergey Baburin; the National Republican Party of Russia (leader, GD deputy Nikolay Lysenko); the World Power Party and the Officers' Union (Stanislav Terekhov heads both structures); the "Soyuz" [Union] Movement, the Liberal Patriotic Party "Vozrozhdeniye" [Renaissance] headed by Mr. Skurlatov, the "Derzhava" [World Power] social-patriotic movement (leader, Aleksandr Rutskoy), and the National Salvation Front (leaders, Ilya Konstantinov and GD deputy Viktor Kobelev). The National Labor Party created on the basis of the National Association of Russian Trade Unions (leader, Aleksandr Alekseyev) should also be singled out. Other than the formations enumerated above, there are other organizations in the patriotic movement which for now may be safely classified among the ranks of "couch parties."

The real potential of the patriotic associations to this day remains a mystery to virtually all observers.

During the time which passed since elections in the Federal Assembly, the patriots just could not manage to create a unified structure like the 1992-1993 model of the National Salvation Front. The "Soglasiye vo imya Rossii" [Accord in the Name of Russia] Movement was fated to join the list of stillborn undertakings, and, in addition, the patriotic organizations themselves took a fairly indirect part in implementing the project. The attempt to form a patriots' faction in the State Duma also ended in failure—the "Rossiyskiy put" [Russian Path] group just could not manage to gather the needed number of deputies under its banners. However, the hope of uniting the entire patriotic opposition remains: in recent weeks work has been done on creating a Coordinating Center of Opposition Organizations of Russia. The World Power Party and the ROS, which signed an agreement on mutual cooperation, are an example to the others.

Recently, radically minded patriotic organizations—Russian National Unity (Aleksandr Barkashov), the National Bolshevik Party (Eduard Limonov), and the movement Russian Breakthrough (Yegor Letov)—have distanced themselves somewhat from the general patriotic movement. Although they cannot boast large numbers, the presence of charismatic figures in this wing of the opposition may bring them certain dividends in the coming elections. Moreover, the average age of their activists is around 30, which favorably distinguishes these organizations from all the others.

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia—Party of Zhirinovskiy (LDPR-PZh) stands alone among the patriotic associations. Despite the fact that Mr. Zhirinovskiy has not managed to fully develop the stunning success he achieved in the elections of 12 December 1994, the LDPR remains the most influential organization among the nationalist associations. However, the very fact that only two deputies from all the LDPR factions made it through the single mandate districts (among them Mr. Zhirinovskiy himself) is evidence showing that the

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regional LDPR organizations are not too strong. However, during the year since the elections, Zhirinovskiy's party has been able to set up major primary organizations.

Centrist Parties and Movements

The Congress of Russian Communities ["obshchina"] [KRO] belongs more to the ranks of the right centrist organizations than to the patriotic part of the political spectrum. The KRO is trying to distance itself somewhat from other patriotic organizations without at the same time rejecting certain patriotic values.

After the chairman of the Duma committee on economic policy, Sergey Glazyev, became leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, the DPR also began to move to the right center. It is not without reason that the Democratic Party intends to conclude an agreement on cooperation with the KRO. Both organizations maintain friendly relations with Yuriy Skokov's Federation of Commodity Producers of Russia (FTR). The DPR remains one of the largest political parties of Russia and its regional organizations operate in more than 50 regions of the RF. Both the DPR and the KRO are in de facto opposition to the government and the president.

The Party of Russian Unity and Accord—PRYeS (leader, Sergey Shakhray), the movement "Regiony Rossii" [Regions of Russia] [RR] headed by Vladimir Medvedev which was recently created on the base of the Duma faction New Regional Policy, and the voter association Russian Civic Union [RGS], formed by the Party of the Majority (Vyacheslav Grechnev and Feliks Yemelin), the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (Arkadiy Volskiy), and other parties and movements are trying to adhere to right center positions. PRYeS, the RR, and the RGS are completely loyal to the government and the president. All three organizations insist that their main electoral base is in the regions, but how true that is will only become clear during the election campaign.

The Russian Social Democratic Union [RSDS] (leaders, Vasiliy Lipitskiy, Aleksandr Obolenskiy, and Igor Yugens) was created in the fall of last year by the Russian Social Democratic People's Party, the Social Democratic Party of Russia (Obolenskiy's party), and other smaller organizations of the social democratic ilk. Furthermore, the RSDS is seriously working with trade unions. Reliance on trade unions is also characteristic of the Socialist Workers Party [SPT] (Lyudmila Vartazarova). Relations between the socialists and the social democrats certainly cannot be called either friendly or hostile. The SPT also has experience in stable and long-term cooperation with the FTR. Both the SPT and the RSDS are in opposition to the president and the government.

Democratic Organizations

The following formations should be singled out among political parties and movements adhering to a "democratic" position: the all-Russian association "Yabloko," created on the base of the Duma faction of the same name and the Russian Movement of Democratic Reforms [RDDR] (leader, Gavriil Popov). These organizations oppose the governmental course, while "Yabloko" in addition insists that democratic parties and movements cannot support President Yeltsin either. As for the organizational potential of the RDDR and "Yabloko," there are many more questions here than answers: the RDDR was unable to pass the 5-percent barrier in past elections, while the relative success of Grigoriy Yavlinskiy was largely the result of the efforts of the Social Democratic Party of Russia [SDPR] (Anatoliy Golov's party) and the Republican Party of Russia (leader, Vladimir Lysenko). After the Republicans refused to support Mr. Yavlinskiy, "Yabloko" can count only on the social democrats, who have been weakened by the creation of the RSDS, and on the party "Demokraticheskoy alternativy" [of the Democratic Alternative] [DA], which was created by some of the Republicans who disagreed with Vladimir Lysenko's course.

The United Democratic Center (ODTs), which is now headed by Ilya Roytman, Irina Zubkevich, and others, can also be classified among the democratic opposition. The ODTs was created as an association of regional democrats. Incidentally, recently the ODTs has been supporting Boris Yeltsin to a greater degree, in particular on the Chechnya question.

A group of liberal organizations headed by Boris Fedorov and Irina Khakamada is also more in opposition to the president and the government. At present the organizational potential of the liberals is small, but Mr. Fedorov and Ms. Khakamada are constantly making agitation trips around the country and, according to certain reports, are managing to attract new supporters. The Federal Party "Demokraticheskaya Rossiya" [Democratic Russia] [FPDR] (leaders, Lev Ponomarev and Galina Starovoytova) refused to support the government and the president after the Chechnya events. The FPDR managed to retain some of the regional organizations of the former DemRossiya [Democratic Russia].

"Demokraticheskiy vybor Rossii" [Russia's Democratic Choice] [DVR] (Yegor Gaydar) remains loyal to the president and the government, at the same time sharply criticizing them. The DVR managed to assemble quite a few regional democratic primary organizations. However, recently many of the regionals have begun to express dissatisfaction with both inadequate financing and the center's inattention to their problems. Moreover, not all the regional organizations supported Yegor Gaydar's position on the Chechnya events. Other primary organizations, in contrast, express dissatisfaction with the fact that the DVR, in spite of everything, supports Boris Yeltsin. It is not impossible that there will be, if not a split, then a certain number of "splinters" of both the party and the faction.

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In addition to those enumerated above, in this part of the political spectrum there are other parties and movements which have known better days. Among them are the Party of Economic Freedom [PES] (leader, Konstantin Borovoy), the Democratic Union of Russia (Valeriya Novodvorskaya), and others.

Others

The Russian multiparty system has always been known for a certain lack of restraint. At the present time such odd formations as the Party of Auto Lovers, the Party of Love, the Party of Human Security, the Party of Pelmeni Lovers, and others are operating (or not operating). The Party of Poverty and the Party of Beer Lovers should be singled out in this enumeration.

The Party of Poverty [PB], which is headed by businessman Nikolay Ayvazyan, could probably have been classified with the socialist part of the political spectrum, but a certain eccentricity of the party measures and its emphatic distancing of itself from other political organizations permit us to move the PB outside the framework of traditional political life. As yet it is difficult to judge the party's prospects, but Mr. Ayvazyan possesses all the characteristics to become a charismatic leader.

The Party of Beer Lovers [PLP] (Konstantin Kalachev and Dmitriy Shestakov) is also known for its extravagant behavior. The PLP probably belongs in the democratic wing. Recently the beer lovers have attracted the attention of many politicians and second-level administrators. The PLP's popularity is growing both because of the simple and accessible slogans and because of a successful advertising campaign. Incidentally, recently a political rival to the PLP appeared, the Party of Sobriety.

Poll Rates Russia's Leading Politicians for January

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[Article by Aleksandr Kinsburskiy: "The Leading 100 Russian Politicians in January; Three Generals in the Top Five: Grachev, Dudayev, Korzhakov"; and comments by Vitaliy Marsov]

[FBIS Translated Text] In 1995 the Vox Populi Public Opinion Research Service and NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA will continue the monthly polls to determine the 100 most influential Russian politicians, in order of prominence (from 1 to 100), and an average score signifying the "weight" of each. In contrast to earlier appraisals (in 1993 and 1994), the rating will now be based on the degree of influence and on the value (positive or negative) of its impact on Russia's domestic and foreign policy in the past month.

The preliminary list of names included those who had been named as the leading politicians in December last year and another 50 statesmen and public spokesmen who had been prominent in national events in January this year. The degree and value of their influence on Russian policy were determined by experts—administrators of central news media, prominent political correspondents, and political analysts (see addendum).

The degree of influence was measured in the earlier way, on a scale from 1 to 10, with 10 signifying the maximum and 1 signifying the minimum. If, according to the experts, a politician played no role at all in events in the past month, he would be given a score of zero. The final list of Russian politicians who were most influential in political affairs, according to the experts, in January is based on these scores (with and without the influence rating). The survey was conducted on 24-26 January this year.

Number	Last name, first name, patronymic	Average score		
		January	January score with influence rating	December
1	Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich	8.94	-4.05	(8.84)
2	Chernomyrdin, Viktor Stepanovich	8.02	+6.95	(8.06)
3	Grachev, Pavel Sergeyevich	7.64	-6.98	(7.30)
4	Dudayev, Dzhokhar Musayevich	7.62	-7.13	(7.73)
5	Korzhakov, Aleksandr Vasilyevich	7.43	-6.67	(7.06)
6	Kovalev, Sergey Adamovich	7.26	+4.57	(5.42)
7	Stepashin, Sergey Vadimovich	6.55	-2.09	(6.72)
8	Soskovets, Oleg Nikolayevich	6.42	-1.15	(7.12)
9	Yegorov, Nikolay Dmitriyevich	6.38	-6.26	(6.69)
10	Ilyushin, Viktor Vasilyevich	6.33	+0.52	(6.32)
11	Luzhkov, Yuriy Mikhaylovich	6.32	+5.91	(6.94)
12	Rybkin, Ivan Petrovich	6.28	+2.40	(6.68)
13	Shumeyko, Vladimir Filippovich	6.26	-1.95	(6.78)
14	Yerin, Viktor Fedorovich	6.23	-4.27	(6.98)
15-16	Chubays, Anatoliy Borisovich	6.17	-2.21	(6.30)

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Number	Last name, first name, patronymic	Average score		
		January	January score with influence rating	December
15-16	Lobov, Oleg Ivanovich	6.17	+1.85	(6.22)
17	Kozyrev, Andrey Vladimirovich	6.04	+1.50	(6.50)
18	Filatov, Sergey Aleksandrovich	5.74	+1.22	(6.36)
19	Barsukov, Mikhail Ivanovich	5.59	-3.95	(5.57)
20	Gaydar, Yegor Timurovich	5.51	+2.22	(5.70)
21	Shakhray, Sergey Mikhaylovich	5.36	-0.84	(4.70)
22	Yushenkov, Sergey Nikolayevich	5.32	+2.60	(5.64)
23	Zhirinovskiy, Vladimir Volfovich	5.28	-3.98	(5.25)
24	Aushev, Ruslan Sultanovich	5.19	+3.93	(5.57)
25	Zyuganov, Gennadiy Andreyevich	5.13	-0.51	(4.92)
26	Ilyushenko, Aleksey Nikolayevich	5.06	-3.45	(4.61)
27-28	Livshits, Aleksandr Yakovlevich	4.98	+3.19	(4.80)
27-28	Yasin, Yevgeniy Grigoryevich	4.98	+4.92	(5.39)
29	Abdulatipov, Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich	4.92	+4.70	(5.18)
30	Panskov, Vladimir Georgiyevich	4.84	+2.61	(4.98)
31	Poptsov, Oleg Maksimovich	4.83	+3.52	(4.06)
32	Yavlinskiy, Grigoriy Alekseyevich	4.75	+3.80	(6.02)
33	Gromov, Boris Vsevolodovich	4.53	+3.20	(4.98)
34	Baturin, Yuriy Mikhaylovich	4.53	+1.80	(5.25)
35	Primakov, Yevgeniy Maksimovich	4.49	+3.08	(5.20)
36	Lebed, Aleksandr Ivanovich	4.47	+3.39	(5.00)
37	Shaymiyev, Mintimer Sharipovich	4.40	+3.87	(4.64)
38	Kiselev, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich	4.38	+3.44	(4.02)
39	Shoygu, Sergey Kuzhugetovich	4.32	+4.30	(4.92)
40	Gonchar, Nikolay Nikolayevich	4.20	+4.23	(4.08)
41	Aleksiy II	4.17	+4.02	(4.60)
42	Galazov, Akhsarbek Khadzhimurzayevich	4.10	+2.66	(5.17)
43-44	Nemtsov, Boris Yefimovich	4.06	+3.27	(4.18)
43-44	Satarov, Georgiy Aleksandrovich	4.06	+1.39	(4.69)
45	Paramonova, Tatyana Vladimirovna	4.04	+2.91	(3.91)
46	Nikolayev, Andrey Ivanovich	3.98	+3.56	(4.27)
47	Glazyev, Sergey Yuryevich	3.94	+1.76	(4.68)
48	Dolgolaptev, Anatoliy Vasilyevich	3.90	+0.97	(3.54)
49	Fedorov, Nikolay Vasilyevich	3.88	+1.81	(3.02)
50-52	Golembiovskiy, Igor Nestorovich	3.85	+2.90	(3.22)
50-52	Kolesnikov, Mikhail Petrovich	3.85	+1.78	(4.35)
50-52	Skokov, Yuriy Vladimirovich	3.85	-0.03	(4.22)
53	Kovalev, Valentin Alekseyevich	3.83	-1.24	(2.93)
54	Fedorov, Boris Grigoryevich	3.81	+0.72	(4.62)
55	Yakovlev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich	3.71	-1.33	(3.96)
56	Kostyakov, Vyacheslav Vasilyevich	3.67	-0.07	(4.26)
57	Nevzorov, Aleksandr Glebovich	3.62	-1.74	(2.47)
58	Nosovets, Sergey Anatolyevich	3.55	-1.17	(3.67)
59-60	Zaveryukha, Aleksandr Kharlaminovich	3.49	+1.16	(3.71)
59-60	Shafranik, Yuriy Konstantinovich	3.49	+2.00	(4.24)

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Number	Last name, first name, patronymic	Average score		
		January	January score with influence rating	December
61	Polloranin, Mikhail Nikiforovich	3.45	-1.45	(3.88)
62	Nikolayev, Mikhail Yefimovich	3.44	+2.97	(3.57)
63	Sobchak, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich	3.42	+1.40	(3.86)
64	Yarov, Yuriy Fedorovich	3.38	+2.70	(4.35)
65-66	Ilyukhin, Viktor Ivanovich	3.37	+0.54	(3.65)
65-66	Lapshin, Mikhail Ivanovich	3.37	+0.54	(3.91)
67-68	Kokoshin, Andrey Afanasyevich	3.35	+2.32	(4.27)
67-68	Lukin, Vladimir Petrovich	3.35	+2.95	(3.66)
69	Zadornov, Mikhail Mikhaylovich	3.33	+3.06	(3.09)
70	Sergeyev, Valentin Mikhaylovich	3.27	-0.88	(4.34)
71-72	Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr Isayevich	3.25	+2.21	(4.16)
71-72	Stepanov, Viktor Nikolayevich	3.25	+2.88	(3.95)
73	Davydov, Oleg Dmitriyevich	3.18	+1.96	(3.82)
74	Pamfilova, Ella Aleksandrovna	3.17	+1.50	(3.60)
75	Tarpishchev, Shamil Anvarovich	3.13	-0.84	(3.78)
76	Volskiy, Arkadiy Ivanovich	3.10	+2.76	(3.52)
77	Rakhimov, Murtaza Gubaydullovich	3.09	+1.67	(3.40)
78	Shaposhnikov, Yevgeniy Ivanovich	3.08	+0.72	(2.80)
79	Pochinok, Aleksandr Petrovich	2.98	+2.38	(3.26)
80	Pain, Emil Abramovich	2.92	+1.80	(3.51)
81	Babichev, Vladimir Stepanovich	2.86	+0.57	(-)
82-84	Boyko, Oleg Viktorovich	2.80	+0.96	(3.41)
82-84	Mityukov, Mikhail Alekseyevich	2.80	+1.84	(3.64)
82-84	Tuleyev, Aman-geldy Moldagazyyevich	2.80	-0.32	(3.53)
85	Zolotukhin, Boris Andreyevich	2.79	+1.27	(2.78)
86	Kotenkov, Aleksandr Alekseyevich	2.78	-1.07	(2.88)
87-88	Vengerovskiy, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich	2.77	-0.29	(3.48)
87-88	Sheynis, Viktor Leonidovich	2.77	+0.75	(2.59)
89-90	Lakhova, Yekaterina Filippovna	2.76	+2.11	(3.33)
89-90	Resin, Vladimir Iosifovich	2.76	+2.00	(3.12)
91	Tyazhlov, Anatoliy Stepanovich	2.72	+1.88	(3.30)
92	Boldyrev, Yuriy Yuryevich	2.71	+2.61	(3.24)
93	Stroyev, Yegor Semenovich	2.67	+1.44	(3.57)
94	Romanov, Petr Vasilyevich	2.65	-0.70	(3.30)
95	Anpilov, Viktor Ivanovich	2.63	-2.51	(2.82)
96-97	Burbulis, Gennadiy Eduardovich	2.61	-0.10	(3.33)
96-97	Mavrodi, Sergey Panteleyevich	2.61	-2.05	(3.10)
98	Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeyevich	2.60	+0.58	(3.25)
99	Fedulova, Alentina Vasilyevna	2.59	+1.59	(3.28)
100	Popov, Gavriil Kharitonovich	2.56	+0.22	(3.00)

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Political Olympus

The rating system familiar to regular readers of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, listing the top 100 politicians in order of influence, is represented by the column of figures on the left in the table. The next column to the right contains **fundamentally new** information—a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the role of Russia's leading politicians by experts. Figures for the previous month, December 1994, are presented in the third column.

We should begin by pointing out the main differences between the January and December performance ratings. In spite of the relatively stable position of the two most influential Russian politicians—President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin—there were particularly noticeable changes in the top 10. This time the third place was taken by Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, and not by Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev (4). The top five also included Aleksandr Korzhakov, the head of the Russian president's security service, who knocked First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets (8) of the RF Government out of fifth place. Finally, Sergey Kovalev (6), the RF president's human rights commissioner; Nikolay Yegorov (9), former head of the territorial administration of federal agencies of the executive branch of government in Chechnya, vice premier, and minister for nationalities affairs and regional policy; and Viktor Ilyushin (10), the RF president's aide, were among the 10 most influential Russian politicians for the first time.

The ratings of the previously mentioned Sergey Kovalev and State Duma Deputy Aleksandr Nevzorov (57) displayed the highest rise (more than a whole point) in January. Grigoriy Yavlinskiy (32), the leader of the "YaBLoko" parliamentary faction and the political party of the same name, President Akhsarbek Galazov (42) of the Republic of North Ossetia (Alania), and Valentin Sergeyev (70), head of the RF Government Press Service, displayed equally impressive losses of "weight."

Eight names were added to the list of the top 100 Russian politicians in the first month of this year: the previously mentioned Aleksandr Nevzorov, new Minister of Justice Valentin Kovalev (53), former Minister of Defense and the representative of the RF president in "Rosvooruzheniye" Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov (78), new Chief of Staff of the RF Government Vladimir Babichev (81) *(because there is a general named Babichev among the leaders of the army operation in Chechnya, we are not certain that the two men were not confused in the minds of some experts; the experts receive a list of politicians, stating their names, but not their official titles)*, State Duma Deputy Boris Zolotukhin (85), Deputy Minister for Nationalities Affairs and Regional Policy Aleksandr Kotenkov (86), State Duma Deputy Viktor Sheynis (87-88), and leader of the Russian Communist Workers Party Viktor Anpilov (95).

The names of Vladimir Lysenko, Sergey Baburin, Vladimir Isakov, Aleksandr Rutskoy, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Eduard Rossel, and Aleksandr M. Yakovlev were dropped from the list in January.

When we analyze the middle column of figures *(the average score, plus the assessment of Russian political influence, was calculated on a scale twice the size of the customary 10-point one. In principle, these assessments can range from +10 (maximum positive influence) to -10 (maximum negative influence). In reality the absolute (modal) value of the assessment with a plus or minus sign is generally lower than the corresponding score without the influence rating, because some of the pluses and minuses "offset" each other during the calculation of the average score. There can be exceptions to this rule, however. Nikolay Gonchar (40), for example, had an average score of 4.20, but his score with the influence rating was +4.23. The reason was that a relatively small percentage of the experts, who had difficulty making unequivocal (positive or negative) assessments of the role of the chairman of the Federation Council Budget Committee, were inclined to give him lower scores than the rest of the experts, who unanimously described his contribution to Russian politics as positive)*, it is easy to see that the highest positive rating for participation in Russian politics was given to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (+6.95), and the lowest negative rating was given to President Dzhokhar Dudayev of Chechnya (-7.13). For the majority (over 70 percent) of the leading Russian politicians, the average score plus the influence rating ranges from +3.00 to -3.00.

A comparison of the first two columns of figures provides much more food for thought. It is easy to see that there are several possible combinations of scores with and without the influence rating. These different combinations reveal the basic types (six in all) of assessments of the role of Russian politicians: 1) strong and positive influence; 2) strong and negative; 3) strong and balanced (a relatively high average score without the influence rating and a relatively low one with the rating); 4) weak and positive; 5) weak and negative; 6) weak and balanced (when the average score with the rating is close to zero). If the boundary between high and low assessments is taken as an average score equivalent to 3.00, there are 20 politicians of the first type, 9 of the second, 49 of the third, 10 of the fourth, 3 of the fifth, and 9 of the sixth on the list. Therefore, the role of most of the leading Russian politicians was not given an unequivocally positive or negative rating by the experts, which is probably consistent with today's realities at the top of the political Mt. Olympus.

Another new feature of the poll of experts in January was the more specific wording of the final question pertaining to the next presidential election: **"Which of the Russian politicians whose names are on the preliminary list (150 individuals) has the greatest chance of winning the Russian presidential election if it were to be held soon?"** The distribution of responses was the following

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(the number of experts naming different politicians):

Name	Number
V. Zhirinovskiy	24
V. Chernomyrdin	24
G. Yavlinskiy	21
B. Yeltsin	19
A. Lebed	13
G. Zyuganov	11
A. Rutskoy	8
Yu. Luzhkov	6
I. Rybkin	6
B. Gromov	5
B. Fedorov	4
Ye. Gaydar	2
Yu. Skokov	2

Other individuals named by the experts—with one vote each—were A. Volskiy, S. Glazyev, M. Lapshin, S. Mavrodi, B. Nemtsov, D. Rogozin, P. Romanov, A. Solzhenitsyn, O. Soskovets, S. Shakhray, and V. Shumeyko.

The opinions of the experts with regard to the possible victors in a presidential race are quite clear from their responses, but we have to consider that the election campaign is only beginning, it will be a long time before the next Russian presidential election (if it is held on schedule), and that is why changes in the experts' view of the balance of power are quite possible.

Vitaliy Marsov

Tendencies

Nothing has a more invigorating effect on politics than elections and wars. We will have to wait a long time for our next election, but the situation with regard to wars has been the usual in Russia recently. This immediately enhanced the prestige of the politicians in civilian clothes and military uniforms who have a direct relationship to the war in Chechnya or to the public opposition to this war. Sergey Kovalev, who has become a symbol of the anti-Kremlin line (in this area), rose to sixth place, which certainly would have been unimaginable under any other circumstances. On the other hand, Andrey Kozyrev, who only publicizes decisions made by other politicians, dropped to 17th place, although he officially occupies one of the key government offices.

The most interesting thing about our January poll, however, was not these fairly obvious tendencies, but the new feature that was added—the assessment of the politicians' influence on the state of affairs in the country (primarily, of course, in connection with the Chechen crisis). If we single out the leaders in terms of positive and negative influence, the two lists are highly indicative.

The following politicians, according to the experts, had the most negative influence:

1. Dudayev (-7.13)
2. Grachev (-6.98)
3. Korzhakov (-6.67)
4. Yegorov (-6.26)
5. Yerin (-4.27)
6. Yeltsin (-4.05)
7. Zhirinovskiy (-3.98)
8. Barsukov (-3.95)
9. Ilyushenko (-3.45)

(The group of politicians with from 3 to 4 points of negative influence includes members of the government and presidential administration and members of extreme opposition groups.)

Maximum positive influence was exerted by the following:

1. Chernomyrdin (+6.95)
2. Luzhkov (+5.91)
3. Yasin (+4.92)
4. Abdulatipov (+4.70)
5. Sergey Kovalev (+4.57)
6. Shoygu (+4.30)
7. Gonchar (+4.23)
8. Aleksiy II (+4.02)

(Around 10 of the most diverse politicians, mostly regional representatives, received a positive rating of from 3 to 4 points.)

It is completely obvious that virtually all of the leaders in terms of negative influence are organizers (on both sides) or active participants in the military confrontation in Chechnya. The "positive leaders," on the other hand, are either "doves," critics of the military operation, or "moderate" reformists.

Whatever we think of the experts' specific assessments, it is clear that the military confrontation has dramatically polarized the behavior of politicians and the attitudes toward them. There is no question that this will eventually have a substantial effect on the choices of voters as well. In this sense, the war in Chechnya is apparently the start of the future political rise of some and decline of others.

Addendum

Board of Experts

Chief editors and political correspondents:

1. I.S. Arbuzov ("Moskva" TRK); 2. T.A. Vasilyeva (Radio Russia); 3. G.G. Vodolazov (MEGAPOLIS journal); 4. P.I. Voshchanov (NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA); 5. O.B. Dobrodeyev (NTV); 6. T.N. Zamyatina (ITAR-TASS); 7. V.N. Ignatenko (ITAR-TASS); 8. A.A. Ilyin (PRAVDA); 9. P.V. Kasparov (ITA); 10. N.N. Kishkin (TRUD); 11. V.M. Kulistikov (Radio Liberty); 12. O.R. Latsis (IZVESTIYA); 13. A.G. Lysenko (VGTRK); 14. A.G. Malkin (Ostankino

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Political analysts:

1. A.A. Galkin (Gorbachev Foundation); 2. G.G. Diligenskiy (Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences); 3. Ya.N. Zasurskiy (Moscow State University); 4. A.G. Zdravomyslov (Russian Independent Institute of Social and Ethnic Affairs); 5. S.A. Karaganov (Europe Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences); 6. A.A. Kara-Murza (Philosophy Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences); 7. A.V. Kiva (Oriental Studies Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences); 8. A.I. Kovler (Institute of Government and Law, Russian Academy of Sciences); 9. Yu.A. Krasin (Gorbachev Foundation); 10. V.B. Kuvaldin (Gorbachev Foundation); 11. N.I. Lapin (Philosophy Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences); 12. D.V. Olshanskiy (Strategic Analysis and Forecasting Center); 13. L.A. Openkin (Fund "For Truth in Politics"); 14. G.A. Pashkov ("Mneniye" Service); 15. A.M. Salmin (Parliamentary Procedure Research Center); 16. V.A. Tishkov (Ethnography and Anthropology Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences); 17. A.P. Torshin (RF Government Staff); 18. Zh.T. Toshchenko (Sociopolitical Research Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences); 19. K.G. Kholodkovskiy (Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences); 20. A.N. Chumikov (Conflict Analysis Center, Russian Academy of Sciences); and others.

Rutskoy Hopes To Form New 'Derzhava' Party

954Q0131A Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Lev Sigal under the rubric "Party House": "How Rutskoy Was Expelled From 'Rutskoy's Party'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A series of splits has overwhelmed almost all Russian proto-parties which emerged in 1990-1991, from the Republicans and members of the SDK [possibly Social Democratic Confederation] to the VKPB [All-Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks]. This phenomenon is natural in the changed historical conditions: "other times, other tunes" and new political configurations. The expanding split of the Russian Social Democratic People's Party (the former "Communists for Democracy") has become quite contentious.

The ex-vice president A. V. Rutskoy is cheerful and energetic. At the prestigious Slavyanskaya Hotel on Friday, he conducted his first press conference in half a year, where he informed Russian and foreign journalists that the Duma is simply a social event and all Russian parties taken together are of no benefit to the Fatherland, while all of Rutskoy's potential rivals in the presidential race are engaged in political "goofing around." Consequently, Mr. Rutskoy does not see any partners for himself in politics and decides, when forming his own "Derzhava" movement, to introduce individual membership registration.

On the ideological level, he has firmly chosen the "white patriotic" niche, having quarreled with his former allies from the RF Communist Party. It is interesting that A. V. Rutskoy's declarations now coincide almost word for word with V. V. Zhirinovskiy's statements. For example, both propose this recipe for returning the neighboring countries to the bosom of great Russia: "Let us close the borders and they will come crawling on their knees." True, everything is even simpler with Chechnya, in General Rutskoy's opinion: We just have to remove Boris Yeltsin from the office of president and Dzhokhar Dudayev will immediately become a loyal Russian citizen.

But as an answer to the NYeG [NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA] columnist's question, whether there are disagreements with the leader of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] in programs specifically, Aleksandr Vladimirovich himself merely called Mr. Zhirinovskiy an "abortion victim" (although the latter, incidentally, secured Rutskoy's amnesty). In other words, it is assumed that the voter will prefer the ex-vice president to the foremost liberal democrat exclusively because of the former's unquestionable personality traits.

However, since Rutskoy lost his main resource, the chair of vice president, and then the fame of his Lefortovo prison term, many comrades in the party no longer feel their former reverence for him. Moreover, it seems that Rutskoy has even been expelled from "Rutskoy's party." True, he does not consider this to be the case at all, and the party needs to keep him if for no other reason than because a law is now under discussion which would permit only parties registered at least half a year in advance to participate in the elections.

It all began when ex-vice president General Rutskoy held the OPUS-2 on an inner party scale, attempting to make sure that from then on he could be both the chairman of the party and of its governing board at the same time, supplanting Vasiliy Lipitskiy, who had lost his trust. Against the wishes of Lipitskiy's governing board, he tried to convene the Federal Council of the RSDNP [Russian Social Democratic People's Party]. According to his supporters' claim, 41 of the 78 members of the high tribunal came at the general's call, while according to opponents, it was only 28 of 78. Member of the

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RSDNP governing board and Lipitskiy supporter Oleg Sokolov, who was present at the event, is inclined to explain the discrepancy in calculations with the idea that the persons assembled coopted the new members into their membership right there on the spot. They cannot, however, be called "Rutskoy's toadies": before Aleksandr Vladimirovich was handed the reins of government, they slapped him with a reprimand for idleness in the field of party work and thereby conniving with the "Lipitskiy heresy." In late March or early April, the Rutskoy supporters want to call a party conference flowing on smoothly into a founding conference of the patriotic movement "Derzhava."

The Lipitskiy ruling board's answer was merciless and quick: "to try to maintain party unity," expel 10 prominent Rutskoy supporters from the party. The ex-vice president himself was the sixth one on the list. The wording here is sharply reminiscent of the wording with which V. S. Lipitskiy and A. V. Rutskoy were "purged" from the CPSU. The Lipitskiy supporters plan to convene the Federal Council in March.

Incidentally, all this is not a story of how Aleksandr Vladimirovich and Vasiliy Semenovich quarreled, but a dispute with an ideological foundation. The Lipitskiy supporters consider the program of Rutskoy, who claims to be the real leader in the Social Democratic People's Party, "chauvinist and clerical," and, accordingly, having the same relationship to social democracy as Zhirinovskiy's views do to liberal democracy.

So, the RSDNP is breaking up into the organizers of the Rutskoy supporters' "Derzhava" and the Lipitskiy supporters, who are figures in the Russian Social Democratic Union [RSDS]. And while the patriotic niche seems overcrowded, the experiment to rescue Russian social democracy is still in the initial stage. Interest in it in the West is obvious, and for that reason Vasiliy Lipitskiy and the RSDS secretary, Pavel Kudyukin, recently visited Brussels at the invitation of the socialist group from the Europarliament. An even more important trump card of the RSDS is the close ties with trade unions (one of the cochairmen of the union, Igor Yurgens, is the first deputy chairman of the World Confederation of Trade Unions). The possibility of creating a pre-election left centrist bloc of the RF Communist Party-APR [Agrarian Party of Russia]-FNPR [Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia]—RSDS which could count on a parliamentary majority is being discussed in the trade union milieu.

If such a bloc is not created, the social democrats will have to nominate their own slate, but they do not have enough distinguished persons in their ranks to do that. Consequently, people in the RSDS are thinking of which "Varangians" [outsiders] it would be best to call upon.

Among existing parties, the Socialist Workers Party [SPT] is a rival to the RSDS in the same ideological niche. But having barely cut the umbilical cord which linked it with the RF Communist Party, the SPT has moved so much to the right that while the RSDS cooperates closely with trade unions, the SPT does so with employers from Yuriy Skokov's Federation of Commodity Producers.

Shumeyko's Readiness for Elections Assessed

954F1393A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 6/82, 9-15 Feb 95 p 8

[Article by N. Troitskiy: "Direct Successor: Chairman of Federation Soviet Vladimir Shumeyko Publicly Admits Intentions To Participate in 1996 Presidential Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Up until now only Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, politicians free from the burden of office, staked their claims to the state's highest post. Henceforth they will have a serious, highly-placed rival, a "third party" in Russia sharply in need of further specialized employment. Shumeyko, after all, has only temporarily been sent to serve as speaker of the senate from his post as first vice prime minister. At the end of the year the senate's powers will elapse, and the next senatorial body will be formed in accordance with the territorial principle. It is not known whether Shumeyko will land the presiding seat, and with all the positions in the government taken, another vice prime minister position for a "third party" would clearly be a step down.

Ascension

The path Shumeyko has climbed to higher spheres has been thorny and winding. He studied at a PTU [Vocational and Technical Institute], completing the institute by correspondence while working as an assembler-fitter at a factory. He found himself doing Komsomol work, but did not make a career of it, and did not move into the party apparatus. Instead he became a candidate of technical sciences and rose in 1990 to the position of General Director of the Krasnodarskiy Instruments Plant. After a brief directorship he was elected to people's deputy, and then to a member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

Deputy Shumeyko participated in the work of the faction, "Kommunisty Rossii [Communists of Russia]" and naturally, promised no hope. In August 1991 he left the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union], or to be more precise, the CPSU pulled out from under its members. Vladimir Filippovich drifted closer to the center, to the faction "Promyshlennyy soyuz [Industrial Union]" and quietly advanced to the position of director. In October 1991 he became the deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and in June 1992, the first deputy chairman of the government. The former general director was moved up to "reinforce" the Gaydar cabinet together with Georgiy Khizha, whereupon the democrats concluded that the two "appointees from the VPK [Military-Industrial Complex]" were brought into the government to "shoot down reforms," more so

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because until then Shumeyko had criticized liberalization and "shock therapy" along with Khasbulatov.

Khizha did not remain in the government. Shumeyko, however, remained in his post and did not "shoot down" anything. On the contrary, he turned out to be one of the most radical reformers. Vladimir Filippovich asserted during one of his interviews that he "never served individual people, only interests." Indeed, his interests have turned out to be more important than his ties to individual people every time. In December 1992, when there was talk of Yegor Gaydar's departure, Shumeyko stated that following the departure of the "chief reformer," all remaining reformers would also leave - he among the first ranks. He did not leave, however, and faithfully served under the new prime minister.

A New Calling

In the new cabinet Vladimir Filippovich gradually moved away from economics and switched to tasks that were particularly ideological in nature. It is difficult to say how a man with such a purely technical background came into this realm, but he mastered the role of ideologist quickly, surpassing the somber spoken Burbulis, the erudite Gaydar, and the juridical Shakhray. He did not misuse learned terms, or discuss lofty matters. He was straightforward and unpretentious to the utmost degree, like the truth.

In March 1993, at the height of the internecine war between the branches of power, when, in a choir of voices, Kremlin lawyers reiterated the existence of a "constitutional crisis," Vladimir Filippovich appeared at the Congress of People's Deputies and said: "From an economic standpoint, there is no constitutional crisis... What is at issue is a harsh uncompromising political battle over two different variations for coming out of the economic crisis."

Soon he started to receive top assignments. Twice he headed organizational committees for conducting referendums; he oversaw a group of thirty of the "best lawyers" composing the new constitution; and even worked as the acting minister of the press and information. He was successful in everything, and mishandled nothing: The referendums ended with the necessary results, and a constitution in the likeness required was written.

No Dogma, But Leadership

Shumeyko so successfully served the interests of the higher authorities rather than individuals, that he did not bother with such trivialities as adopting a world view that one could say was even slightly logically consistent. If he has such personal views, no one knows about them except their possessor.

In 1993 Vladimir Filippovich worked for "strict financial policy," and for "conducting reforms in the shortest time possible." In 1994, having become the speaker of the senate, he spoke of the necessity of adjusting this course, of a "soft entry into the market." Up until fall 1993 Shumeyko strongly distinguished between the "progressive" executive hierarchy, and the "reactionary" deputy corps. The following year he stated that "today in Russia there are neither democrats, nor communists," and that it was fruitless to search everywhere for "reactionaries and enemies of reform." In 1990 he fought for the "transferral of all power to the Soviets," after which he ardently and at length tried to expose and eradicate these Soviets. Now he is proposing to revive a "fully empowered system of representative bodies of authority throughout all of Russia," starting with Chechnya. In the opinion of Shumeyko, the most legitimate body of power is the Supreme Soviet, which was broken up three and a half years ago. Incidentally, Vladimir Filippovich has shown particular maleability with regard to the Chechen question: In spring last year he called upon Yeltsin to enter into direct negotiations with Dzhokhar Dudayev without prior conditions. In the fall he approved of the military operation, but in a week he suddenly condemned it. Again he supported it, having said that "Dudayev was outside the law," and that there could be no talk of negotiations with him.

Shumeyko was also long in determining his party membership following the collapse of the CPSU. After two years of nonmembership, in July 1993 he became a founding father of the movement "Vybor Rossii [Choice of Russia]." He then sharply changed his course and cast off his former comrades, even criticizing them for an unwarranted zeal for power and "Bolshevik ways." In the summer of 1994, however, Shumeyko announced during an interview with VECHERNAYA MOSKVA, "It is good that communists are coming into local bodies of authority, after all, they have an understanding of city management, and they know how the network of ties works." He also called Gennadiy Zyuganov a "politician of the future, over whom the past still hangs."

A Bowling Alley

Vladimir Shumeyko's line of policy is really not so elusive. As a rule, it coincides with the fluctuations of official policy. When it was necessary for the country and the president, Shumeyko acted as a revolutionary reformer; circumstances changed and Shumeyko transformed into a inveterate conservative-state supporter, and almost communist. Sometimes, it is true, Vladimir Filippovich was ahead of his time. He came out with bold new innovations and initiatives, which he then disowned. In political slang this is called letting go of "test balls." Shumeyko has had enough of these balls accumulate during the past year for a bowling alley.

What ideas has Vladimir Filippovich not come up with?: Giving legislative functions to the Federation Soviet; removing the General Staff from under the Ministry of Defense; and creating a new national doctrine based on a triad - the transcendence of the spiritual over the material, moderate means over wealth, and good over evil. His most well known "test ball," however, was the

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proposal to extend the powers of the deputies in both houses of the Federal Assembly for two years.

Is it possible that Shumeyko simply has a well developed sense of imagination, and that he cannot hide the ideas that pop into his head? That would seem somewhat frivolous for a "third party" in the government, and besides Shumeyko's projects, while evoking stormy indignation from colleagues and the public, have not once brought on excessive anger. One must assume that Vladimir Filippovich is "using his imagination" not for his own satisfaction, but on instruction.

Who wields enough power to commission the speaker of the senate? The deputies would like to, but little would come of it. There are doubts that it is Viktor Chernomyrdin, and what business is the General Staff and deputy elections to him anyway? Most likely, Vladimir Filippovich has confidential relations with Boris Nikolayevich himself, and more so because they live in the same house. Their dachas are also located not far from one another. Shumeyko regularly visits the bath house in Yeltsin's company, and is on friendly terms with the popular general-guard Korzhakov, with whom he concurs on everything, and has admitted even that "he is that kind of man."

Who, If Not He?

What will come of all this? In all likelihood, Shumeyko's last "ball" regarding his participation in the presidential election is far from a false probe. Last spring Boris Yeltsin promised that if he succeeded in finding and grooming a worthy democratic successor, he would not run for a second term. A fuss began. There were discussions, gossip, and rumors. Everyone set about searching for Yeltsin's successor. Press Secretary Kostikov even tried to smooth over Yeltsin's statement, hinting that the president had said that he had not been correctly understood.

This time the head of state himself had released a "test ball," perhaps in the heat of the moment. The weapon, however, was drawn on the stage, and now the shot has been fired. A successor has been found. It is time to get him going and turn him out into that sphere of activity. Why not Vladimir Shumeyko for president? He is young, mature, and tall. He has a straightforward Russian face and white smile. He speaks smoothly and has a broad, virtually boundless political platform. Apparently, he long ago began preparing for the preelection campaign: during the past year he has been receiving women, veterans, artists and even the enigmatic "representatives of the workers dynasties" in his office. He has promised to help military service members, sailors, fishermen, entrepreneurs and manufacturers. The Kremlin, it appears, will not find a better candidate. If only Boris Nikolayevich does not decide to make a second attempt.

P.S.: February 10 Vladimir Shumeyko will be 50 years old. OG [OBSHCHAYA GAZETA] joins in to wish him a happy birthday.

Tretyakov Assesses Zyuganov Report to CP Congress

954F1163A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 Jan 95 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Tretyakov: "May the Strongest Be Victorious! The Communists Have Gotten Smart. What About the Anticommunists?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has been a long time since I have read such an interesting document as Gennadiy Zyuganov's report to the Third Congress of the Communist Party of Russia (PRAVDA, 24 January 1995). The general sense: the Communists (the present ones, among the party's leaders; I cannot assess the qualities of the others, since I do not know any of them personally) have not simply drawn a lesson from their defeat but have gotten smarter. They have been thinking, reading and analyzing. And therefore they write intelligently. Of course, there is no avoiding propaganda, but the proportion of it is extremely small.

Gennadiy Zyuganov has directly borrowed from last year's presidential message on priorities in the national security of the United States' the idea of the three main goals of national security policy: defense of the state's territory, defense of the people, and defense of their way of life. Clearly, in analyzing present-day Russian practice in light of those three goals, Mr Zyuganov has left no stone unturned. And in the process he has left it without a leg to stand on.

He goes on to detail this analysis (and quite successfully) from various points of view, including in the context of the classical Marxist-Leninist method. Everything comes together. The diagnosis is the same. It coincides, incidentally, with the interpretation of the course of events and their causes made by many people who have long since quit considering themselves Marxists (but remain Marxists in spirit, the caustic critic will observe, and he may be right), and even by others who have never considered themselves to be. I will not dwell on the diagnosis, since it is known to everyone who walks the Russian earth.

What is much more interesting is something else: Zyuganov gives a rather logical sketch of a plan for extracting the country from crisis, a concept based on an understanding of the trinity of society, the production complex, and nature. In this connection he notes that the Communists' chief task is not to eliminate private property owners but to turn all citizens in actual fact into real property owners, co-owners of the property of the people as a whole.

He very persuasively depicts Russia's international situation and the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international politics. And he moves on to specifically party and internal party affairs—that is written in an extremely traditional, uninteresting manner with a thorough dose of customary communist pathos.

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Those who so desire may classify everything that has been said above as an advertisement for communism. But what I want to dwell on are the weaknesses of Zyuganov's report.

FIRST. The analysis of the history of the USSR since the times of the October Revolution is far from sincere. In essence, there is neither any genuine criticism of Stalinism nor, on the contrary, any moderation in the criticism of Gorbachev, who may have been unable to accomplish a lot, but was clearly not the sort of rogue that the report portrays him to be.

SECOND. The reasons for the collapse of both the CPSU and the USSR, and of socialism as a system, are analyzed weakly, if at all. If almost everything was theoretically good, and a great deal was good in practice, why did everything fall apart overnight? Not just Gorbachev and Yeltsin are to blame, after all.

THIRD. The greed and undemocratic nature of the new regime, and especially its total disregard not just for morality but for laws in the division of property, are quite rightly pointed out. What is not clear, however, is what would guarantee the morality and law-abiding behavior of the Communists themselves in the event that they came to power. Isn't the private-ownership instinct that "thing in itself," still unrecognized by communist theory, that simply will not allow Russian idealists to realize their ideals in practice for long?

FOURTH. The role of the apparatus and the system of power as such is another UFO in the Zyuganov text. If the apparatus was no good before the democrats, and if it turned the majority of democrats either into its slaves or into masters, how will it be humanized in Russia after the present democrats (the majority of whom, of course, are not really democrats)?

FIFTH. Besides Stalin, Gennadiy Zyuganov circumvents another sensitive issue, namely the nationality issue. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that this is no accident, but the result of the infection of many members of the Communist Party and its sympathizers with either everyday or "scientific" anti-Semitism. Yet this is not just a theoretical or moral problem, but also a pragmatic one: after all, the Communist Party has proclaimed a new policy of alliance with Russia's intelligentsia.

SIXTH. If many people were not driven away by their negative associations (both real and mythical) with the concept of a "communist party," the Communists, as critics of the present regime, would be ensured extremely wide voter support. There is also, I repeat, a great deal that is persuasive in the constructive part of their program. But why such tactlessness in the attitude toward potential allies? Why does the report list together in a single category, separated only by commas, the "Gaydars, Fedorovs, Chubayses and Yavlinskiys, who have deliberately deceived the people with respect to the essence of their 'reforms'"? After all, G. Yavlinskiy, indisputably, cannot be put in the same category as Ye. Gaydar, B. Fedorov and A. Chubays in terms of his attitude toward the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreement, the shelling of the White House, the essence of the present regime, or its economic strategy.

I do not think that I will do Grigoriy Alekseyevich a disservice (that label will be pinned on him even without me), if I propose two alternatives—the idiotic and the even more idiotic. Either Zyuganov and Yavlinskiy, having come to an agreement, will temporarily play on different fields in order to unite their voters at the decisive moment to the surprise of the present rulers. Or the Communists, blinded by their class feeling, out of an inability or unwillingness to distinguish shades of colors, do not see any objective difference in the ranks of their opponents. Yet it is clear that so far the Communist Party has won neither presidential nor parliamentary elections (despite all the disasters of the present regime) (the allergy "to communism" has not yet passed). Consequently, if it desires happiness not just for itself but for the country, it needs not to sink *all* its rivals, but to use its power, if it really has any, to help democracy as such. In that sense renouncing Anpilov is an essential but insufficient condition. It must still make common cause with someone from among the democrats.

As broad circles of the Kremlin public know, I am a not-indifferent admirer of the creativity of the current president of Russia. Now, following the appearance of Gennadiy Zyuganov's report, I am awaiting the appearance of the text of the next (second) presidential message to the Federal Assembly with particular impatience. Last year's attempt was unsuccessful (the excuse that practice was even worse). What about this time?

For all my respect for the composers of the current presidential message, especially for their optimism in tackling a hopeless cause, I am afraid that it will be hard for them to win the competition against the Communists' leader. You will have to strain yourselves, Messrs former CPSU members. But may the strongest be victorious!

New Communist Party Program Critiqued

954F1349A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Otto Latsis: "Forward, Into the Past!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The RF Communist Party program that was adopted by the party's 3rd Congress in late January has been attracting attention because it is a statement about the intentions of a numerically very large party with a solid parliamentary faction at its disposal. In addition, we have before us the program of a party that is the successor of the CPSU, which ruled the country for 74 years. But that is not the crux of the matter.

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In several East European countries the social upheavals that have been accompanying the market reforms have swung the political pendulum to the left, and socialists and reformists who were members of the former ruling Communist Parties have come to power. Is something like this possible in Russia?

The Party of Reshuffled Slogans

The December 1993 election did not yield a suitable result for two obvious reasons. First, the period in which the Communist Party ruled in the USSR was longer than for its European neighbors, and the memory about the crimes that had been committed was deeper in people's minds. Secondly, the KPRF [RF Communist Party] made almost no attempt to renew its own socialist slogans. The renewal of the ideological baggage consisted basically of borrowing other people's nationalistic slogans. But with this kind of situation it is more convenient for the voter to vote for the genuine National Radicals like the Zhirinovskiyites. Despite the losses, the election left the democratic bloc as a very large political force.

The Chechen venture changed the situation. The chances of the democratic bloc worsened. Did the Communists' chances improve? To a certain degree that depends upon their program. Was a step taken to meet halfway the hopes of those who are seeking a reasonable alternative to the policy of reforms in its present form?

Reading the first section of the program ("The World on the Threshold of the Third Millennium"), I shuddered when I encountered the next sentence: "In the overwhelming majority of countries, including Russia, there has been widespread work to formulate national strategies for stable development..." Are we really to believe that the Communists have succeeded, ahead of all the other parties, in saddling the idea which, as of today, appears to be the only convincing replacement for the collapsed social ideology of the Soviet era? They would have had to work quite a bit to do that, because the social concept of the CPSU (revolution; the nationalization of property; forced collectivization; accelerated industrialization that degenerated into the militaristic expansion of the struggle between the two systems; and even "acceleration") was the absolute opposite of stable development.

But the miracle did not happen. The casually mentioned "stable development" proved to be probably the only new concept in the program. The mention was not followed by any further clarification—what followed was a reshuffling. The very next sentence states, "The KPRF feels that what is for Russia the act that is has the best substantiation and that corresponds to its interests is the choice of optimal socialist development." Instead of arguments, the program uses hypnosis, by stringing out a number of words with a positive nuance: "stable," "optimal," and then "socialistic." Then there is even more: "Society will change over from individual technologies to postindustrial ones."

All these words sound remarkable, but what does socialism have to do with this? Yes, the concept of stable development has been recognized throughout the world, but it was given its ticket to life by the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development, which was created in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, definitely not on the Communists' initiative. Yes, work in this area is also being carried out in Russia (although at an extremely unhurried rate), but in accordance with the president's edict and under the aegis of the government, rather than that of political parties. It is also true that mankind will be changing over, and even is already changing over, to postindustrial technologies, but the only countries that will succeed in doing this are the advanced capitalist ones—the former "socialist" ones have already tripped up on this. Moreover, the very division into socialist and capitalist formation under the conditions of postindustrial society is simply obsolete, at best.

People living in Russia do not have to be told what socialism is. The society where everyone was equal, but some were "more equal than others" is still fresh in their memory. The originators of the program did not invent even a single new argument to prove the advantage of socialism. Instead of arguments, the reader is inundated by a flood of words from the Volapuk that is remembered by social scientists, as spoken by the assistant professors in the departments of scientific communism. If one strains one's memory, it is possible to determine where something has been pulled from. Mention is made, for example, of the "development of socialism on its own basis." That is from the memorable works on "developed socialism." Then there is "contributions of society to the development of man." That is the favorite topic of philosopher Ivan Frolov, who actually headed the preparation of the Gorbachev draft of the CPSU program that was torn to pieces by the Communist conservatives: they were not too embarrassed to drag out ideas from someone whom, even now, they call a "traitor." Then there's... But this is not simply familiar. It is frighteningly familiar, and should be discussed separately.

"To a considerable degree there has been justification of the foresight that, as socialism is created, the resistance on the part of the forces that are hostile to it not only does not abate, but frequently takes on the most cruel and ugly forms." The original source of that idea (which has been respectfully elevated to the rank of "foresight") is not mentioned here, just as he is not mentioned in other places, even where the ideas of Marx and Lenin are used. But use was made here of a practically verbatim primary source that is too easily remembered by people in the older generation. It is not simply one of Stalin's apothegms, but the most ominous of the vast number of his ominous ones. It is the main topic of his report at the sinister February-March 1937 plenum of the VKP(b) Central Committee, which changed the USSR from a country of secret, total terror into a country of legalized and open terror, in which allocated lists of arrests and

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plans for execution by firing squad became standard practice. Incidentally, Stalin tested that idea for the first time in 1928, while preparing the most extensive villainy that he perpetrated—the destruction of the *kulaks* as a class.

But if that is the theoretical explanation that the Zyuganovites have for the roots of *perestroyka* and the reforms, then, consequently, it is they—the *perestroyka* men and reformers—who are the "enemies of the people." That is what we deserve if this party returns to power: camps. Thanks for warning us...

The Party of Social Utopia

This is hard to believe, but you cannot find in the KPRF program (in 1995!) a single word that censures Stalin's crimes. But you can find words that justify the Stalinist strategy for development. "Use was made of practically all the fantastic opportunities of the 'mobilization economy'"—those words, which refer primarily to the death by starvation of 10 million peasants, were written in the program not as a censure, but as praise. "The victory of the Soviet nation in the Great Patriotic War and the successful restoration of the national economy proved the historic justification of that path of our development," the program asserts. It is as though you are reading something written in 1970. It is as though we do not have a large number of works that convincingly, by relying of facts, prove that the choice of the Stalinist path of industrialization did not strengthen, but, rather, weakened the country before the war, and that that choice predetermined our country's tremendous sacrifices.

The Stalinist period of history is extolled and justified almost unconditionally. Extended criticism does not begin until the Khrushchev period and reaches its peak when it gets to "traitors" Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Yeltsin, and Shevardnadze. But, it turns out, the struggle "for true socialism never ceased." Who, then, waged that struggle, and when? The answer is: "In 1983 Yu. V. Andropov began a restructuring of the administration of the national economy, and the democratization of state and public life." Then there is a list of the good directions taken in that policy: "self-government in production; the democratization of elections; freedom of speech and the freedom to form political associations."

Well, the sorcerers responsible for creating the program probably overdid it. The 1980's are too close. Even the young and untaught know them, and there was no need to lie so forthrightly about them. The birth of all these directions has precise dates, and all of them occurred several years after Andropov's death, and that was specifically during the era of the "traitors'" rule. Andropov's time remained a time of hopes and expectations, but not of achievements—otherwise Chernenko would not have followed Andropov.

Incidentally, there are so many historic fantasies in the program that they cannot all be discussed. Let us deal with modern times. What is proposed for our days? Everything. Everything that can please the leftists and the rightists, the old and the young, the conservatives and the revolutionaries. On the one hand, the traditions of conciliarism, great-power policy, spirituality, and nationality are extolled, and there is an almost verbatim reproduction of the triad of the state ideology of tsarist Russia that was so hated by the socialists of the revolutionary period—Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality. On the other hand, it is asserted that the "Russian idea" is a profoundly socialist idea. And in conclusion it is reported that the KPRF banner is red, the KPRF anthem is the Internationale, and the KPRF symbol is a hammer, sickle, and book.

Intellectuals and second-class workers, do you remember the rayon party committee limits on accepting you into the party? Rejoice that there won't be any limits now: the book has been put on a par with the hammer and sickle.

There is one more section in the "Minimum Program" that is intended for those who are completely gullible. It is not just the words—not a single new comma has been added to the promises of a miracle that are well known from the Communists' speeches at rallies and in parliament. They promise simultaneously to lower prices and raise wages, to strike at inflation and unemployment, and to provide all kinds of blessings for the workers and peasants, military personnel and scientists, families with many children and young men and women, producers and retirees, the Russian nation and other nations. And the mechanism for the miracle is indicated: state regulation. True, it is not clear why it did not work previously, when the all-union Central Committee and Gosplan wielded power, or why suddenly it will work now, when not a trace remains of that power. But social Utopia does not require any logic. All it needs is a passionate desire.

The Party That Can Get a Chance

One would scarcely think that the Communist leaders could feel that, among the modern generation of Russians, a passionate desire to see the KPRF in power will arise on a positive base: the lamentable results of the 74-year experiment are too fresh in people's memory. They can be given hope by a negative base: aversion to the deeds of the present authority. The economic reforms did not evoke universal dissatisfaction,since, even during the most difficult transitional period, they yielded not only negative social results. But the war in Chechnya is providing just what the Communists need.

True, the struggle against the war has definitely not become the primary task of the KPRF—that is obvious from its program, which practically ignores that topic. The Communists are currently attacking more eagerly the democrats who are criticizing the venture in Chechnya, than they are attacking the war party. Nevertheless the nation's growing indignation with the war may play into the hand of the Communists—simply as the main force that criticizes in general the authority that is conducting the war.

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Russian Communists, unlike other East European ones, have not raised a finger to make the idea of socialism even in the slightest way more attractive for the nation: their program is the best proof of this. They hope that, even without any special efforts of theirs, the war party will push the nation into their embrace. During the two months of the war that did not happen, but there is still almost a year until the parliamentary election, and almost a year and a half to the presidential one. Who knows the degree of desperation and animosity that the nation will reach if the war drags out and becomes even broader?

Human Rights Commissioner Denounces Authorities

954F1293A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 4, 26 Jan 95 p 1

[Interview with Sergey Kovalev by Vitaliy Yaroshevskiy: "One Cannot Live in a Country Where the Top People Lie"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Yaroshevkisy] Do you intend to go to Chechnya again?

[Kovalev] I do, in a delegation of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] on 27-28 January. It is very important to show them the so-called filtration camp.

[Yaroshevskiy] What is this filtration camp?

[Kovalev] The only thing that I know about the camp is what I have heard from eye-witness accounts. Russian troops have now entered the region of Groznyy where the Chechen were. Special forces from the Ministry of Internal Affairs go down into the cellars. There are people in every cellar. Among them are women, children, and very old men. No one takes them. But all those whom the special forces consider to be capable of carrying weapons are dragged out. According to the witnesses, they are men from 15 to 60 years of age. They are brought together in one place. And then they beat them. They beat them and say: "Do you confess that you are an artillery observer?"

After being "worked over," the men are taken to the railroad station in Mozdok. There they are held in railroad cars. This is the filtration camp. One group was transported in trucks. They tied their hands behind their backs and put them face down. They put another layer on top of them and another on top of that. Altogether there were four layers. Of the three trucks, one broke down and those who were in it were thrown into the other two trucks. When they unloaded them in Mozdok, they piled them up just like firewood. Among the living they dumped four corpses. These people probably suffocated on the way.

[Yaroshevskiy] President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev told journalists from OBSHCHAYA GAZETA that if Moscow agrees he is prepared to fly to Dudayev as a mediator on behalf of Russia. What do you think about this initiative?

[Kovalev] Any initiative of this kind is extremely important. It is necessary to speak about the political aspects of the Chechen crisis not just with Chechnya and with Nazarbayev. In Groznyy, there are opponents of Dudayev who make no secret of their opposition. They say: We will deal with Dudayev later but right now we are defending our home.

[Yaroshevskiy] What kind of a person is Dudayev?

[Kovalev] He somewhat resembles our president: he is quite ambitious but also impressionable. Whoever is the last to meet with him is right.

[Yaroshevskiy] In recent years, not to mention last week, we have not moved even a step from where we have been since 1989. Even then we said: if Gorbachev goes, things will be much worse, for there is no alternative to Gorbachev. Today they are again scaring us: if Yeltsin goes, Zhirinovskiy will come.

[Kovalev] Actually everything is much simpler: it is impossible for a normal person to live in a country where the top people lie. For the first time, we have a situation in which the authorities are ignoring the society.

[Yaroshevskiy] Do you not sense that Chernomyrdin tried to stop the combat operations and begin negotiations but our "field commanders" thwarted his efforts?

[Kovalev] If you agree to include Sergey Shakhray among the "field commanders," then I certain admit such a possibility.

[Yaroshevskiy] What about Grachev and Stepashin?

[Kovalev] Well, they have adapted well.... They are not subordinating themselves to Chernomyrdin.

[Yaroshevskiy] What happened on 24 January at the meeting of the human rights commission that is headed by the minister of justice, the man with the same last name as you?

[Kovalev] I decided to find out whether or not it intends to get involved. And how could this be determined? It was necessary to make some very obvious proposals. For example, let the commission condemn the military means of resolving a political question. Let it demand the end of bloodshed. Let it condemn the use of weapons of mass destruction. How can a commission that is called upon to observe human rights fail to condemn the use of "Grad" launchers in the city? But it did not condemn them. It decided that there must be an investigation before it could make any final decisions. Then I answered: Investigate what? Did they hit Groznyy from the "Grad" launchers or did they not? I asserted that this is a fact and the man with my family name demanded proof. That is the whole difference.

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I must say that even in this commission there were three people (they were in Chechnya)—General Bezborodov, General Stolyarov, and Deputy of the State Duma Zhamsuyev—who attested to the use of inhumane weapons by the Russian Army. But there were just the four of us plus the writer Anatoliy Pristavkin. He was absent but he totally shares our position. We condemn this war. The other 10 members of the commission support it.

[Yaroshevskiy] Do you have any intention of leaving this commission?

[Kovalev] Yes I do, very definitely.

[Yaroshevskiy] Are you not afraid that your name will be discredited? This has already begun. They got their way. I know people, completely normal people, who turn off the television when you appear on the screen. You are accused of saving the life of Dudayev, being together with him at his palace. They say that this is why they did not bomb the palace.

[Kovalev] In the first place, I was not alone there. There were also Russian prisoners there. Does this mean that if I had not been there they would have gone ahead with the bombing despite the presence of the Russian prisoners at the palace? Secondly,....

I often remember the letter of Gertsen to His Imperial Majesty. Being in London, Gertsen wrote (I quote from memory): "Your Imperial Highness, I have heard the rumor that your agents intend to kill me. I understand your family traditions and I remember very well how one was smothered by a pillow and another was killed by a snuffbox in the temple. But as for me, there is no need. For if I die even from a cold, they will point the finger at you. I would advise your agents to watch over me and to make sure that a hair does not fall from my head accidentally."

[Yaroshevskiy] Has the war in Chechnya made the Chechen people and the Russians permanent enemies?

[Kovalev] No, it may be that the success of our trip was relative but not in what you asked about. The Chechen people are very naive and chivalrous. And the fact that we sat with them under the bombing means a lot to them. I saw a Ukrainian who said that his friend was killed and now he cannot take any Russians prisoner.

I did not meet a single Chechen like that.

Minister on Postal Sector Woes, Media Charges

954F1380A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 6, 8 Feb 95 p 10

[Unattributed interview with Vladimir Bulgak, communications minister: "Put Yourself in the Postman's Place...: Vladimir Bulgak, Communications Minister Answers LITERATURNAYA GAZETA's Questions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Vladimir Borisovich, communications in its very essence suggest integration, cooperation between cities, regions, republics. The collapse of the USSR, the parade of sovereignties, the crises in the economy—what kind of impact has all of this had on your branch? It is obvious that things haven't gotten better. But even so, what cardinal problems have arisen?

[Bulgak] Since January 1, 1993, postal exchange between Russia and the former USSR republics has been performed according to international principles, that is, in accordance with World Postal Union (WPU) requirements. They state that postal exchange expenses must be paid in hard currency. Tariffs on forwarding international mail dispatches, including the former USSR republics, have been established in strict accordance with WPU acts. However, taking into consideration the steady communications with CIS countries and the social significance of postal communications services, existing tariffs on forwarding written correspondence (letters, post cards, printed matter, small packets of letters with a declared value) to these countries have been lowered in comparison with set rates by six times, and for packages—by three times.

Despite the fact that banking operations are not conducted with many CIS countries, we have retained the postal transfer exchange with them, mainly transfers of social significance (pensions, subsidies, alimony). But the Republic of Georgia has suspended transfer exchanges on its own initiative due to financial difficulties.

After the collapse of the USSR, communications ministry workers were able to preserve an integral informational space. The distribution of printed mass media sources, radio and television programs is proceeding, and they are transmitted to the populations of all the former union republics. Subscription to all the Russian publications (as well as those of other independent states) included in the central catalogues should be accepted without limitations in all the former USSR republic countries. At this time, the periodical press has a circulation of over 650 thousand copies per issue outside the borders of the Federation, while about 400 thousand newspapers and magazines are delivered to Russia from former union republics.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] The Ministry of Finances and the Ministry of the Economy are probably the leaders in the number of complaints they get from the population. But I would imagine that there are no fewer claims brought against the Ministry of Communications. Everyone criticizes you, from retired old ladies to the chief editors of newspapers and magazines. Of course, in answering this question, it would be easier for you to cite market relations, the difficulties of the transitional period. But all the same, why is there a striking difference between the price of one copy of a newspaper in Moscow (I'm talking about central publications) and its

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price in Moscow Oblast, not to speak of Sverdlovsk or Magadan oblasts? What logic can be used to explain the fact that the delivery of something may cost more than the article itself?

[Bulgak] The tariffs on distribution services for the press are contractual, and are determined by postal workers based on expenses. They can and must differ by regions, because the economic conditions of operation for postal institutions (the prices for electricity, fuel, GSM [petroleum, oil, and lubricants], the lease of buildings and transport, the prices for airlifts, etc.) are different. Press distribution has always operated at a loss for communications workers, because the tariffs are determined eight months before the services are performed, which for all practical purposes makes an exact determination of expenses impossible. As a result, the postal services' losses from that type of operation amounted to 62 billion rubles in 1993, and about 140 billion rubles in 1994. The government does not provide subsidies for this service. Editorial offices continue to receive state subsidies punctually (in fact, the Russian Federation Law "On the Budget for 1994" stipulates that 122.9 billion rubles be allotted to them; in comparison, yearly distribution and delivery for all subscriptions cost the postal service 340 billion rubles). Besides this, editors utilize their incomes from advertising, which also allows them to decrease the catalog cost of publications. All of this leads to the fact that an imbalance is developing for certain publications between the catalog price, which has nothing in common with the editors' actual expenditures, and postal tariffs for distributing the press. The tariffs for that type of operation that are established by communications ministry employees have been subjected to verification several times on federal and regional levels. During which the tariffs on delivery have been recognized as reasonable.

If we are to speak of tariffs for press delivery in the city of Moscow, then it should be noted that Yu. Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, who is known to be a zealous master, is approving a resolution on a special subsidy for post office losses incurred through the provision of this service for the third subscription campaign in a row (the subsidy amounted to four billion rubles for the second half of 1994).

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] May people say that the Ministry of Communications is a monopolist. But what do you think, should communications remain a state monopoly, or are destatization, privatization, competition and so on possible here?

[Bulgak] In our country, postal monopolism on the distribution of printed matter has been the result of single-minded state policy. With the adoption of a new legislative base, the process of demonopolizing the distribution of printed matter began. Now, the postal service is no longer a monopolist in receiving subscriptions, processing orders, expediting and transporting the press. The postal service's natural monopoly is preserved only in one service connected with the distribution of the press—delivery—because of its unprofitability. Despite the Ministry of Communication's proposal for aid, competitors with the ministry workers are in no hurry to appear, which again indirectly confirms the unprofitability of delivery.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] The idea exists of a joint issue of stock by, let's say, communications workers and publishers, paper manufacturers, which, in the opinion of its initiators, should resolve many problems. How do you feel about this?

[Bulgak] Positive. A joint issue of stock by the producers of the printed mass media, in my opinion, would ease the resolution of many questions. As far as communications employees are concerned, they distribute the press according to contracts held with editors and publishers, and their presence in a stock issue by the publishing-printing complex can only be welcomed. This especially applies to expeditionary enterprises located directly in printing and publishing houses. These Ministry of Communications proposals have already been made in the draft federal Law "On State Support for the Mass Media."

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Could you give your own prescriptions for improving this branch's work, without the resulting "deficits" for rank-and-file citizens?

[Bulgak] An improvement in the quality of postal communications can occur only when services are accessible, if mailings are guaranteed security and if they are made in as short a time as possible. In order to resolve these tasks, the fleet of automobiles and mail wagons must be constantly renewed, the existing network of communications sectors must be preserved. This, in turn, requires serious capital investments which the postal service does not possess at this time.

The development of postal communications assumes an increase in service volume, as well as the broad implementation of new forms of service, an acceleration in postal dispatches and the creation of a postal bank service. We intend to implement a technical refitting, the construction and reconstruction of main-line, city and rayon communications hubs, the mechanization and automation of production processes, the development and introduction of informatization and electronization systems that would make possible a constant rise in the quality of the services delivered.

A few words on security. In connection with the unfavorable situation that has arisen concerning the security of mail, especially international mail, the Ministry of Communications has been forced to create a postal security service. An improvement in mail security is being noted not only by communications enterprises in Russia, but in the former USSR republics and states of the far abroad, as well. Incidentally, the World Postal Union is working with the union's remaining member

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countries, encouraging them to organize internal postal security services. In the future, this will make possible the creation of a single postal security service within the WPU, and the guarantee of complete security for the mail.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Do figures exist that give the percent that Ministry of Communications services make up in the population's daily expenditures? Is this proportion comparable to indicators from other countries?

[Bulgak] According to data from the Russian State Committee on Statistics, the share of expenditures on communications services in the budget of one family (with an average income of 1,117,925.6 rubles) was 0.3 percent in the Russian Federation in 1993. In comparison: in Denmark, it is 1.4 percent.

In countries in the organization of economic cooperation and development, the population spends an average of 2.5 to 3.5 percent of its income on communications services.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] By how much do we lag behind in the development of modern mass communications? Or are we leaders? What can you say about priorities in developing means of communications?

[Bulgak] In its size, Russia's general use communications network is one of the largest in the world. In a year, the Russian Federation's "Communications" complex provides about 550 billion electronic communications, radio broadcast, television and postal services.

However, our lag (of 15-20 years) behind the countries that lead the world in the technical level of their electronic communications networks, the wear on our basic production facilities, financial and other currently unresolved problems concerning domestic communications have made necessary the development of a "Concept for a Communications Program for the Russian Federation."

The concept proposes the modernization of general use communications networks based on the widespread introduction of digital systems, fiber-optic cables and automatic commutation system stations. Digital networks with integrated services, networks for the transmission of data with commutation packets, honeycomb communications networks, as well as satellite systems that would provide communications for isolated and inaccessible regions of the country will receive first priority.

Plans extending to the year 2005 include the creation of a digital general use communications network equipped with modern commutation stations and transmission systems. Over ten years, it proposes to develop an adapted national network with capacity for 20 million subscribers that will meet modern technical requirements.

With this goal in mind, a series of prospective projects have been developed. One of them, which has acquired the name "50X50," proposes the creation of a digital inter-city telephone network for Russia by the year 2005, based on 50 thousand km of digital communications lines, 50 automatic inter-city telephone stations, seven automatic commutation transit hubs and seven international telephone stations fitted with electronic equipment. The future network will become an integral part of the general use telephone network, and will offer its subscribers the entire spectrum of modern communication services.

In 1993, another large-scale project was implemented—the construction of an international telephone communications complex between Russia and Denmark, including an underwater fiber-optic communications line (VOLS) running between Copenhagen and Kingisepp (1250 km, 15,360 channels), two digital radio-relay lines between Kingisepp and Saint Petersburg (118 km, 3840 channels) and Kingisepp-Moscow (818 km, 5760 channels) and three automatic inter-city stations (AMTS: two in Moscow and one in Saint Petersburg, with a total capacity of 9860 channels). When it becomes operational, this complex will increase Russia's total number of international communications channels by over ten times. Along with the residents of Moscow and Petersburg, the services offered by this network can be utilized by residents of 36 other Russian cities.

At this time, AMTS construction projects are under way in Samara, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk and Khabarovsk. Two more similar projects are planned: the construction of an Italy-Turkey-Russia VOLS (with branches serving Ukraine), an AMTS in Rostov-na-Donu, and the Trans-Siberian Project. A digital radio-relay line between Moscow and Khabarovsk (8300 km, 11,520 channels) is under construction. The construction of a Russia-Japan-South Korean VOLS and an AMTS in Khabarovsk is complete. Modern automatic inter-city telephone stations (AMTS) are being built in over 30 Russian cities. In Russia, the swift development of data transmission networks and document exchanges has to do with the growth of demand from state organizations, stock exchanges, bank and commercial structures for information exchange. Over the last three years, 70 state, private, stock and joint enterprises, after being licensed by the Ministry of Communications, have expanded their operations in the creation and exploitation of such networks on all-Russian and regional scales.

NMT-450 standard honeycomb networks are already operating in Moscow and Moscow Oblast, Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast, Karelia, Murmansk Oblast and Kaliningrad. The "Moscow Honeycomb Communications" TOO [limited liability partnership] (which operates the NMT-450 network in Moscow) includes Tver, Voronezh and some of the automobile roads running between Moscow and Saint Petersburg, in Ryazn, Kaluga, Tula, Belgorod and Saratov.

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GSM standard honeycomb networks have not yet been introduced for commercial use. Their installation and preparation is nearing completion in Saint Petersburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, Rostov-na-Donu and the Khanty-Mansiyskiy national okrug. The GSM network set up in Moscow is now undergoing a test run. The total number of subscribers to federal honeycomb networks has reached 11 thousand today. In the Russian Federation, regional honeycomb networks are also being created.

The 'Rossiya' Program for the Development of Satellite Communications Systems and Broadcasts in the Russian Federation for 1992-2000" was written to spread multi-channel television broadcasting to the entire Russian Federation, to facilitate the creation of regional television and radio broadcasting, the provision of communications services to remote and inaccessible regions of the country and to assist in achieving other goals.

[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA] Finally, the only question that can be called even slightly political. The opinion exists that the Ministry of Communications is making a special attempt, through the use of economic methods, to strangle the central press in order to blockade the central government policy, and that in the provinces, people are mainly opposed to the current government. How would you comment on this?

[Bulgak] I think that this opinion is a creation of the central press mass media, themselves. I am a member of the government, and to believe that the ministry that I am in charge of is taking any kind of steps to blockade government policy is, at the very least, stupid. The essence here lies in the following. Lately, a tendency towards a growth in subscription circulation for local newspapers has been noted, along with a drop in volume for the central press, which corresponds with world-wide experience, and can be explained in several ways. First, people are becoming more and more interested in events that take place in their own regions. Second, modern means of communication make it possible to receive information from the center, from other regions of Russia and from abroad efficiently, and to publish it in a timely manner on the pages of the regional press. Third, in several regions delivery of the central press is delayed by 2-4 days because editors, in the interests of economy, are cutting back the number of decentralized printing facilities. The local press doesn't have those problems. Fourth, regional written periodical publications are cheaper, and, accordingly, more accessible to the population thanks to subsidies received from local budgets.

Importance of Constitutional Court Emphasized

954E0549A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 8 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Dmitriy Orlov: "Without an Effective Constitutional Court, the 'Third Branch' Will Always Play a Secondary Role"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Constitutional justice in Russia has "had bad luck," so to speak, historically. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Senate did virtually nothing but monitor the legality of decisions that were taken and engage in confiscation; the Bolshevik regime's attitude toward the separation of powers is well known; and the Constitutional Oversight Committee formed toward the end of perestroyka quickly turned into an interest club, since its findings were not worth much.

The Constitutional Court of the era of radical reforms has given rise to contradictory attitudes toward it. On the one hand, without the Constitutional Court the balance of power is upset (and its inaction for more than a year now vividly confirms that thought); on the other, certain decisions by the supreme body of constitutional justice during the "Zorkin" period, such as the procedures for holding the 25 April 1993 referendum, contributed directly to the destabilization of the situation in the country (and the Constitutional Court judges cannot help admitting that).

However, in any case the present situation is absolutely intolerable for anyone who believes that governmental structures are institutions of a rule-of-law state, and not enclaves where decisions for which it is difficult to give any rational explanation are taken under the influence of certain influential individuals or abstract political ideas. The federal constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court that was passed last summer stipulates that the court must be constituted no later than one month from the time that the law enters into force. A half year has now passed, and the court still has not been fully constituted.

A great deal has been said about the reasons for this. A selectivity on the part of the Federation Council that borders on pathology (after all, who hasn't the president proposed? His nominees for the Constitutional Court have included prominent legal scholars, military jurists, and people from the provinces), a selectivity which is often based not on any dislike for given candidates but on the fact it was President Yeltsin who nominated them, and also on the fact that many people who occupy Russian corridors of power—certainly the main people—consider the Constitutional Court to be a "fifth wheel" in the system of state administration, a wheel that can only impede the solution of problems by the methods by which they are accustomed to acting.

In presenting a draft law on the Constitutional Court last March, Nikolay Vitruk, acting chairman of the court, said, in part, that the supreme body of constitutional justice should be more restrained in its relations with the "outside world," especially the press. Right up until the beginning of this year, the judges' public statements have for the most part pertained to general legal problems, and so little information on disagreements on the Constitutional Court has leaked out that many observers have got the feeling of a calm. However, the recent press conference by Ernest Ametistov at which he called the process of choosing Constitutional Court judges "sabotage," and the article in OBSHCHAYA GAZETA based

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on an interview with Gadis Gadzhiyev, admixed with the author's extensive and extremely free-wheeling commentary, which makes it clear that the existence of a constitutional justice system is nothing but "freeloading," has resulted in a situation where judges will readily talk with the representatives of various publications but categorically object to the publication of their opinions. No wonder. A blow against the Constitutional Court is being struck, willy-nilly, by the press, which would seem to have a direct stake in the earliest possible resumption of its work.

However, the mass media are only reflecting the opinion, which emerged not so long ago, that a Constitutional Court is supposedly too costly for Russia. Too costly, not in the sense of how much citizens care about the ideals of a state based on the rule of law, but in the direct sense that it burdens the budget. It is difficult to dispute such arguments. How, indeed, can one persuade the ordinary citizen that the existence of a Constitutional Court is not a feeding trough for civil servants but a guarantee? A civil society, like any system that guarantees anything, is costly in principle (so far, for us in Russia, not too costly), but rejecting it would be much more costly.

The debate that has resumed about whether the Constitutional Court could begin functioning with less than a full membership (a debate which would seem to have ended long ago with the judges' decision not to begin holding court sessions until the court was fully constituted), and the latest attempt to divide up the agency of constitutional justice into groupings based on political leanings obviously reflect an attempt by certain forces to once again reduce legal disagreements on the court to a personal confrontation among its individual members that is interfering with its work. However, this attempt is hardly destined to succeed: during the period of forced idleness, the members of the Constitutional Court have drawn up detailed draft Regulations and carefully systematized all appeals. With the selection of the last judge, the court will immediately resume its work. One can confidently predict a sharp increase in the influence of the Constitutional Court and the judicial system as a whole after it considers its first case that is generally deemed to be important.

The persistence with which the upper chamber of parliament defended the candidacy of its colleague Isa Kostoyev at its past session allowed one to assume that the process of discussing candidates proposed by the president would be by no means be simple. And that assumption proved correct. The candidacy of Anatoliy Vengerov, chairman of the RF president's Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes, was rejected. As this issue of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI was going to press, it was learned from unofficial sources that Marat Baglay, doctor of legal sciences and specialist in constitutional and labor law, the first prorector of the Academy of Labor and Social Relations, had, after all, become the final member of the Constitutional Court.

Today the Constitutional Court, alas, is powerless. And the powerlessness of that body, which in many respects personifies the Russian judicial system, creates the danger of violence against the "third branch" on the part of the other two. After all, it was just recently that the courts became relatively independent of local authorities in making decisions that defend the infringed interests of specific individuals. Therefore, the decision of the Federation Council to choose the final constitutional judge cannot help but be encouraging. After all, the balance of power that will be restored when the body of constitutional justice begins functioning will mark the final creation of a unified field of law.

Control Administration Chief Describes Organization's Work

954E0549B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 8 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Zaytsev, director of the Russian Federation President's Control Administration: "There Will Be as Many Inspections as State Decisions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The truth, of course, is not a new one: even the best law or edict can remain nothing but a good intention without systematic and effective monitoring of its implementation. Therefore, as the presidential control service, we strive, on the one hand, to do the utmost to expand the scope and range of that control, and on the other hand, to enhance the effectiveness of our inspections. Especially since both the legal and the organizational conditions have now been created for doing so.

The functions and rights of the Control Administration have become much more substantial. And the sphere itself of presidential control has also expanded to include federal bodies of state authority and the bodies of state authority of the components of the Russian Federation, diplomatic and trade missions and other Russian institutions abroad, and special control and oversight agencies in the center and at the local level.

The administration's priority area of activity is continuous and effective control over the implementation of the Russian Federation president's social and economic policies. Of course, we keep our eyes, first and foremost, on the most important, key presidential edicts that define the country's economic strategy.

In order to enhance the professionalism and effectiveness of the inspections it conducts, in its work the Control Administration maintains close business contacts with the central bodies of federal executive authority, the leading economic ministries and departments, and territorial control agencies. Inspections are generally comprehensive in nature. Experienced specialists of the State Committee on the Administration of State Property; the RF Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economics and Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations;

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the RF Committee on Land Resources and Land Management, and other ministries and departments are enlisted in them.

It should be especially emphasized in this connection that priority is given to the most effective form of control—studying the actual state of affairs. In 1994, 144 specially targeted and comprehensive inspections were conducted. Staff members of the Control Administration visited 48 regions of the Russian Federation. Various areas of the activities of 51 ministries and departments were inspected.

The activities of ministries and departments in carrying out economic reforms and state programs are constantly in the administration's field of vision. In this area alone, 41 inspections were conducted, and six edicts and orders of the Russian Federation president and seven decrees of the Russian Federation government were drawn up and adopted with the Control Administration's recommendations in mind. An analysis was made of the implementation of the Russian Federation president's normative acts pertaining to the privatization of enterprises in the fuel and energy complex. Issues involving the draining of financial (foreign-exchange) resources out of Russia were examined. The problems of gold mining in Irkutsk and Chita oblasts were studied in detail. Packages of proposals were prepared in connection with all these inspections.

One promising area of work involves specially targeted inspections of the activities of federal executive agencies. The administration also conducted inspections of the activities of ministries and departments in the past, but this work was not sufficiently systematic and open. Only individual areas of work were investigated, without any thorough analysis of the activities of a state administrative agency as a whole. Now a special unit has been set up in the administration that conducts comprehensive inspections directly in federal executive agencies and their local subdivisions.

The progress of economic reform in the regions is monitored. For the most important aspects—privatization, land and tax policy, and foreign economic activities—inspections have been conducted in practically all the country's major regions: the Republic of Bashkiria; the Udmurt Republic; the Chuvash Republic; the republics of Karelia and Komi; Altay, Krasnodar, Maritime and Stavropol krays; and Amur, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Sverdlovsk, Saratov, Tomsk, Tyumen and other oblasts.

What have they shown, and what tendencies have they revealed? Economic reforms are not proceeding dynamically in all the regions. There are especially many problems with privatization. Edicts of the RF president in this area are not being fully implemented. Thus, out of 331 facilities in Tver Oblast, only 144 have been privatized, and in Tomsk Oblast, only 29 of the 50 state and municipal enterprises that were supposed to have been converted to joint-stock companies have been converted. In Saratov Oblast, the privatization of trade, public food-service and everyday-service enterprises has been completed in only 11 of 29 rayons.

We continuously monitor the implementation of the Russian Federation president's edict "On Urgent Measures to Implement Land Reform in the RSFSR." In the past two years, brigades of controllers have visited all the country's main agricultural regions and conducted more than 30 comprehensive inspections. Analysis has shown that in a number of places haste and a one-shot-campaign mentality have taken the place of consistent and painstaking work to implement land reform. As of the beginning of 1994, 95 percent of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes had been reregistered, of which more than one-third had maintained their former status. Without proper state support and attention on the part of local executive agencies, a considerable number of the individual farms ceased to function.

On-site visits were made to check on the implementation of the Russian Federation president's edicts pertaining to state support for the socioeconomic development of the Chuvash Republic, the Republic of Mariy El and Perm and Samara oblasts, and for stabilizing the economy and developing the social sphere of the Republic of Komi.

We are striving to expand the geography of our inspections. The implementation of the Russian Federation president's edicts pertaining to the socioeconomic development of Altay Republic and the Koryak and Yamal-Nenets autonomous okrugs is being monitored. The main branches of the economy are undergoing a profound crisis. The population is declining in size. Russian Federation ministries and departments and executive agencies in those regions have not ensured the implementations of measures called for in state acts. The final materials from these inspections have been presented to the RF president and Russian government.

Considering that last year a state of emergency arose with respect to the shipment of products to regions of the Far North, we carried out an inspection in the Chukotsk Autonomous Okrug. Materials from it were also sent to the president and chairman of the government with appropriate recommendations. Consequently, additional interest-free loans amounting to 30 billion rubles have been made out of federal budget funds, and R125 billion in centralized credit resources has also been allocated.

At the president's orders, we studied the sources of the formation of the wage fund for employees at 231 enterprises in the Republic of Karelia and Volgograd, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Orenburg, Tomsk, Tyumen and a number of other oblasts. Serious errors were discovered. Most of the executives are making poor use of the legislative base and the material interest of employees to stabilize production, and have grown accustomed to enterprises' indebtedness and chronic failure to pay wages. In the first seven months of 1994, the payment of

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a total of more than R64 billion in wages was held up at 766 industrial, construction and agricultural enterprises and organizations with 378,800 employees in Rostov Oblast, and the payment of about R95 billion was held up at 397 enterprises with 441,200 employees in Samara Oblast. In Ivanovo Oblast, the payment of wages has been delayed by more than two months at half the enterprises, and the oblast occupies one of the last places in terms of average employee income.

Quite often, enterprise executives are to blame for delays in the payment of wages. At the time of inspections, the foreign-exchange balance of authorized banks in the aforementioned Rostov Oblast amounted to $33.6 million, or R66 billion, and there was $79 million, or more than R145 billion, in the current accounts of enterprises in Samara Oblast (in Russian and foreign banks). Some executives take advantage of their positions to enrich themselves through the illegal appropriation of enterprises' funds. Thus, in June 1994, R20.7 million was allocated to the general director of the Plant imeni Tar-Sov Joint-Stock Company in Samara Oblast. His average monthly earnings for the first half year came to R4.4 million, which was 32-fold the workers' earnings.

The information that was sent to the Russian Federation on this matter included a recommendation to tighten control by the Central Bank to ensure the use of enterprises' funds for their designated purposes.

The Control Administration devotes special attention to the implementation of the president's and the government's normative acts pertaining to social concerns. In particular, detailed analyses have been made of presidential edicts and government decrees pertaining to the provision of medications and medical equipment to the public and health-care institutions in Novgorod, Nizhniy Novgorod and Rostov oblasts and St. Petersburg. With the connivance of the executives of those regions' administrations and of the RF Minzdravmedprom [approximate expansion: Ministry of Health Care and the Medical Equipment Industry], a grave situation has developed in this area. Funds allocated for health-care needs have been spent extremely ineffectively and often for other than their intended purposes. We promptly reported serious errors committed by officials to the Russian Federation government and the executives of interested ministries and departments, and we sent materials to the Russian Federation procurator general.

In accordance with the orders of the Russian Federation president, an inspection was carried out of the receipt and use of monies allocated to compensate for damages caused in 1994 in Maritime and Khabarovsk krays, Sakhalin Oblast and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. Serious violations were uncovered: only 66 percent of the stipulated amount of federal funds had been sent to Sakhalin Oblast, as a result of which 1,775 families had failed to be paid compensation in Yuzhno-Kurilskiy Rayon alone. Through the fault of the Maritime Kray administration, the payment to the population of R2.5 billion earmarked for lump-sum aid was held up for more than two months, and foodstuffs received in the kray were not distributed in a timely fashion.

The foreign-economic activities of executive agencies constitute an immense field of activity for controllers. According to statistics, export volumes are increasing. Key strategic types of resources—petroleum and petroleum products, coal and timber—are being exported in large quantities. And frequently they are exported illegally. Therefore, inspections have been conducted of the implementation of the Russian Federation president's edicts regulating foreign-economic activities in 19 Russian federal executive agencies and the administrations of 17 krays and oblasts. Executive agencies, state and commercial enterprises and organizations, and officials have been violating Russian Federation normative acts pertaining to the formation of the foreign-exchange reserve, the exportation of strategically important raw-material commodities, and the allocation of regional quotas and the issuing of licenses. Just three of the inspected enterprises—Viko-Rossiya (Rostov Oblast), the Southern Urals Foreign Economic Company, and Chelyabkommers (Chelyabinsk Oblast)—failed to return more than $10,000 in foreign exchange earned against regional quotas. Because of the delivery of raw materials for export at artificially low prices, exporter enterprises in Tomsk Oblast failed to receive $3.6 million in the past two years.

On the basis of most of the recommendations forwarded by the administration as a result of inspections in regions, the heads of administration have taken measures and eliminated shortcomings, and those who have been guilty of official negligence and irresponsibility have been punished. For example, in Tver Oblast the oblast and city administrations rescinded a number of illegal decisions pertaining to privatization and the allocation of parcels of land and of housing.

Based on the results of inspections conducted by the Control Administration, L. Bashmakov, head of the Ryazan Oblast Administration; Yu. Shoykhet, head of the Omsk City Administration; and V. Samoylenko, head of the Krasnodar City Administration, were dismissed for the failure to implement the edicts of the RF president and other shortcomings in their work, and V. P. Solovyev, head of the Chelyabinsk Oblast Administration, was issued an admonition concerning his failure to be entirely suitable for his office. V. L. Mertsalov, chairman of the RF State Committee on the Administration of State Property's territorial agency in Kavminvody, was dismissed from office, and reprimands were issued to Yu. A. Yevchenko, head of the Rostov Oblast Administration's department of foreign economic relations. Disciplinary fines were imposed on eight chairmen of rayon committees on land resources in Stavropol Kray.

In the course of inspections, a total of R356 billion and $211.9 million in damages caused to the state by local

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executive agencies and economic agents were uncovered. R98.7 billion and $11.5 million were repaid to the federal budget.

Naturally, it is impossible for control from the center to encompass all regions. And existing regional control agencies lack communications with one another and, by and large, serve regional administrations, and they frequently do nothing but simply log in executive documents that are received and fail to conduct in-depth, full-fledged inspections. Therefore, in accordance with an edict of the Russian Federation president, we are presently working to establish our own territorial subdivisions (district inspectorates) that will become local bases of presidential control in 11 of the country's largest regions. Each district inspectorate will perform its own control functions on a territory encompassing several components of the Russian Federation: conduct inspections of the activities of executive agencies and their executives, as well as of enterprises and organizations; monitor their implementation of the Russian Federation Constitution, federal laws, and the edicts and orders of the Russian Federation president; and analyze the activities of territorial subdivisions of the special control and oversight agencies of federal executive agencies.

The establishment of full-fledged territorial subdivisions of the Control Administration will help fundamentally expand the horizons of presidential control and enhance its effectiveness.

Commission To Prepare Publication of RF Legal Code Created

Edict Creating Commission

954E0556A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Feb 95 p 6

[Text of Edict of the RF President: "Preparation for Publication of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In order to realize the provisions of Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, put legislation in order, ensure that it is stable, and consolidate constitutional legality, I decree:

1. It is recognized as essential to begin preparations for compiling and publishing the Legal Code of the Russian Federation, an official, systematized, and complete collection of the operative normative enactments of the Russian Federation.

2. It is suggested that the Institute of State and the Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law of the Government of the Russian Fedration, the school of law at Moscow University imeni M. V. Lomonosov, the Moscow Legal Academy, and other research and educational institutions of the law, in the first half of 1995 submit recommendations on the formative principles and structure of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation.

3. As the first stage of preparation for publication of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation and the state and the law administration of the President of the Russian Federation will in 1995 inventory all federal laws, normative enactments of the President of the Russian Federation, normative decrees of the Government of the Russian Federation, and other normative enactments which are in effect and have not been formally repealed, as well as normative enactments of the USSR which continue to be in effect in the Russian Federation, for the purpose of forming a chronological collection of operative normative enactments on machine-readable media.

The federal agency for governmental communication and information of the President of the Russian Federation will provide software and hardware support for work on building this collection and will also begin development of the software and hardware for publication of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation.

4.The state and the law administration of the President of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation will, in 2 months, submit proposals on the President of the Russian Federation's use of the right of legislative initiative to create the legislative base for forming the normative corpus of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation.

5. A Temporary Commission To Prepare for Publication of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation will be formed with authority to operate until 31 December 1995.

The attached Statute on the Temporary Commissiion and its membership are ratified.

6. Agreement is given to the proposal of the coordinators of the Russian-American project to assist legal reform in the Russian Federation to finance work on preparations for publication of the Legal Code of the Russian Fedration in 1995 from the capital of this Project.

7. The Government of the Russian Federation, in developing the draft federal budget for 1996, will envision financing of work to prepare and publish the Legal Code of the Russian Federation as a separate sub-heading.

8. The Temporary Commission To Prepare for Publication of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation will submit, by 15 December 1995, a report on its work and proposals on areas of further work to prepare for publication of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation.

President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin Moscow, the Kremlin 6 February 1995 No 94

Statute on Commission

954E0556B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Feb 95 p 6

[Text: "Statute on the Temporary Commission To Prepare for Publication of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation"]

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[FBIS Translated Excerpt] 1. The Temporary Commission To Prepare for Publication of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter called the Commission) is a working organ of the President of the Russian Federation which ensures development and realization of measures to prepare for publication of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation (hereinafter the Code)—an official, systematized, and complete collection of operative normative enactments of the Russian Federation.

2. In its activity the Commission is subordinate to the President of the Russian Federation and is guided by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, normative enactments of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation, and the present Statute.

3. The primary tasks of the Commission are:

- coordination of work to inventory all federal laws, normative enactments of the President of the Russian Federation, normative enactments of the Government of the Russian Federation, and other normative enactments that are in effect and have not been formally repealed, as well as normative enactments of the USSR which continue to be in force in the Russian Federation;
- preparation of proposals on making amendments, adding supplements, and declaring enactments (articles, points) out of force in connection with adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and with newly adopted normative enactments;
- development of proposals on the formative principles and structure of the Code.

4. The Commission prepares and by established procedures introduces proposals on development of drafts subject to inclusion in the Code of codified and other consolidated legal enactments as well as enactments necessary to fill existing gaps in legislation.

5. The Commission develops and in the established manner presents for ratification drafts of plans for the participation of federal organs of the executive branch, scientific establishments, and other organizations in preparation of the Code, setting definite times, coordinated with performers, for each phase of the work; it monitors performance of assignments envisioned in the plans, and evaluates the state of affairs in preparations for publication of the Code.

6.In accomplishing the tasks given to it the Commission:

- coordinates the activities of the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law of the Government of the Russian Federation, the Institute of State and the Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the school of law at Moscow State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov, and other research and educational institutions of the law to work out the formative principles and structure of the Code and to carry on other work related to preprations for publication of the Code;
- summarizes the proposals made by these institutions related to preparations for publication of the Code and organizes their realization;
- reviews drafts of federal laws and normative enactments of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation on questions related to preparations for publication of the Code, and carries on this work in cooperation with the appropriate committees of the chambers of the Federal Assembly and subdivisions of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation and the Apparat of the Government of the Russian Federation;
- in accordance with its jurisdiction, requests from federal organs of state power information, documents, and reference material on legislation that is needed to carry on the Commission's activity;
- submits, in the established manner, proposals to the Government of the Russian Federation on financing work to prepare for publication of the Code from federal budget resources in 1966;
- enlists representatives of federal organs of the executive branch, legal scholars, and practicing specialists in its work.

7. The Commission carries on its activities in cooperation with the Federal Commission on Systematization of Legal Information of the President of the Russian Federation.

Members of the Commission may participate in the work of the Federal Commission on Systematization of Legal Information of the President of the Russian Federation with a consulting vote.

8. The membership of the Commission is ratified by the President of the Russian Federation.

9. Meetings of the Commission are held as necessary, but at least once a month, in conformity with its plan of work. Decisions at meetings are adopted by a majority of votes of the Commission members present. The Commission can form working groups for treatment of the most complex matters submitted for their review.

10. Organizational-technical support of the Commission's activities is provided by the State and the Law Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.

11. Legal information support of the Commission's activities, including setting up a periodically updated data base of operative legislation on machine readable media, is provided by the Sistema scientific-technical center of legal information of the Federal Agency for Governmental Communication and Information of the President of the Russian Federation.

List of Commission Members

954E0556C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Feb 95 p 6

[Text: "List of Members of the Temporary Commission To Prepare for Publication of the Legal Code of the Russian Federation"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] 1. V. M. Kuzmin: first deputy minister of justice of the Russian Federation (co-chairman of the Commission).

2. A. V. Maslov: deputy chief of the State and the Law Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (co-chairman of the Commission).

3. V. I. Nekrasov: deputy chief of a department of the State and the Law Administration of the President of the Russian Federation (accountable secretary of the Commission).

4. I. A. Bunin: deputy general director of the Yuridicheskaya Literatura [Legal Literature] Publishing House of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation.

5. B. V. Kiselev; deputy general director of the Federal Agency for Governmental Communication and Information of the President of the Russian Federation.

6. N. V. Lapchenkov: deputy chief of the Legal Administration of the Administration of the Government of the Russian Federation.

7. L. A. Okunkov: director of the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law of the Government of the Russian Federation.

8. A. P. Slivko: deputy chief of the Legal Administration of the Apparat of the State Duma of the Federal assembly (by consent).

9. B. N. Topornin: director of the Institute of State and the Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

10. N. A. Khavanskiy: chief of the Administration of Systematization of Legislation of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation.

11. I. G. Shablinskiy: first deputy chief of the Legal Administration of the Apparat of the Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly.

Electronic Election Data System Critiqued

954F1307B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Sergey Chugayev: "The 'Elections' Electronic System Does Not Prevent Manipulation of Elections in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The announcement made on the last day of January by the deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, A. Ivanchenko, that regular parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia will definitely be held in the time periods defined by the Constitution may with good reason be considered the starter signal for the new election campaign. Judging from the materials the editorial office has, while a number of prominent Russian politicians were questioning the wisdom of holding the election, a number of interested federal departments were energetically formulating new conditions for organizing and conducting this expression of the people's will. It is not impossible that their efficient work convinced politicians to stop vacillating.

The Edict of the president of Russia "On Developing and Creating the Russian Federation State Automated System 'Elections' (GAS 'Elections')" was published on 23 August of last year, but the public took little notice. Only a few observers noted that along with the Committee on Information Support Policy under the president of the RF (Kominform), the Federal Agency for Governmental Communications and Information (FAPSI) was designated one of the main creators of the new system (the Central Electoral Commission was designated as the general purchaser). As the Edict said, the system is supposed to make preparations for and holding of elections more efficient. According to legislation in effect in the country, FAPSI is an agency which is officially a military structure and special service. That is precisely the circumstance which in large part made people look more closely at how realization of this—at first glance purely technical—project was going.

The All-Seeing Computer

The results exceeded expectations. As became clear, an ultramodern electronic information system, unprecedented in scale and quality, is being built in Russia without any publicity. It presupposes equipping all territorial electoral commissions with computer technology—automated work stations (AWS's) which are linked with Tsentrizbirkom [Central Electoral Commission]. In this way, it will be possible to observe and monitor the election campaign from Moscow, at least on the rayon level. The cost of developing the system, according to the chairman of Kominform, I. Gorshkov, is about 100 billion rubles allocated from the federal budget. The first stage of the system should be put on line in the middle of this year. The entire system will be in full readiness at the start of next year. That is what the presidential Edict says and, judging from existing information, this presidential directive will undoubtedly be executed, unlike some others.

The materials earmarked for the press which the system's developers prepared emphasize that above all it is supposed to facilitate vote counting and reduce the time needed before election results are announced. That is its main job. Those who recall how the count and announcement of results of the election and referendum in 1993 were done can only welcome these objectives. The developers, in particular the leaders of Goskominform, also tried to anticipate questions regarding such a delicate subject as the reliable transmission of the voting results. "It should be specially emphasized," the "Commentary on the Presidential Edict" prepared at Kominform says, "that not all operations in the system are delegated to the machine. The traditional voting procedure placing ballots in the ballot boxes, primary control of ballots, and

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Structure of Russian Federation Election Organs Equipped with Automation Equipment



Key:—1. Central Electoral Commission (Tsentrizbirkom); 2. State Communications Network; 3. State and Departmental Information Systems; 4. District Administration; 5. City (Rayon) Administration; 6. Territorial Electoral Commission; 7. Sources of Information—Precinct Electoral Commissions; 8. District Electoral Commission; 9. Electoral Commission of Subject of the Federation

vote counting at voting precincts, as well as comparison of information put into the computer's memory with the original reports, are left for human beings to do."

During our talk at Kominform, the system's developers also tried to show as convincingly as possible that their offspring cannot create conditions for any kind of juggling of the voting results. The data from the reports of the precinct electoral commissions, they said, will be verified before they are entered into the computer. There are control systems in the program for single and multiple mandate districts—the machine itself will reject inaccurate reports. Members of the electoral commissions will supervise the entry of the reports. A dual control system will be used when comparing the reports. Summary tables will immediately be transmitted to the monitors in the hall for observing the election—where votes will be counted and where the rankings of the candidates can be established immediately. The data from the records will be sent "upstairs" immediately. Information can always be obtained from the upper level through the communications channels. It will be impossible for outsiders to get into the data base—it has been encoded with a special 32-bit cyclical code.

A System Cut Off from Society

The explanations seem exhaustive at first glance. But a closer familiarity with the "Elections" system raises quite a few questions. The first ones appear after studying the organizational chart of the system presented by the editorial staff of Kominform (see diagram).

It is not difficult to see that there is no place in the chart for the representative organs of power. Neither those in the center nor those in local areas. The system's lower subdivisions are located on the premises of city and rayon administrations. Judging from the chart, the members of the electoral commissions and observers do not have access to automated work stations where the most important part of the election process should occur—entry of data into the computer. Nor are the halls for observing elections found in the chart. Members of

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electoral commissions, observers, and representatives of parties may be allowed to observe the summarizing of election results, or they may not be.

But then the bottom right corner of the diagram shows the structure called "State and Departmental Information Systems." As is well known, these systems are under FAPSI control. And consequently, this service will obtain rapid information on the course of the election along with Tsentrizbirkom.

In this way, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that the State Automated System "Elections" being created represents an enormous information network cut off from society and designed only for the executive branch of power and closed departments.

But the main question is to what degree can persons and organizations with access to the system, thus obtaining the most rapid information from voting precincts, modify the results of the balloting? Kominform specialists assure us that this is impossible—because data entry is monitored by members of electoral commissions and there is the dual entry rule.

Let us try to make a model of the situation, to use the language of the system's developers. There are an average of 50-70 representatives of voting precincts in the territory of each electoral commission in Russia. Thus, after the balloting is over and reports have been compiled, usually near morning, 50-70 representatives of precinct electoral commissions are supposed to bring the reports on the ballot counts, the voting results, to the rayon or city administration where two of the system's computers will be housed and where the territorial electoral commission will be. According to specialists' estimates, from 6-12 hours will be required to enter all this information in one computer (the administration will have the second computer). We probably cannot assume that the members of precinct electoral commissions will survive this marathon. Most likely, representatives of the rayon electoral commission will monitor the entry of the data. Or even more likely, technical associates will.

Moreover, there is no doubt that the premises in which the system's computers are housed will have the status of what they call "regulated" rooms. And as yet no one knows who will have the right to enter them.

However, experts suggest that election results can certainly be modified during the stage of entering data into the computer. The person dictating to the computer operator can name any figure, and the operator himself can, for example, add another 100 votes to any column. And no automated protection system which the Kominform specialists talked of will help here. So the dual entry rule itself protects the data only from technical errors. Thus, a perfectly realistic possibility, at least a technical possibility, exists that persons or organizations who possess that same 32-bit code can not only obtain cumulative data on the balloting, but can even change data at any level.

There is no reason to believe that the "Elections" system was initially formulated to make it easier to falsify election results. We mean only that such a possibility remains. The machines are not perfect, and sometimes people are subjected to temptation. Consequently, it seems to me that the work of protecting their rights should be undertaken by the voters themselves. And above all, their representatives in the State Duma. It seems to me it would be wise, in particular before the elections begin, to adopt a number of short and precise laws to clearly prescribe the procedure for counting votes (otherwise Tsentrizbirkom and other organs of power will define this procedure). These laws, for example, could introduce a mandatory rule for inverse verification—comparing the printout of the data entered into the computer with the original reports of the precinct electoral commissions; require that the summary tables of the election results be published in the press immediately, within 2-3 days after the balloting; make sample checks on 2-3 percent of the voting precincts for recounting ballots mandatory (since if an attempt is made to falsify election results on a large scale, all voting precincts will be affected); and, finally, on top of the rest adopt a norm—which up to now Tsentrizbirkom has opposed—strictly prohibiting precinct election reports filled out in pencil or with corrected figures.

One can say with a great deal of certainty that effective social control over the conduct of elections reinforced by equally effective legislation will ultimately prevent us from questioning the integrity of the conduct of future elections. But there is reason to assume that processing the results of the balloting is only the tip of the election iceberg.

Files on Voters

Let us ask a simple question: what will the GAS "Elections" do in the interval between elections? It would be naive to assume that a system costing hundreds of billions of rubles which thousands of skilled specialists will be servicing will be idle. The first response to the question was obtained at Kominform: twice a year in each rayon of Russia, the system will be used to carry out a so-called update of the data base, or to put it more simply, to revise voter rolls. This will include establishing who voted, when, and for whom. In order to conduct sociological studies, analyses, and forecasts, as the Kominform specialists explained.

So it turns out that verification of voter rolls is moving under the control of the rayon administrations and Tsentrizbirkom, although the independent federal service ZAGS [Civil Registry Office] used to be responsible for this. But the most important thing is that the system will be used, as is obvious from the explanations of the Kominform representatives, to create a strategic data bank where in fact all political information will be concentrated, a file on every even slightly politically active citizen of Russia. It is theoretically possible to establish a political file on each Russian citizen

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(although it would be very expensive). All this information will be the property of those who have access to the system, of course.

This statement from the Kominform's publicity materials also attracts attention: "... Distinct data 'islets' of information support within the system form a fundamentally new medium of information interaction not only for the purpose of election campaigns but also for the purpose of joint actions of subjects of state and private structures, **both in conditions of everyday life and in extraordinary situations.**"

Based on a CPSU Central Committee Design

Here is a more detailed comment on this topic from **A. Sobyanin, the former head of the expert group for studying elections and referendums under the RF president's administration and now expert for the Russia's Choice faction:**

"The president's Edict modestly calls the new Federation-wide information system 'Elections.' RF Tsentrizbirkom, which seems to have nothing to do with the structures of executive power, is acting as the general purchaser. But this circumstance should not mislead us. In fact the power and political structures of the president's administration have begun to create a very powerful modern information network which links the federal organs of power with each of the 3,000 administrative rayons of the RF, bypassing the heads of regional administrations."

No matter what the Edict says, such an information network consisting of more than 7,000 automated work stations (costing at least 1,500 dollars apiece) and protected "from unsanctioned access to information," a network which needs an army of many thousands of specialists who have modern software for its routine operation, such a network cannot remain the monopoly property of Tsentrizbirkom after it is put on line.

In fact, as it seems to me, we are speaking of the revival on a completely new technical level of the CPSU Central Committee system for gathering and processing information which used to exist and which linked the CPSU central apparat with the apparats of all republic, oblast, okrug, and rayon committees and party organizations of large enterprises. The "brain" of this information octopus (the TsOI, as it was called, the Data Processing Center) was housed in a specially equipped 900-square-meter room located in the seventh wing of the complex of CPSU Central Committee buildings on Staraya Square. That will most likely be the same location of the "brain" of the new information system, which essentially is supposed to perform the same functions, constantly supplying the central apparat (in this case the apparat of the RF president's assistants and administration) with prompt political information and when necessary quickly issuing the appropriate instructions to the lower echelons.

Information Is Power

Evidence that the new information system will serve precisely the president's administration rather than the government or the Federal Assembly can be seen in, among other things, the fact that the president has put responsibility for fulfilling the order not on governmental but on presidential structures: Kominform and the Federal Agency for Governmental Communications and Information.

This last-named structure deserves a few words of special discussion. FAPSI, which modestly calls itself an "agency," is at the present time one of the largest and most influential Russian special services. It was formed in the spring of 1992 through the merger of the Governmental Communications Administration, which had been separated off from the USSR KGB and was at that time relatively small in terms of numbers, with one of the few (if not the only) economic information special services, which had preserved its divisions not only in strictly Russian regions but in the territory of almost all the countries which had been part of the USSR.

Later FAPSI systematically subordinated, one after another, the information services which were or might in principle be in competition with it. One of the last to fall was the renowned Information Resources Administration under the RF president (chief V. Kupriyanovskiy), which had on its balance all the computer equipment of the president's administration and the government. Now this equipment and at the same time some analytical departments which used to be part of the Administration also belong to FAPSI.

Incidentally, people say that all the computer equipment of both chambers of the Federal Assembly belongs to FAPSI. People claim the "professionals" from FAPSI have been charged with supervising the entire legal database of the president's administration and the government. The typists of this agency print and publish (or do not publish, according to their instructions) the president's edicts and the government's decrees and directives.

Finally, FAPSI controls the electronic information network which interconnects the system of Russian banks.

The only thing FAPSI does not have is control over election (voter) information. But when the GAS "Elections" goes on line, the agency will obtain this control. Incidentally, it is not impossible that on the level of Tsentrizbirkom, which is located in the complex of buildings of the RF president's administration, FAPSI already has this information. That would possibly explain Tsentrizbirkom's obstinate unwillingness to publish the notorious detailed numerical data on the results of the election and referendum of 12 December 1993. But Tsentrizbirkom's possession of the information still does not guarantee there will be no leak of election information through the city and rayon electoral commissions and the electoral commissions of the subjects of

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the Federation. But when the "Elections" system is turned over for use, nothing will be able to break FAPSI's monopoly.

It is well known that information is power. And when one of the departments has a monopoly on information, it means that department has a monopoly on power. How can we fail to recall here the surprising "information deafness" which is increasingly afflicting the Russian president? Neither the mass information media, nor the deputies, nor Sergey Kovalev, nor even his own assistants and the members of the Presidential Council can get through to him any longer.

At one time a similar "deafness" struck M. Gorbachev and resulted in the terrible disaster of August 1991, which both affected him personally and the entire country. And that was when the former communist rulers of the USSR tried never to concentrate information in any one place. At that time the TsOI gathered political information within the country, while Goskomstat [State Statistics Committee] and the closed information system of the NPO [scientific-production association] Energy gathered economic information. The information networks of the KGB and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] competed between themselves for domestic "special information," while the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and the GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] did the same for foreign "special information." Some other ministries had independent information systems as well.

But now, it seems, two departments which are in close alliance, FAPSI and GUO [Main Security Directorate], have won the invisible information war in Russia.

P.S. Throughout the week, the editorial office tried to get Tsentrizbirkom to comment. But its leaders could not find the time to meet with the newspaper's correspondent.

Edict on State Order for Retraining State Employees

954E0577A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 5

[Edict of the Russian Federation President on State Orders for the Retraining and Advanced Training of State Employees, under the heading: "Universal Education for State Employees"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the purposes of implementing a uniform state personnel policy for satisfying the requirements of Russian Federation state bodies of authority for the retraining and advanced training of state employees, I decree:

1. That it be established that the retraining and advanced training of federal state employees holding positions defined in the Register of State Positions of Federal State Employees confirmed by the 11 January 1995 Edict No. 33 of the Russian Federation President, "On the Register of State Positions of Federal State Employees," shall be carried out on the basis of state orders and financed out of federal budget funds.

That procedures for the preparation, placement and use of state orders for the retraining and advanced training of federal state employees shall be drafted and approved by the following:

By the Russian Federation government—for staffs of federal executive agencies;

By the director of the Russian Federation president's Administrative Office, for the Russian Federation president's Administrative Office;

By the director of the staff of the Federal Assembly's Federation Council—for the staff of the Federal Assembly's Federation Council;

By the director of the staff of the Federal Assembly's State Duma—for the staff of the Federal Assembly's State Duma;

By the director of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court—for the staff of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court;

By the Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Court—for the staff of the Russian Federation Supreme Court;

By the Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Court of Arbitration, for the staff of the Russian Federation Supreme Court of Arbitration;

By the Russian Federation procurator general—for the personnel of the Russian Federation Procuracy General;

By the chairman of the Russian Federation Central Election Commission—for the staff of the Russian Federation Central Election Commission.

2. That the Russian Federation government shall:

provide as a separate item in draft annual federal budgets beginning with 1995 for the financing, on the basis of economic normative rates, of state orders for the retraining and advanced training of federal state employees;

draw up within two months and convey to federal bodies of state authority economic normative rates for the allocation of funds from the federal budget (depending on groups of positions of state employees and types of instruction) for the financing of state orders, and indices for statistical reports on the results of the fulfillment of state orders for the retraining and advanced training of federal state employees, as well as procedures for the presentation of such reports;

3. That the coordination of work on the preparation, placement and fulfillment of state orders for the retraining and advanced training of state employees in

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federal bodies of state authority shall be assigned to the Russian Federation president's Council on Personnel Policy.

4. That it be recommended to bodies of state authority of the components of the Russian Federation that they annually prepare orders, on the basis of identified needs, for the retraining and advanced training of state employees of components of the Russian Federation, as well as the employees of local government bodies, to be subsequently placed on a contractual basis with regional personnel centers of the Russian Federation president's Russian Academy of State Service and other educational institutions that carry out professional education programs for the training of state and municipal employees.

That the retraining and advanced training of state employees of components of the Russian Federation and employees of local government bodies be financed with funds from the budgets of components of the Russian Federation and local budgets.

5. That this edict shall enter into force ont eh date of its publication.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation
B. Yeltsin

Moscow, the Kremlin
7 February 1995
No. 103

Media Issues

NTV General Director Malashenko Interviewed

954E0577B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 95 p 3

[Interview with Yevgeniy Malashenko: general director of NTV, conducted by Tatyana Akkuratova: "Does The 'Fourth Estate' Exist on the Fourth Television Channel"; date and place of interview not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] **More than a year ago the little green sphere that is the NTV logo first appeared on the fourth television channel. There were a lot of debates as to whether this nonstate television company, which does not receive a ruble from the state budget, would make it, whether it would be able to win an audience, and whether it wouldn't become a mouthpiece for those who were financing it. Now one can boldly say that NTV has made it.**

The television company's viewer rating has particularly improved along with the exacerbation of the Chechen conflict. On the other hand, people in the corridors of power have threatened to take NTV off the air for the "inappropriate coverage of events in Chechnya." "Don't execute the messenger. He isn't to blame for the fact that the news that he brings is usually bad," remarked Yevgeniy Kiselev, moderator of "Summing Up" [Itogi], in response to that threat. That is the reason for the first question to NTV general director Yevgeniy Malashenko:

[Akkuratova] What are your methods for reporting the news?

[Malashenko] News programs are not the creative expressions of individual authors, and commentary and shows of emotion on the part of their moderators are impermissible. In principle, it is not our task to berate, condemn or praise anyone. We do not create the news; we report it, no matter how distressing it may be. I am convinced that both society and the regime have an interest in that. That is why we constantly have at least two teams working in Chechnya. That makes it possible to cover the situation there from various sides. I must say that the attitude toward journalists on the part of the federal authorities has changed lately, and they are beginning to understand that they need to help, not interfere with, journalists in order to get coverage of actions they take. On the other hand, Dudayev's people, who have become extremely embittered, have started to treat us with hostility.

[Akkuratova] Nonetheless, many representatives of the regime continue to have serious prejudices against NTV. The continue to consider you tendentious, with a penchant for sensationalism.

[Malashenko] I will respond by citing a simple example. Do you recall the case of the false information about Chernomyrdin's dismissal? It was carried on various television channels and radio stations but ascribed solely to NTV. Representatives of the regime are also human beings with their own prejudices and predilections. The truly serious question is something else: Where does such false information come from, and should journalists report it? One thing is indisputable: they aren't the ones who make it up. Those for whom it is advantageous simply dump it on journalists, and in doing so they are also making a calculation: they are betting on the authorities' prejudice against the press. We must not let ourselves "get caught" by these moves—with that I agree.

[Akkuratova] But is NTV really so independent? Since the moment it was established passions have never calmed down over the question: does Most Bank influence your news and personnel policy, or to put it more simply, has Gusinskiy bought the company?

[Malashenko] Noninterference in the company's professional affairs was part of the contract with our investors. But the reason they are financiers is that they deal with finance, which we have much less understanding of. And all the gossip to the effect NTV has sold out to the sharks of business is possible only in the post-Soviet situation, because up until now we have been profoundly Soviet people, and many of us possess a kind of ineradicable cynicism, which is expressed by the old Russian proverb: he who plays the piper calls the tune. It would not occur to any American in his right mind to say that ABC, NBC and CBS express the interests of Capital Cities, General

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Electric, or the Tisch family (beer producers), to whom those television networks belong. People in our country do not ask T. Turner, owner of CNN, questions about the extent to which CNN reflects his personal biases. For some reason, that is possible only with regard to Russian journalists. Someone who persistently asks whether we have sold out to Most Bank will always ask that question and pretend that he does not know the answer, although he knows it perfectly well. Nonetheless, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA will write once again about how we have sold out, and about the bankers who have bought up the mass media—that is its policy.

[Akkuratova] But in that case, why does Most Bank need another headache?

[Malashenko] First of all, the bankers are guided by purely commercial considerations: television is a very profitable sphere of business. That has finally been recognized by many other Russian businessmen—it is no accident that a line formed at Ostankino for the 49 percent of shares that were offered to banks and other commercial organizations. And second, the businessmen are acting on the simple truth that television that is stable from the economic standpoint (there can be no healthy television with an unhealthy economic base) is an extremely important factor in ensuring sociopolitical stability in society. And that is essential to businessmen.

[Akkuratova] And so, NTV is a commercial project. But what is needed to establish a new company?

[Malashenko] A team, money, and access to the airwaves. That sounds very simple, although each of the components is a complicated, independent problem.

In my view, the team should be minimal. The structure of NTV is very simple; the basic decisions are made by about six people who in no way duplicate one another; the company employs about 300 people, which is very few.

Second, there is money. To launch a company, a massive infusion of funds is required at the initial stage in order to get off to a smooth and strong start and attract notice. We solved the problem with the help not only of Most Bank but also of the Stolichnyy [Capital] and Natsionalnyy Kredit [National Credit] banks. I want to stress that this wasn't money given for free by rich uncles but credit that was obtained at interest and that must unquestionably be repaid. And we are already earning money, and more than we counted on, and this past December we made the first payment on our debt.

And finally, access to the airwaves. As you know, by presidential edict we received the evening hours on Channel 4 "on an experimental basis." It was obviously that phrase that gave certain representatives of the regime grounds for declaring the possibility of a reorganization of Channel 4 and even the withdrawal of NTV's license that was issued last October. In January we underwent reregistration and obtained a new type of license from the Federal Television and Radio Broadcasting Service in accordance with the RF government's decree on the licensing of television and radio broadcasting. Now I hope that the endless information "leaks" about all sorts of plans on the authorities' part with respect to NTV will start to diminish. And if someone still wants to deprive the company of its right to the airwaves, he will have to act in accordance with the Law on the Mass Media, which provides for a legal judicial procedure in such cases.

[Akkuratova] Off all the influential companies, yours seems to be the only one that does not need money but is trying to give it back. This is possibly the only such case in our whole economy at present. How are you making your money?

[Malashenko] On a rational advertising policy. After all, advertising is the only means of survival for a nonstate television company. At first, when NTV was just starting to broadcast, we did not carry commercials—we did not want to sell airtime for commercials at dumping prices, which were the lowest of all on Channel 4. We did not accept such commercials, since we realized that we would thereby be undermining the long-term basis of our survival. That is why we immediately set an extremely high price, which very few were prepared to pay at first. But when our programs showed a serious rating and we proved that this was no fluke, the advertisers started coming to us. Now commercials on NTV are expensive, but if you compare them with those on other channels, they cost exactly what they ought to. And if you compare them with the West, they are cheap—the Russian economy is still weak. For example, last year NOVO-TV, which was established in the Czech Republic at practically the same time as NTV, earned 1.5-fold what we did for a commercial. Yet its audience is just over 10 million viewers. And we, starting with 40 million television viewers, are now approaching the 100-million mark; since the end of December NTV's signal has been relayed by one of the Gorizont satellites, and several new ground transmitters started operating at once. Now our programs may be viewed not just in Russia but in Kazakhstan and a substantial part of Ukraine.

Although NTV, by earning money on commercials, has started to repay its debts, this year we will have to borrow money again: we are starting to build our own television complex.

NTV President Malashenko Interviewed

954Q0127A Moscow NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Feb 95 pp 1,2

[Interview with Igor Malashenko, by Sergey Varshavchik: "In the Kremlin There Are Two Buttons: 'On' and 'Off.' But There Are a Lot of Mischievous Hands"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **January marked the end of a year since Channel 4 at 1800 hours have granting us the opportunity to watch "new generation" television. As you**

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have guessed, we are talking about NTV. I am having a conversation with the president of that company, Igor Malashenko. He is a candidate of philosophical sciences, and since November 1992 has been the acting chairman of the Ostankino GTRK [State Television and Radio Company].

[Varshavchik] Igor Yevgenyevich, although NTV appeared recently, it has already managed to "win points" from the viewers. How do you think it managed to do that?

[Malashenko] The success that we have managed was the result of extremely simple things: first, we feel that the audience today wants first of all to be informed and entertained. And it is specifically for that reason that our channel is an information and entertainment one in which there are no didactics, no instructions, no long-winded speeches. And, judging by the ratings, we are apparently "on target." Secondly, we have a simple and precise schedule. That is, every day, at one and the same time, we show those broadcasts that have been announced in the program and that the viewers are waiting for. And, also, because we provide information programs, even the movies and broadcasts that we buy largely correspond to the viewers' preferences.

[Varshavchik] Doesn't it seem to you that, as compared with Ostankino and RTR [Russian State Television and Radio Company], you have greater advantages, inasmuch you are a "child" of private capital?

[Malashenko] Let's consider, from my point of view, the advantages that we have over the television companies you have mentioned. Advantage number one is the fact that we have a very compact company, as is standard for commercial television companies throughout the world, as compared with state—or, as they are called in the West, "public"—ones, which are tremendous bureaucratic monsters. The small ones employ hundreds of people (we have 300 staff workers, plus approximately 100 technical workers at the Ostankino technical center), whereas the number of people working at RTR and Ostankino is measured in the tens of thousands. Our company consists of four large units: finance, technical direction, information service, and motion-picture group (although, in addition to movies, it engages in all the artistic broadcasting). Thus, the chief advantage that we have is compactness and mobility, that is, we always know who is responsible for what. We have five or six people who make the decisions, and, unlike the situation in state TV, at NTV we always know specifically who has made a decision, when, and why. It is very difficult for large companies to arrange the broadcasting schedule that I mentioned. There is always that pressure from various people's interests. There is the tremendous number of studios or other producing structures, which attempt by any means to send their products out over the air. With all the concomitant consequences for the ratings, etc. Plus the fact that our company was one of the first where we took a very strict approach to the question of centralizing the advertising, which is one of the key factors in any company's financial welfare. But if we have in mind the fact that the Most [Bridge] group is one of the founders of NTV, the situation here turns out to be very simple: we have never received any sponsorship money from our founder. We have received only credit. And at the present time we have approximately $15 million of debt, which we are slowly beginning to pay it back (since June, we have not taken even a single credit ruble or dollar). In other words, for more than half a year we have been completely self-supporting. The rules of the game are identical for everyone, regardless of the form of ownership: if it is possible to establish a healthy economic basis, then it will operate and bring in a profit. If not, then there are endless subsidies, credit, etc.

[Varshavchik] NTV has been noticed not only by the viewers, but also by the political circles. And, judging by the recent statement by First Vice-Premier Oleg Soskovets concerning the fact that your company should be deprived of a broadcasting license, NTV "receives no favors."

[Malashenko] In this regard we have had problems, and still do. Basically they began when NTV began throwing light in a considerable amount of detail on the Chechen crisis. We evoked the ire and dissatisfaction of a group of people who feel that we are defending someone's position. However—and I want to emphasize this—we were simply attempting to throw complete light on this event that is so important for Russia. Unfortunately, for those people that illumination is completely undesirable and unacceptable. Suffice it to recall in this regard the creation of the Provisional Information Center, the task of which was to supplement the mass media with strange semiofficial points of views and interpretations of the events.

[Varshavchik] Also, both Poptsov and Yakovlev have in their offices the famous *vertushkas*—telephones with direct lines to the country's leadership, over which they receive a "reaming out." How do they exert an influence on you as a manager?

[Malashenko] I don't have a *vertushka*, but the officials have learned how to use the city telephones. Therefore, when Mr. Nosovets, for example, telephoned me in order to warn me officially that if we did not change the nature of our treatment of the events in Chechnya, we would simply be kicked off the air waves, he used an ordinary telephone. Although, as a person who used to work at Ostankino I must admit that, psychologically, when you get a telephone call over the ATS-1 or ATS-2, it is a completely different thing from getting a call on the city telephone. In the latter instance, you are not in that hypnotic state that encompasses you when you get a telephone call over the governmental system.

[Varshavchik] Igor Yevgenyevich, what do you think caused the rumors to the effect that somewhere deep within the president's apparatus there is an edict

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according to which the government is one of the stockholders in your company, with the rights of the owner of the controlling block?

[Malashenko] Governmental circles and people in the president's entourage are definitely not a monolith. There are various groupings there, which dislike one another rather strongly and which adhere to rather different political views. For example, as soon as there was a leaking of information over the ITAR-TASS channels concerning that edict, the next day Sergey Filatov, the head of the president's administration, made a statement in which he asserted that this was a "game against the president" that was being carried out by certain people in his entourage. And I do not have any doubts that, out of the very numerous leaks that have occurred recently about the presidential edicts and governmental directives that are allegedly being prepared, half of them are completely phony and are nothing else but an instrument of blackmail and intimidation. If one speaks about the leak itself, it talked about giving Channel 4 to private companies. However, they are strange companies, inasmuch as the share of state participation is supposed to be no less than 51 percent. Correspondingly, it was proposed to the government that it conduct negotiations with NTV, in order to get those percentages from us. However, the most important thing was not written there. The fact that, if we object, we are politely told, "Excuse me, but we have new rules." This is the same thing as living in your own cooperative apartment, that you paid for long ago, and suddenly having some guy show up and tell you that you can continue to live in your apartment, but half of it has to belong to the state or to Uncle Vasya. So in this situation we decided for ourselves that we would not pay any attention to that tiresome blackmail. In the final analysis, we cannot change, inasmuch as (I have in mind primarily the information service) we follow several simple principles that guide our colleagues throughout the world. The public has the right to know about important events. But we do not pursue any political goals. We provide information only, rather than propaganda.

[Varshavchik] In this regard don't you think that the attacks on NTV are one of the components of a large plan to discredit the Most group and the politicians standing behind it?

[Malashenko] Definitely this is part of the big "game." True, I do not know how carefully the plan for that "game" has been worked out or the extent to which these people are acting under the influence of their political instincts or group interests, but one can discern the overall outline. Incidentally, to put it crudely, we do not know what is the "cart," and what is the "horse." When, after the 2 December events in front of the mayor's office (and our office is situated specifically there, and we observed that ugly scene from the ninth floor), people started talking about a connection in the threats to the Most group and NTV, I at first took a very skeptical attitude to that. However, the events appear to me now in a somewhat different light. As we now know, on 29 November there was a session of the Security Council, at which the operation in Chechnya was discussed On 2 December—the events in front of the mayor's office and then the sending of troops into Chechnya—a powerful political crisis began. So now I assume that the act of intimidation was aimed also at us, inasmuch as the authorities feel that the one who pays is the one who orders the music.

[Varshavchik] Doesn't Gusinskiy give you TsU?

[Malashenko] No, Gusinskiy isn't smart enough to do that. Also, our situation fundamentally is no different from that, for example, the ABC television company, which owns Capital City, or NBC, which owns General Electric. But no one with common sense in the United States would even take it into his head to say that ABC is "singing with the voice of the company that owns the controlling block of shares. In our country, however, certain people believe that and genuinely assume that if pressure is exerted on the Most group, that will change the NTV position. They just cannot understand that this is a professional mass medium on which it is senseless to exert pressure in this way.

Russian TV Channel Situation Updated

954F1296A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 4, 26 Jan 95 p 13

[Article by Irina Petrovskaya under "Rules of the Game" rubric: "A Field of Miracles in the Beloved Country"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We are sick of talking and arguing. Let us play instead. The games under the provisional name "You Guessed It, You Got It" are the favorite pastime of the absolute majority of television viewers in the vast expanses of the Motherland that has turned into an unbroken field of miracles. I am not Yakubovich and therefore I am not offering any expensive prizes. The solution that you will learn a little later will serve as a prize.

So guess who among well-known politicians answered like this in response to the question of the television interviewer: "What is the meaning, in your opinion, of independent mass media and independent television and of whom and what are they independent?":

"Above all independent of political aims and a single orientation. If we once again carry out just a single line, it will once again become a monopoly.... Independence presupposes that it is necessary to listen to different points of view. There must be many different ideas on television. It seems to me that Russian Television must give an example....

"Furthermore, about the truth. Since the viewer's mistrust of television begins with the distortion of particular facts.... Truth and only the truth. It is difficult for us to tell this truth. It is hard for people. It is hard for...the

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leadership of the Russian Federation. But television is an institution that must still tell the truth. If Yeltsin made a mistake, it is definitely necessary to tell the truth about this. If he does not want to tell it, tell it for him. That is, he does not want to or there is no time. It happens....

"I think that there must be more than one television and radio company. There must be commercial television as well. And then there will be no Russian monopoly in television...."

Some of my acquaintances whom I asked to guess to whom these words belong did not hesitate to name Oleg Poptsov, chairman of the All-Russian Television Company. Alas, there is no such letter in this word!

The opinion of other "guessers" varied: among those named as possible authors were Nikolay Svanidze, Vladimir Pozner, Anatoliy Lysenko, Igor Malashenko, Yevgeniy Kiselev, and Eduard Sagalayev. These are wrong answers and therefore those who played but guessed wrong are out of the game.

Andrey Karaulov suggested that these statements may belong to Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin. That is warmer but still not it.

I will not torture you any longer, my patient reader. Attention, the correct answer: on 13 May 1991, on the day of the opening of Russian Television, Oleg Poptsov chatted on the air of the newborn television company with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. All of the seditious statements for that time about the independence of television, about truth, and about the necessity of the existence of not one but many varied television companies belong to him, the future president of the future free Russia. Even then he, just as President of the USSR Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, spoke of himself in the third person. By the way, this did not frighten anyone at the time: he was so affable and so democratic!

Oleg Poptsov noted in response to these words of Boris Nikolayevich: "If Yeltsin erred, the truth certainly must be told about this. If he does not want to tell it, tell it for him....": "I will consider this, Boris Nikolayevich."

And he did consider it. He continues to quote and be guided by a statement that Yeltsin made almost four years ago: "Independence presupposes that it is necessary to listen to different points of view...mistrust of television begins with the distortion of particular facts...."

One thing the chairman of Russian Television did not consider: the inability and unwillingness of democrats coming to power to listen to the truth about themselves and about their policies. It is easy to speak of independence and truth when you oppose the official authorities, as our current president demonstrated.

Oleg Poptsov has now fallen into disgrace for precisely what he once called on Russian Television to do and he was almost fired. This has not yet happened. Last week a group of leading journalists from Russian Television (Karaulov, Svanidze, Sorokina, and Borovik) along with a group of leading workers from there (Lysenko, Nekhoroshev) asked Chernomyrdin to meet with them. Viktor Stepanovich set a meeting for the next day.

At the very beginning of the conversation, the journalists made it clear to the prime minister that if Poptsov is touched they will go with him. "Since Poptsov himself is not the one who is broadcasting, it means that he is being removed for our truth, for our words," the journalists declared, after which they told Chernomyrdin the conditions under which they have to work and procure information. In the words of Andrey Karaulov, one of the participants and initiators of the meeting, the premier was stunned by the picture that he received of the resistance of many ministries and departments to television journalists and he promised not to undertake any action with respect to Poptsova without first consulting with the staff of Russian Television.

And the poor managers of Russian Television, intimidated by the endless threats of being removed, reformed, or merged with "Ostankino," are trying to the extent possible to reduce the degree of sharpness of the political broadcasts of the company: they significantly "slashed" Ruslan Aushev in "Without Retouching," they clipped the latest production of Artem Borovik's "Absolutely Secret" dedicated to the events in Chechnya, and they "cut" Boris Fedorov in "Moment of Truth." The authors of broadcasts subjected to "cuts," understanding the situation of their leadership, are resigning themselves to rather strict "editing." If the authorities that threatened to fire Poptsov wanted to to exactly this, it can be considered that they accomplished their purpose.

But the appearance of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin on Russian Television on 13 May 1991 has certainly been kept in the archives of the company. When the authorities raise the next Damocles sword over Poptsov's head, then they can show the tape to illustrate the idea of the surprising consistency of our top leaders—in words and in deeds.

The game is over. Forget it. The winner is the one who was not so naive as to understand the words powers that be literally and straightforwardly and who always endorsed the party line and wavered along with it.

To the studio for your prizes!

Spread of Ultra-Nationalist Publications Reported

954F1296B Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 4, 26 Jan 95 p 12

[Article by Anna Politkovskaya under "Diagnosis" rubric: "But the 'Bell' Is Still Sounding: Facist Publications Still Feel Wonderful in Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two years ago in Volgograd, the newspaper KOLOKOL began to be published as the

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official publication of the oblast association of independent entrepreneurs. Essentially it was 10 people who decided to establish a newspaper with a democratic orientation in support of the interests of the emerging domestic business. The founders mutually agreed to appoint a chief editor—Stanislav Terentyev, first of all a person with a strong leaning toward a literary career and secondly a very successful businessman capable of managing the new publication. It seemed that everything was coming together very well.

But after two or three weeks and hence two or three issues, there was not a trace left of the former democratic idea that fed KOLOKOL. The newspaper received the typical subheading "Weekly of the Russian Assembly" and the pages were filled with the following novelties:

"Without speaking of everything else, we will just ask: Do we live in Russia? Or did the Jew already come and conquer our kingdom?"

"A Russian administration for the Russian people!!!"

"Question: Can you give signs by which it is possible to recognize the children of the Devil who have disguised themselves as human beings?

"Answer: The direct signs are these: a) speech defects, where the letter 'r' is not pronounced or the speech is accompanied by a smacking sound or something inarticulate is uttered; b) for 99.9 percent, the ear lobes are fused with the skin of the cheek; c) the lower lip has a sagging appearance; d) there is a resemblance with a rat. Individual persons successfully mimic the Slavic type.

"Indirect signs are these: a) he is a member of some democratic organization; b) he wears a beard 'a la Trotsky'; c) he is prepared to lead anything; d) he is a born traitor."

Did it make you sick? Naturally. The cofounders felt the same thing. They were outraged by the metamorphoses and of course they gave up their participation in the newspaper, reasonably assuming that it would die, inasmuch as Terentyev does not have "that kind of money." But the democrats, as always, made a tactical mistake: the money was found and very quickly.

It turned out that many local businessmen and even more representatives of the state sector of the economy totally support these outrageous views. Moreover, in a short time the chief Volgograd "patriot" was able to increase the number of published pages and to raise the circulation to 10,000, which is not so few for Volgograd.

Then, as is proper, the Rostov regional inspectorate for the protection of freedom of the press and the mass media intervened and justifiably issued two consecutive warnings to KOLOKOL for a series of anti-Semitic articles. The matter went to the procurator's office and from there it went to court. And this is where everything got bogged down. The newspaper continues to be issued regularly and for more than a year and half two rayon courts of Volgograd have been marking time, lacking the intellectual strength to free the city from ideas that belong in the garbage dump.

The reason is simple: the courts point out that there is no way that they can receive an "expert conclusion" whose competence they believe. And the conclusion must be such that the court officials can be absolutely certain that the content of the articles from which we presented only excerpts, not even the strongest and most sadistic of them, contributes to the kindling of interethnic discord.

One can agree in full that such a conclusion cannot be written by the regional inspectorate but is it possible that it is too much for the specialists from the Press Committee? It is difficult to believe the latter. But the people in Volgograd did not wait for a qualified expert conclusion from Moscow. The courts got bogged down repeatedly (there were several suits against KOLOKOL). They could not charge chief editor Stanislav Terentyev with anything sensible.

And this is all that Terentyev needed—in the eyes of the people of Volgograd, he literally was inflated politically from the perception of his own importance and persecution "for all the Russian people." Terentyev carried ideas and the masses. He began to speak at plant entrances and in parks and during the visits of political leaders of a certain persuasion to Volgograd. As a result, the newspaper was in great demand and Terentyev turned out to be a desired figure in some influential offices, above all those of the chiefs of two Cossack districts located in the territory of Volgograd Oblast. From that time on, his speeches and the publication enjoyed special attention precisely among the Cossacks.

Having become stronger and having gained these ties, Terentyev went on the offensive and he himself went to court against those who "insulted" him and "called him a fascist." Guess what decision was made? It is hard to believe but in the year of the 50th anniversary of the victory over fascism, in the same city that the fascists destroyed down to the last stone, the Soviet (as though through some irony) Rayon Court of Volgograd answered the suit of the Russian fascist and obliged the local newspaper GORODSKIYE VESTI, which in its issues had accused KOLOKOL of inflamming interethnic discord, to pay to Terentyev 8 million rubles plus 2 million directly from the pocket of the author of an article as compensation for the moral damage that was inflicted.

And again the court pointed out that it does not have a "qualified expert conclusion" that could finally convince it, the court, to look the truth in the eyes. And the truth is that under all the laws of reason a normal person CANNOT and MUST NOT apologize to a fascist and certainly he must not pay him for further successful "work" in his chosen profession.

It should be noted that in general it is difficult to talk about some "expert conclusion" if the country has a

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constitution of direct effect, where there is an Article 29. The country has a Law on the Mass Media, where there is an Article 4. They involve the inadmissibility of the stirring up of racism, anti-Semitism, and interethnic and interreligious discord and compulsory prosecution of such inflammatory actions! You must agree that here it is simply impossible not to ask one important question: If ordinary journalists know all of this, why is it uncharted intellectual territory for professional jurists?

There are the courts but the country also has a General Procurator's Office. Alas, in the situation with KOLOKOL, the General Procurator's Office reported very strangely and publicly that this newspaper has supposedly been closed for a long time in Volgograd and hence there is no reason for the inflamming of passions. Either the General Procurator's Office does not know anything or it is consciously deceiving public opinion to make it possible for publications of a fascist persuasion to continue to flourish on our soil. It appears that the latter is closer to the real situation.

Six months ago, OBSHCHAYA GAZETA wrote about the existence in Russia of 100, according to some reports, or 150 fascist or so-called "patriotic" newspapers and journals, according to others. It seemed to us that all of them, being, as a rule, small in circulation and mediocre with respect to literary content and poorly made up, were doomed to a marginal existence, from which they were unlikely to rise. At that time we were sure that they never could and never would be able to have much effect on the inclinations of the majority.

Most people are now afflicted with an understandable apathy and feelings of depression and desperation. We are seeing a transformation of spheres of influence in Russian journalism and the struggle for readers has entered a new phase. For this reason, the activation of fascist publications and the open support given to them by judicial authorities in Russia cannot fail to be alarming. As long as KOLOKOL [the Bell] is still sounding, let us not forget about ourselves and our own future: about how we will be living within a year, to what god they will make us pray, and how great will be the compulsion....

P.S. The Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes appealed to the General Procurator's Office of the Russian Federation with the proposal that it carry out a criminal investigation with respect to S. Terentyev, chief editor of the Volgograd newspaper KOLOKOL. In the opinion of the Judicial Chamber, his actions fall under Article 74 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (propagandizing of anti- Semitism and inflammation of social discord and ethnic intolerance) and also are in conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the Law on the Mass Media.

In the course of an expert's opinion, the Judicial Chamber found a divergence between the thematic orientation declared by the founder at the time of registration and the real content of the publication. Instead of the declared "spiritual and economic development of the society," the newspaper dealt with the propagandizing of anti-Semitism. The Judicial Chamber together with the Russian Committee for the Press is planning to appeal to the State Duma to provide legislatively for a tightening up of the responsibility of founders of publications for such violations.

Public Surveyed on Trust in TV, Radio News Programs

954F1381A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 6, 8 Feb 95 p 15

[Article by Andrey Bystritskiy: "Viewers Trust 'Vesti' Most, Listeners—'Radio Russia'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the end of January, 1995, the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion conducted a survey of 1600 people in Russia. The survey illuminated certain aspects of citizens' attitudes towards our television programming.

The results are fairly interesting. On the one hand, there is cause for cheer. For example, almost 42 percent of those surveyed stated that they trusted "Vesti" more than the other news programs. Thirty-one percent of those surveyed trust "Novosti" ("Ostankino"), and 14.7 percent—"Segodnya" (NTV). It is true that "Segodnya" shouldn't be put in third place, because NTV is received by more than two times fewer people than, let's say, "Ostankino." In a recount, it works out that the level of trust for "Segodnya" is close to the level of trust for channel one's "Novosti."

If we speak of the general channel popularity, then, within its broadcast area, those surveyed liked NTV more than the others. Then comes "Ostankino," and in third place, dropping down a little, is Russian Television. On the whole, channels one and two are the leaders in Russia, occupying places corresponding to their numeration. We should note that tradition, the public's habit of watching program one is definitely working in channel one's favor. Incidentally, this is true not just in Russia, but in several other countries that have had the tradition of a First National Channel. VGTRK [All-Union State Television and Radio Company] steadfastly maintains the image of the main opponent. The emotional "Vesti" and its managers, with their inclination towards commentary, do not allow that image to fade.

The national radio leader is becoming clearer all the time. It is "Radio Russia." It holds the trust of 38 percent of those surveyed; more than the others. "Mayak" is in second place, lagging behind by almost ten percent. There is ten times less trust in foreign radio stations, among which the BBC and "Freedom" are the leaders, each trusted by 4.3 percent. Also important is the fact that the third place in trust is held by "Yevropa Plus," whose news program seems the most reliable to nearly 12 percent. This is especially important if we take

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into consideration the fact that this radio station is for young people. "Yunost" loses hopelessly to "Yevropa Plus."

Displaying their famous rationalism, about 60 percent of those surveyed stated that Russia needed a state television and radio channel that would broadcast the official point of view and official information. Somewhat contradicting this are answers to the question of how the manager of such a channel should be appointed. Only 8.5 percent said that he should be appointed by the president. Ten percent wanted to leave this delicate matter to the parliament. Another nine percent felt that a special council of well-known figures in culture, science, politics, and so on would be better. Nearly 7.5 percent decided that the head of television programming of this type should be elected by an all-Russian vote, like the president. Finally, and this is important, 37 percent decided that the journalists, themselves, should choose their own boss.

The wide variety of opinions on channel quality (see above) corresponds with citizens' well-known satisfaction with their television programming and radio. And so, only 17.7 percent feel that television and radio should be radically reformed. And 29.5 percent said that in general, they could have a little more propriety, but this would require partial reform, reorganization. Twenty-seven percent suggest that everything is fine the way it is, while the rest don't have a particular opinion about it.

Characteristically, citizens did not support the government's attack on the mass media. Thirty-two percent stated that it occurred because the mass media was no longer allowing the government to hide the truth. Depending on the accusation, 6-12 percent agreed with the statements that the mass media are defaming the army, are acting against the interests of the Russian people, that they have placed themselves in opposition to society, that they are destroying the state, and so on.

But there is a sad side to this.

Not a single news program, not a single radio station enjoys the trust of even half of those surveyed. Only 24 percent basically agreed that the mass media provide objective information. In this manner, there is a clear deficit in the trust that citizens feel towards their mass media, but it is not aggressive mistrust: "They're all lying, the snakes! They should be hung, they're hiding the truth!"—but more passive: "They're up to something there; you'll never find out the whole truth..."

And here, in my opinion, the real problem is, inasmuch as it signifies that the mass media will not be a sufficiently effective weapon in the pre-election battle, that the very strategy of the mass media must change. We will note that the same survey showed both high support for Zhirinovskiy (22 percent would vote for him right now), and a high level of passivity (47 percent of those surveyed, to all appearances, have no plans to go to the elections, or are concealing their views).

Unfortunately, according to public opinion, the mass media have turned out to be firmly fastened to society's leaders, to whom the population generally denies its trust without trying to figure out who holds which views.

Federal Assembly

Duma Budget Committee Chairman Zadornov Interviewed

954Q0128A Moscow NOVOYE VREMYA in Russian No 5, Feb 95 [Signed to press 31 Jan 95] pp 16-17

[Interview with Mikhail Zadornov, chairman of the budget committee of the State Duma, by Aleksandr Deykin: "How They Cook the 'Public Pie': Chairman of the Budget Committee of the State Duma Mikhail Zadornov on the Secrets of Getting State Expenditures in Line With Revenue"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In a normal situation, of course, the state budget is affirmed prior to the beginning of the next fiscal year. This time, however, the delay of several weeks in the adoption of the budget for the current year—if it does not become a delay of many months—means a certain interim "achievement": the previous annual budget was approved in the middle of 1994, when half of the "affirmed" period was actually past.

This had seemingly become established procedure over the past three years—not a single budget was passed on time and for many months the country essentially lived without its basic economic document. But this very procedure was extremely convenient for executive authority, for it precluded full participation of legislative bodies in the resolution of budgetary matters. Appropriations were distributed "after the fact" and in practice this meant an affirmation of the division of the "public pie" already executed in accordance with the power and influence of branch, departmental, and other lobbies, whose expenditure requests were not really checked out and justified by anyone.

Such habits involving trillions of rubles [R] are easily acquired but extremely difficult to overcome. Actually the government becomes the master over one-fourth of the gross national product; in practice, there is no time to implement control even if it is foreseen by law. And we have no such law.

Life without a normal budget probably explains most of the economic disorder or recent years. To take the other point of view, that of justifying the budgetary and financial confusion through the catastrophic situation in the economy, is senseless and illogical: the budget in civilized countries is a means for regulating economic processes and a tool for the stimulation of economic growth. True, the realization of the basic budgetary functions requires a rather high level of economic organization of the society and the obedience of its members to the law.

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If this level is inadequate, the whole burden of the task lies on parliament. The State Duma has far fewer rights and powers with respect to the budget than the former Supreme Soviet had but it was able if not to set budget and tax matters straight—we are still terribly far from this—at least to establish a little order in budgetary procedures. The dense cloud that prevailed until recently in the government's financial plans and reports is gradually clearing. It is primarily the actions of the budget committee of the Duma that are contributing to this.

Last year three doubtless achievements of the committee were noted: a concise law was passed to regulate the budget process in 1995; for the first time, it was possible to make up the budget before the start of the fiscal year; with the coming of the new minister of finance, the working contact of this department with parliamentary subdivisions finally began to get going.

The conciliatory budget committee of the government and State Duma was able to cut out a federal budget that is tight like a violin string but does have some connection with reality. But as before, none of the calming epithets about the situation in this area is acceptable. To the old problems are added "unforeseen factors" like the Chechen crisis and they threaten to undermine the few positive results that can be achieved.

I turned to Mikhail Zadornov, chairman of the budget committee of the State Duma, with questions about today's problems with the Russian budget.

[Deykin] Mikhail Mikhaylovich, can the situation with respect to the Russian budget be considered hopeless and upon what factors—economic, political, or organizational—does it mainly depend?

[Zadornov] I think that the budget will be hopeless until a more or less stable political system is established in the country and the rate of inflation falls to an annual level of 60-70 percent. The problem is that heretofore the government forecasts on the social and economic situation in the country and on its basic indicators have been very far from reality and therefore the planned final result of budget policy was naturally significantly different from the actual figure. Nevertheless, in working on the individual items of the budget or its overall variants, we always sought to make it as close as possible to the real economic situation and policy and also to utilize the opportunity for the teaching of what may be called the economic culture of the society. Not everything succeeds but some things work out.

[Deykin] The Chechen crisis has noticeably changed several aspects of our life. What sum might estimate its "budgetary" cost?

[Zadornov] In my opinion, we cannot give a final estimate until after the end of active combat operations and branch specialists calculate the cost of the necessary work to restore what has been destroyed. But the military operations cost R20-25 billion every day beyond anything foreseen in financial plans. It is still unclear what sort of military contingent will have to be left in the territory of the republic at the end of the fighting for how long and accordingly what additional expenditures this will mean. There is also the assistance to the population left without housing or any means of a livelihood and to refugees under the Federal Migration Service. The most difficult thing will be the rebuilding of housing, transportation, and in general everything that we have become accustomed to calling the "national economy." As of mid-January, all of this could be estimated at about R5 trillion but corrections will have to be made if the military operations are prolonged.

[Deykin] There is talk about it being necessary to put the Chechen problem under a separate line of expenditures of the federal budget.

[Zadornov] It seems to me that the problem is not one of having a separate "position" in the budget but that the government would like to finance all of the "Chechen" expenditures through the "internal reserves" of each item without changing the overall wording of the budget. The objective is understandable: not to disrupt the structure of the budget. But in the first place, in my opinion, this is impossible, for there is no getting around substantial changes in a number of items under the influence of the Chechen conflict. Secondly, what kind of draft budget is this if such "reserves" can be found in its items?

[Deykin] In your opinion, does the Chechen conflict effect Russia's relations with international financial organizations—the IMF and World Bank?

[Zadornov] One must think that the position of the international financial organizations will depend on how convincingly the Russian Government can present the situation and the events to representatives of these organizations. Of course it appears that Chechnya will complicate our contacts with them. As for my position with respect to the aid being offered by the international financial organizations, it appears to me that one should assume a sober and critical attitude. Some of the recommendations are useful, while others, on the other hand, are unacceptable for Russia. One must be grateful for the loans and technical assistance but these things should be viewed realistically without overestimating their significance.

[Deykin] Mikhail Mikhaylovich, the conciliatory budget commission under your cochairmanship recommended in the first reading of the draft budget that the indexing of wages of "budget" organizations be put off until 1 October. How, let us say, will the Moscow "worker under budget" earning R120-150,000 or even less live this year when today a kilogram of butter costs R15-17,000, a loaf of bread R1,000, and a single transit ticket R48,000 and that under high inflation?

[Zadornov] The problem is that unfortunately in the midst of the rest of the mess our government essentially

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has no social policy. Many people have long been living on "auxiliary" income. The position of several tens of millions of people is truly frightening. All of this is considered and therefore, while being concerned with the technical indicators of the budget, we together with the social departments will nevertheless seek a means to raise the income of the "budget" category of the population.

[Deykin] In the United States, the Republicans have just come to power and they have already decided once again to "comb" all expenditure items of the already prepared draft budget for 1996 in the certainly that this will help to resolve the problem of the deficit in the federal budget. What, in your view, may be the potential benefit from such a measure as applied to the Russian budget?

[Zadornov] I think that one must not expect too much but of course there will be some benefit. After all, last year in reexamining expenditure items the deputies "discovered" R8 trillion and this was under the haste of today's conditions. But a number of amendments must be made to the constitution for such a mechanism to really work.

[Deykin] Probably it is a matter, in particular, of the role of parliament in the control of the execution of the budget?

[Zadornov] Naturally some changes are necessary in this most important area. After all, only parliamentary supervision of the expenditure of funds ought to be considered the basic form of public control of the actions of the government. The State Duma has essentially been deprived of such a right. But as long as parliamentary control has not been established, the embezzlement of public funds will continue, there will be more and more grievances of citizens, and the meager funds released by the state will be spent ineffectively or not as intended. In short, disorder and abuses will continue and will increase.

[Deykin] If we now look at the revenue side of the budget, can we consider the tax reform as basically finished, as was declared not so long ago? Or that it has not yet really begun, as many think? What must be done in this area above all?

[Zadornov] I will say right away that any talk about the existence of a tax system in Russia is clearly still premature. What we now have was established in 1991 in great haste and with the expectation of very high inflation. Of course this scheme cannot please anyone today. I believe, however, that such an extremely complex problem cannot be resolved quickly, however much we would like to give free rein to this traditional habit of the Russian individual: "make it good all at once." For the tax system must become a version of the public contract between the state and its citizens with respect to the magnitude of taxes that the citizens agree to pay and the kind and quality of services that they expect from the state in return. Here one can act only gradually, especially since in addition to the tasks usually mentioned—reduction of the number of taxes, regulation of their rates, and improvement of the effectiveness of all taxation—the basic direction of the reforming of the tax system must be its reorganization and modernization: its new structure and provision—an exhaustive data base, up-to-date and reliable tax statistics, and the like....

[Deykin] When all of these diverse and contradictory problems are examined at the official level, you always participate in the discussion in several roles: as a well-known economist, as a member of the faction "YAB-Loko" [Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc], and as a representative of the budget committee of the State Duma. Here, of course, there are substantial conflicts of interests and problems of an ethical nature arise...

[Zadornov] I consider the following to be correct: first, the observance of professional principles, then the viewpoint of the faction, and finally, on this combined basis, the position of the chairman of the budget committee of the State Duma. In my opinion, this will ensure the observance of the requirements of professional ethics, common sense, and the interests of the matter. This is what I am guided by.

Regional Affairs

Ingush Vice President Interviewed on Chechnya, Other Issues

954F1383A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 5/81, 2-8 Feb 95 p 1

[Interview with Vice President of the Ingush Republic Boris Agapov by Vladimir Kiselev, under the rubric "Two on the Week"; place and date not given: "Three Signs of Trouble"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

[Kiselev] What the Russian Government undoubtedly has achieved since the beginning of the Chechen campaign is that it has totally destroyed all trust in it. Last week again I heard from the powers that be the customary score of things that should be read as precisely the opposite. Including the prime minister's assurances that the federal authorities will assist in every way in preparations for elections in Chechnya and that literally within two months all conditions will be in place for the expression of the free will of the Chechen people. What is in fact happening there? Either Russia's leaders are completely unaware of the situation, or they are frankly and shamelessly lying. Or most likely, forgive the expression, take us for idiots.

[Agapov] Gross miscalculations have been made in domestic, ethnic, and economic policy, and now the moment of acknowledging these errors is being put off. The result: a feeling of complete mistrust in the national leadership and everything that is happening around us.

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Until it is acknowledged that the decision to bring federal troops into Chechnya was a gross, tragic mistake, we will not get out of this crisis. Yes, some people believe that we have already crossed the line of no return. Nevertheless, it is never too late to stop bloodshed.

[Kiselev] I would like to be an optimist. But I cannot... I seriously fear that Ingushetia's turn is next, and you are vice president. Because of the extremely independent position taken by the republic leadership. You afford yourself the luxury of speaking the truth and behaving as conscience dictates...

[Agapov] The text of the presidential decree on disarming illegal formations mentions not only Chechnya but also North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Which provides formal grounds for continuing military action after Chechnya on the territory of Ingushetia. Our people feel that something horrible is looming upon us. There are at least three forces that can bring about such a development of events. The first is a group of politicians in the top echelons of Russian authority, who perceive the Ingush as potential separatists and wish to "demonstrate the strength of the federal center" as a lesson to the peoples of Russia.

[Kiselev] We heard something like this during the Stalin-era deportations...

[Agapov] The second force is that a certain part of Chechnya and some of its leaders who would like to see Ingush in military formations now, on the side of the resistance forces. And the third are certain political circles in North Ossetia, who believe that the situation in Chechnya may be used to provoke a repeat strike against Ingushetia and resolve the protracted Ossetian-Ingush conflict in favor of Vladikavkaz. Two factors are usually enough for trouble to begin; here we already have three.

[Kiselev] When they were about to begin the Chechen campaign, did the federal authorities consult with Ingushetia or other neighboring peoples close to Chechnya? Are they interested in their opinion now?

[Agapov] No, absolutely not. No consultations. They do not listen to any of our suggestions. And if we show initiative, they simply brush us off.

Russian politicians vested with authority keep talking about territorial integrity. But they do not say anything about national integrity. So what do they in fact need? The people who populated Russia for millennia, or their land and meager possessions? They should have told the Chechen people: We need you, the Chechen. We, Russians, cannot live without you, and you cannot live without us. Instead, under the slogan of territorial integrity, people are bombed in cold blood, pummeled with shellfire by tanks and rocket systems.

[Kiselev] But do Russian republics not understand that they can no longer stay silent? There was the White House. Then Chechnya. Ingushetia is next in line. What next? Oh, Fedorov in Chuvashia is issuing strange decrees—it is time to send in the tanks. And then before you know it, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan... I cannot get rid of the sinking feeling that we will perish separately.

[Agapov] If you are puzzled that the republics have not yet jumped into the trenches, I hope this will not happen at all. Reaction to the current events, however, is extremely negative. Both in the entire North Caucasus and in other regions of Russia. The bulk of the population does not support the policy of the center.

[Kiselev] But I mean the republics' leadership. I do not see any particular consolidation.

[Agapov] It is not just the leaders. Look at how the population reacts even in those oblasts and republics where the leaders proclaimed their support for measures "to restore constitutional order" and supported the actions in Chechnya. There are protests! Did you notice that at the local level the overwhelming majority of those who took a stand against the Chechen campaign were leaders elected by the people. While those appointed by Moscow at best remained silent and the most zealous even supported it...

[Kiselev] There is an unquestionable drop in the president's rating and a crisis of trust in the government. But I would not overestimate the people's capacity to resist the horrible things looming over us.

[Agapov] If nothing changes, I fear an explosion. Our Russian rebellion, ruthless and cruel. We may find ourselves again on the brink of a civil war. And the military already have been taught to participate in political score-settling...

Public Attitude to Chechnya War Changing

954F1408A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 5, 3-9 Feb 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Alexander Oslon, general director of Public Opinion Foundation: "Society Is Not Getting Used to the Chechen Crisis"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Data from weekly polls, conducted with the help of "Penta" technology among urban and rural populations in 13 Russian regions by the Public Opinion Foundation (representative sample of 1,300-1,500 people), suggest that the view on bringing troops into Chechnya had taken form already on the eve of December 11 and has not changed since. Society has not become accustomed to the conflict.

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Do you believe Russia should bring its forces into Chechnya? Percentage of respondents.

	Yes	No	Undecided
Early December	19	65	16
Late January	16	71	13

Sources of information often clash with each other. What sources do you trust? Percentage of respondents.

Non-government	46%
Government	14%
Unsure	40%

Group Types (The Names are Conditional)

	"Critics" Against the War, Against Yeltsin	"Power Users" for the War, Against Yeltsin	"Doves" Against the War, Not Against Yeltsin	"The Loyal" for the War, Not Against Yeltsin
Attitude toward the war with Chechnya	—	+	—	+
Attitude toward Yeltsin	—		+	
Percentage among the respondents 17.12.94:	46	11	15	8
24.12.94:	45	12	15	10
07.01.94:	48	12	15	8

The Number of Those Who Agreed that the Military Action of the Russian Army in Chechnya...

	The Whole Population	Group Types (The Names are Conditional)			
		"Critics"	"Power Users"	"Doves"	"Loyal"
"...can turn into the lengthy war between Russia and peoples of the Northern Caucasus"	64	76	43	75	39
"...weakens international authority of Russia"	51	64	32	61	31
"...means that financial condition of your family will get worse"	48	53	49	44	38
"...means the end of democracy in Russia"	19	23	17	18	7

Will you take into consideration your candidate's attitude toward the war in Chechnya during the next elections?

	Percentage of Answers
No, I will not	25
Yes, I will vote for advocates of the war	8
Yes, I will vote for opponents of the war	42
Unsure	25

All the respondents represent four types in accordance with their attitude toward the two key questions—war and power.

"Critics" are conditionally called those who do not accept either use of troops nor action of authorities in general. You will find disappointed democrats here who do not accept use of force and excuse the authorities for nothing; you also will find those merely disappointed and pessimistic-minded here. The largest group of respondents share this position. In politics this view is represented by Yabloko and CPRF (Russian Communist Party).

"Doves" is a word which was used by the press to indicate the part of the president's inner circle who did not approve using troops. We will use this word to call those who oppose the war but still are not disappointed with Yeltsin. Radical democrats from Russia's Choice who keep to the right wing in our political spectrum seem to take this line. This is the second most numerous group among the respondents.

"Power users"—we chose this term instead of hawks used by several newspapers—are those who oppose Yeltsin's conduct as gentle and indecisive. This position unites extreme right reformers ("Union of December 12"/B. Fedorov) and extreme nationalists (A. Nevzorov). V. Zhirinovsky with his LDPR is also here.

And finally "the loyal" are the least numerous type which unites people who do not express either a lack of confidence in the president nor protest against the Chechen campaign.

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Those who found it difficult to answer to at least one of the two key-questions mentioned above owing to lack of interest or to incompetence proved to be one-fifth of the population. We have labelled them "passive."

Migration Service Outlaws Ethnic Chechens

954F1407A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 5, 3-9 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Alexander Burtin: "Government Order Outlaws Chechen Refugees"; first paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "In connection with the events in the Chechen Republic, citizens of Chechen nationality arriving in the regions of the Russian Federation should not be given the status of forced settlers, but simply registered..."

This strange telegram was received by *MN* from the representatives of the Memorial Society and the Civil Assistance Committee of aid to forced settlers. These societies recently visited several camps for the temporary accommodation of refugees. The telegram was sent to the heads of regional migration services and was signed by Tatyana Regent, head of the Federal Migration Service (FMS).

MN turned to the document's author for an explanation. Regent said that from December 11, 1994 the migration service had stopped registering all refugees from Chechnya, since the FMS expects that these people will return to Grozny. She stated that the decision to pass the order dated December 27 not to register Chechens as refugees did not depend on her.

What does this order mean for those who are forced to leave Chechnya? At the request of *MN*, Svetlana Gannushkina, chair of the Civil Assistance Committee, comments on the situation.

"The telegram that divides the inhabitants of Grozny who fled from bomb attacks into 'their own' and 'alien' actually outlaws Chechen refugees. What does the ban on Chechens obtaining forced settler status mean? A refugee without status is fully deprived of state aid. He or she cannot have any documents made to get even a temporary dwelling. Many of them have left their documents under the ruins. They cannot get a free meal or the extraordinary allowance of 20,000 rubles that the FMS pays today. It stands to reason that they cannot hope to receive residence registration and permanent jobs. They have no rights and no one is responsible for them.

Meanwhile, in some regions (Stavropol and Krasnodar territories, St. Petersburg and Moscow) Russians are also not likely to be able to get settler status; local acts adopted in violation of the federal legislation make this practically impossible. Thus in Moscow only someone who has residence registration in the capital on a universal basis, that is, a Muscovite, is eligible for refugee status.

However, even people who have been granted such status have little chance at the restoration of normal life. The state does not fulfil even half of its obligations. By law, the migration service must resolve the issue of a permanent place of residence and work for each family within three months. Prior to that, refugees have the right to live in places of temporary settlement, enjoy free meals and medical aid, as well as to receive pensions and allowances for children. However, in practice everything is reversed: refugees are told that they must look for housing themselves and are warned that they will be deported after three months have elapsed.

Neither is anything done to provide people with jobs. The migration service has not set up a database regarding vacancies on professions, even those in demand (doctors, teachers, construction workers, etc.). The refugee camps are set up in regions which already have surplus labor resources and are frequently far from any enterprises. Moreover, the state did not even study the demands and possibilities of various regions. Now this work is being carried out in Russia by the international migration organization and several public associations.

Many refugees not only lack information but also money for the transportation to find a job. In reference to the absence of residence registration, local authorities pay them neither pensions nor allowances, and they have no right to obtain residence registration because they are refugees. Not all of them are able to get medical aid or even dairy products for babies.

Article Seven of the Law on Forced Settlers reads that if people have lost property irretrievably, they are entitled to compensation in the order and in amounts outlined by the government. In the two years that have passed since the adoption of the law, not a single refugee has received such compensation in Russia. There was a time when the government referred to the absence of international agreements with neighbors from where the refugees had come. However, now that tens of thousands of people have been left homeless precisely at the criminal will of the authorities, society has every reason to demand compensation, and not only material."

Gannushkina says that there is no doubt that the instruction issued by the migration service is in fulfillment of orders from above. Fortunately, it is known that not everyone fulfills it from below.

Problem of Restoring Chechnya's Educational System Viewed

954E0558C Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Nikolay Nikonorov: "There Was a Ministry, But There Was No School: Under the Dudayev Regime, The Chechen Republic Has Its Own 'National' Educational Policy"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] They even had their own Ministry of Education. It is true, no one knows how it operated, since externally it did not manifest itself in any way, and its archives are as yet inaccessible.

In the southern rayons of the Chechen Republic the system of education in fact is not functioning. The Dudayev government announced a course toward "training soldiers" which presupposed, first of all, the repeal of education for girls and, secondly, a three-year elementary education for boys. Only those children whose parents could afford to pay for the schooling studied in the general education schools.

In the last three years all 17 of the vocational-technical schools in the Chechen Republic also did not operate. Often their facilities were used for teaching military science. According to current operative data, during the military actions the buildings of numerous schools, PTU [vocational-technical schools], pedagogical schools, and institutes were used by soldiers as support points. Only the walls remain of most of them. Everything else has been looted, burned, or broken. While on 1 January 1993 there were 456 schools in Chechnya (including 350 rural schools), today, according to the estimates of the RF [Russian Federation] Ministry of Education, around 200 schools and 11 boarding schools are in need of total restoration. Of 17 PTU and 11 institutions of secondary vocational training—18-20 must be restored. In order to recreate the instructional-material base for the system of education of Chechnya, at least R204 billion will be needed, including for the restoration of schools, boarding schools, PTU, pedagogical institutions, and the Chechen State Pedagogical Institute.

In the northern rayons of Chechnya (Naurskiy, Shelkovskiy, Nadterechnyy), the situation is somewhat better. Here the schools are generally operating. They are closed down only for technical reasons (to defrost heating pipes, due to difficulties in replacing boilers, etc.). Out of 21 schools in Naurskiy Rayon, eight are temporarily not operating. Out of 17 educational schools in Nadterechnyy Rayon—three are not operating. The leadership of these rayons and the teachers did a wise thing in saying: "Regardless of anything, the schools should not close their doors." This despite the fact that in Naurskiy Rayon in two of the schools the wages have not been paid since December of 1993, and in most others—since August of 1994, since the system of education was not financed at all by the Government of Chechnya, while outside financial revenues were sharply limited and very difficult to obtain.

Under these conditions, the RF Ministry of Education is faced with the task of helping to recreate the Ministry of Education of the Chechen Republic which today, one might say, physically does not exist. According to the testimony of RF Deputy Minister of Education Vladimir Batsyn: "Today in the Chechen Ministry of Education there is only one official left—Minister of Education P.M. Zakriyeva. She has, first of all, a telephone which one cannot get through on, since it is not connected. And second, a Moskva typewriter which punches the paper rather than types. And that is the sum total of the ministry's equipment."

However, we cannot limit ourselves to giving aid to the system of education for the Chechen Republic alone. According to Ministry of Education data, around 25,000 children of school age from refugee families have been registered. Most of them are located on the territory of the Ingush Republic (around 15,000) and the Republic of Dagestan (7,000). Many schools in these republics are operating in three shifts.

It goes without saying that, in trying to save one's life, no one was thinking about schooling. Therefore the children have nothing to study with. The newest textbook you may find in northern Chechnya was printed in 1991, the oldest—in 1984. In the nearest future the Prosvesh-cheniye publishing house will be sending 14 titles of textbooks from its reserves to Ingushetia and Dagestan.

The schools of Chechnya do not have a single document issued by the RF Ministry of Education in the last three years. The students, as well as the teachers, do not have the vaguest idea of what is going on in "big Russia."

Finally, an extremely important problem is that of the psychological rehabilitation of children and their parents, since the stress experienced by the nation is on the whole very deep-seated. Vladimir Batsyn says: "Myths, prejudices, and rumors are actively circulating, since there has long been no faith in the written or televised word. Under these conditions, teachers are faced with problems which do not exist under ordinary conditions."

Regional Leaders Debate Relations With Moscow

954F1327A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Aleksandr Aleshkin from "Zemstvo" supplement on local self-government: "Matreshka Dolls for Presidents; Should Russia Consist of Provinces or 'Independent States'?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The Ostankino "Journalism" studio broadcast a live interview with Chairman Eduard Rossel of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Duma, President Nikolay Fedorov of the Chuvash Republic, and Chairman Viktor Stepanov of the Government of the Republic of Karelia. The topic was the federation center's relations with the regions.**

When the host of the program broached this subject, he resorted to the ritual subterfuge of the aboriginal hunters of Siberia. When they went out after a bear, they never called it by name, but used euphemisms: He, Himself, the Master of the Taiga, the Shaggy One, the Hibernator, and so forth. This was a sign of respect for Mr. Bear and for the superstition that the hunt would be unsuccessful otherwise.

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If we abandon the subtle diplomacy of the aboriginal hunter, however, the question would sound like this: Should Russia consist of provinces or "independent states"? This was the main topic of discussion in the live broadcast, and both points of view had worthy advocates.

The idea of provinces was defended by Eduard Rossel, a politician whose name first became a household word in Russia in connection with the attempted creation of the "Ural Republic." This was a reaction to the parade of sovereignties of the former autonomous republics, which suddenly redefined themselves as "independent democratic states belonging to the Russian Federation." The "initiative" of the people of Sverdlovsk could have meant the total collapse of Russia. The idea of the Ural Republic eventually lost support, thank God, and Rossel also gave up the idea.

Rossel confirmed his commitment to a single and indivisible Russia in the studio.

The division of the state into provinces, the duma chairman promised, cannot injure the sense of ethnic identity in itself. Sverdlovsk Oblast offers graphic proof of this.

It assigns priority to the social factor, and not to nationality. If a person can have comfortable working and living conditions, he can always find ways of satisfying his ethnic needs.

The present division of Russia into sovereign republics, krays, and oblasts, according to Rossel, puts federation members in an unequal position: The republics have more rights than the krays and oblasts.

Predictably, the live dialogue did not produce any revelations, but simply confirmed well-known facts. Rossel defended the provincial principle of the division of the state, and Nikolay Fedorov and Viktor Stepanov are still convinced that only the national-territorial principle can make the citizens of multinational Russia happy.

The leader of Karelia even stressed that democracy itself is unthinkable in principle without a just decision on the issue of nationality (in other words, without the existence of national states). Anything else would lead to totalitarianism, centralism, and other "isms."

Nikolay Fedorov, a politician who achieved prominence in connection with the events in Chechnya, expressed the same point of view, but he used blunter terms. He was the initiator of the well-known statement of the Seven and the author of the edict prohibiting participation by Chuvash servicemen in the military operations of the Russian Armed Forces.

The president of Chuvashia believes that the attempts to eliminate the national-territorial divisions are a result of the Moscow politicians' fear of losing control over federation members. "If the shoe fits...," he said, denying the Kremlin's charges that the leaders of some republics are advocates of separatism. In his opinion, it is the center, and not the republics, that wants to concentrate all power in its own hands.

In an interesting part of the discussion, the opponents earnestly cited historical examples and analogies to support their own point of view and completely ignored each other's arguments.

Rossel reminded the rest that Peter I, the great reformer, was the first to divide Russia into provinces. This act was completely justified by the more than two centuries of their existence. The national-territorial entities that were created by the Bolsheviks, on the other hand, led to the myriad of bloody conflicts in the country today.

Ignoring these highly persuasive arguments, the opponents began to support their own point of view with foreign experience. Fedorov chose the administrative-territorial structure of the United States, and Stepanov chose Germany. Both made references to the strong authority of the states and lands. Without their consent, federal officials cannot pass a single important national law, especially laws pertaining to the budget.

They said we should also strive for this kind of balance, because it is a well-known fact that strong regions create a strong center.

Did the debaters' minds suddenly go blank or did they know that they were using the wrong example and hope that their naive opponent would not notice the garbled interpretation? The State of Illinois and the Land of Schleswig-Holstein are an argument in Rossel's favor, and not a corroboration of the opinion of Fedorov and Stepanov.

People from all over the world, people of every color, speaking every language, fly, drive, and walk to the states and lands primarily so that they can live in peace and tranquility (after they have settled in, of course), and not to become involved in endless, enervating (and sometimes even bloody!) arguments over which nationality is the oldest and greatest.

The president of the United States, the White House, and the whole American public would have an extremely negative reaction if the French, the Turks, or the Selkups tried to set up an "independent democratic state belonging to the United States of America" in Oklahoma. This would be called absurd, and rightfully so.

It is precisely this freakish form, however, that the parade of sovereignties took in Russia. Yesterday's autonomous republic adopts a constitution, stating in black and white that it is an "independent democratic state belonging to the Russian Federation."

This means that the president of this small but completely independent state could issue a decree disparaging a law signed by the leader of the other, much bigger state to which it belongs....

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Pardon me, but this is a form of delirium that has, regrettably, overwhelmed the masses.

There is a physical object with a design satisfying the peculiar definition of the "state within a state." This is the well-known Russian matreshka doll. Up to this time the matreshka dolls have been of interest to children and foreign tourists.

Now, however, they appear to have an odd appeal to the presidents of the independent democratic states.

Central, Regional Representatives Spar Over Proxy Demarcation

954F1371A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 7 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Indira Dunayeva and Irina Shkarnikova, under the "Parliament" rubric: "The Representatives of the Regions Do Not Agree With the Deputies. Interior Ministry Experts Are Against the State Duma's Draft Decree"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday in the State Duma, the parliamentary hearings "On the Concept of a New Regional Policy" were held. In the opinion of participants in the hearings, federal organs of state power should summarize the concept work-ups in the field of state regional policy and determine its basic principles. As is said in the hearings' draft recommendations, the concept is expected to provide a balance of interests between the center and the regions. The authors of the recommendations also believe that it is necessary to create a permanently functioning mechanism of coordinated action of all the subjects of the law according to the legislative provision of the state regional policy; to set about the resolution of tasks of demarcation of state property as federal and as property of subjects of the Federation; and to accelerate the adoption of federal laws on common principles of organizing a system of organs of state power of subjects of the Russian Federation, a law on local self-rule, and a number of other laws.

However, the attitude of representatives of the regions was critical with respect to both the hearings' draft recommendations and to the concept itself, the synopsis of which was prepared by the New Regional Policy deputy group, considering them excessively declarative. Representative of the Stavropol Kray Duma Valeriy Zelentsov noted that the concept does not disclose a mechanism for the realization of equal rights status of Federation subjects, nor of the interaction among the federal authorities, the organs of authority of the Federation subjects, and organs of local self-government. Mayor of St. Petersburg Anatoliy Sobchak declared the necessity for decentralizing power. In addition, he noted that "since the adoption of the Constitution, we have observed an intensification in the power of federal structures at the expense of the regional ones." Thus, in St. Petersburg, 64 federal structures have been created, in which more than 11,000 people work, and, as Sobchak reported, "the creation of not one of the structures was approved by the Federation subject, as the Constitution requires." Sobchak also cited another example: It was enough to get the right to license 20 types of activity transferred to the regions, and immediately the government approved a statute on licensing which, essentially, "brings to naught the licensing rights of the subjects of the Federation." Sobchak accused the Russian Government of a lack of a thought-out system of interregional programs—first of all on the development of financial-banking structures, the military-industrial complex, and transportation and telecommunications infrastructure. Sergey Shakhray believes that the government should switch from the sectoral principle of managing the economy to a territorial-sectoral principle.

Since the representatives of the regions realize parliament's large role in the development of the principle of federalism in Russia, the participants in the hearings also touched upon the question of the upcoming elections. Vladimir Medvedev, leader of the New Regional Policy deputy group, declared that the interests of the regions will not be represented with a "party" system of elections to the State Duma, since "parties struggle for power at the center." In Medvedev's opinion, acceleration of lawmaking activity in the next State Duma can take place only in the event that people elected from the regions, and not coming from party lists, predominate in the Duma.

* * * *

In the coming days, the Council of the State Duma will examine the draft decree "On the Declaration of Amnesty With Respect to Persons Who Have Committed Unlawful Acts Connected With Investing Financial Assets Abroad." The document stipulates two basic measures. First, exempting from criminal liability persons who have unlawfully taken capital abroad or who are concealing it there. Second, exempting this capital from taxation in the event that it is brought back to Russia and invested in the Russian economy before 1 July 1995. As is indicated in the draft decree, the proposed measures are expected to attract additional funds into the country's economy.

However, assert experts of the Main Administration for Economic Crimes (GUEP) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, in actuality these acts will have a directly opposite effect, specifically, to promote, not the repatriation of the country's capital, but on the contrary, the further criminalization of the economy.

Members of the militia cite the following arguments in favor of such a conclusion. From an economic point of view, they believe, such measures are ineffective, since they are in principle unable to attract large volumes of capital into Russia's economy. The total sum of Russian capital that has settled abroad is estimated at approximately $100 billion, and the share of illegal leakage

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constitutes about 10 percent, that is, about $10-12 billion. Even if these $10-12 billion return to Russia, which is very dubious, the principle amount of capital will still remain abroad.

Debate on Delineating Local, Federal Powers Continues

954E0576A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Prof Vadim Pechenev, deputy director of the RF Presidential Administrative Staff's Administration for Work With Territories: "The Race for Sovereignty: Who Is Interpreting His State Independence and How"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **A regular meeting of the Russian Federation president's Expert Analytical Council was recently held at which the problem of delimiting powers between federal and regional bodies of authority was discussed. We asked one participant in the discussion, Prof Vadim Pechenev, deputy director of the RF Presidential Administrative Staff's Administration for Work With Territories, to comment on the essence of the problem. Here is what he told us, stressing that he was expressing his own personal views.**

The topic chosen for discussion was a very pressing one. Especially since we are marking the anniversary of the signing of the treaty on this matter with Tatarstan, a treaty which is commonly believed to have eased a certain tension in relations between Kazan and Moscow and generally improved the ethnopolitical and interethnic situation in Tatarstan, where more than half of the population does not belong to the "titular" nation.

This treaty and also the treaties signed with Bashkiria and Kabardino-Balkaria, which incidentally, differ significantly from one another, raise a whole series of fundamental issues. In my view, the main one, on the resolution of which the prospects for Russian statehood and Russia's future as an integral, federal, democratic and rule-of-law state depend, is the issue of the status of components of the Federation, especially the republics belonging to Russia, and especially the real extent of their sovereignty.

It is common knowledge that a number of republics declare themselves in their constitutions to be sovereign states. In and of itself, that phrase does not contain anything "frightening" or "unusual." Such a phrase, as we know, was also contained in the so-called Stalinist Constitution of 1936 and, in weaker form, in the 1977 Brezhnev Constitution with respect to the union republics. They even mentioned the right of those republics to secede from the USSR.

Hence the question consists in just what meaning that concept is invested with and how it is applied in practice. After all, a member of a federal state naturally possesses sovereignty in the sense that it is endowed with certain powers that are exercised as part of its exclusive jurisdiction. And if sovereignty came down to that alone, there would be nothing to argue about. A certain decentralization of power and the transfer by federal agencies of the maximum number of powers to the local level are a vitally important objective for the development of a genuinely federal state.

But as we know, certain components of the Federation have a different understanding of sovereignty. They interpret it, first and foremost, as state sovereignty, that is, essentially as state independence within the framework of the federal state. And if we follow that path, instead of a federation, which everyone professes to be concerned about, we may get, for all practical purposes, a confederation. However, even in word certain republic leaders have a highly unique understanding of a federation: a classic example is the claims that the Russian Federation comprises not the krays and oblasts but the republics, which removes from the Federation approximately four-fifths of its population—Russians living outside republics.

From the standpoint of international law, the understanding of the sovereignty of the components of a federation as state sovereignty that entails their independence and autonomy in internal and foreign relations is highly dubious. The world community does not recognize the members of federal unions as independent agents in that way but interprets a federation as a unified state entity, which is impossible without an essentially unified domestic and foreign policy. And we must bring our own internal federal acts—from the federal treaty to internal state treaties with the republics—into conformity with the norms of international law.

It seems to me that what I have said fully applies to the well-known, sometimes extremely fundamental differences between the constitutions of the republics belonging to Russia and the RF Constitution. Those differences must be overcome, and the sooner the better. After all, a "bad example," if you will pardon the expression, is contagious. Similar claims to the full extent of sovereignty that, according to the Constitution, is possessed only by the Russian Federation, will start to be (and are already starting to be) put forward by some oblasts and krays, which are not only equals of the republics from the standpoint of the Russian state's Basic Law, but also generally possess greater economic and scientific potential than most republics.

I think that we must now focus on the main point—on concluding the debates about sovereignty—and then it will be much easier to solve all the other problems, or they will even solve themselves. After all, the differences in approaches to delimiting matters of jurisdiction, to the mutual delegation of powers, to understanding the ways in which the Russian Constitution and federal laws enter into force on the territories of components of the federation, and to questions of organizing the system of state authority—all these things are derived from and ultimately depend on the approach that is taken to the problem of sovereignty. If it is genuinely federalist

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authority that accords with the history of the development and present status of the Russian state, it will not be difficult to find compromises on other disputed issues.

On the other hand, if under the guise of strengthening the Federation, certain of its members create in their constitutions the legal basis for seceding from it in one form or another, in various circumstances, and lay claim—with understandable or, I would say, "transparent" motives—to the role of full-fledged, independent entities under international law, our federal system will not survive for long. Instead of a federation what may arise, at best—and I want to emphasize this once again—is a confederation: by separating out from it, first of all, as independent state and legal entities, the present national state formations. And the well-known example of Chechnya shows what may come of this.

However, this alternative is relatively improbable, if one considers the absolute predominance of the Russian [russkoye] population in the country, including in most republics—a population which has not yet attempted to exercise the Leninist "right to self-determination," that is, to form "its own" independent Russian [russkoye] state. Therefore, a much more plausible reaction to the RF republics' race for sovereignty may be a turn toward a unitary state under powerful pressure from the emerging movements of the Russian nation that are arising as a response to attempts to place the so-called titular nations of our republics in a special, privileged position. I think that the advocates of careless sovereignty ought to reflect on such a prospect more frequently.

In that sense, what not is only curious from a philosophical standpoint but is actually dangerous and contributes to the influence of the Russian radical nationalists is the fact that, in connection with the events in Chechnya, certain so-called and real democrats from Democratic Russia have put forward what are essentially Bolshevik slogans about the defeat of their own government (and own president) in the war that has been launched here. Democrats of this sort, whom B. N. Yeltsin brought to power (and not the other way around, as some of them naively believe) have long and, in my view, justifiably been criticized for the fact that the idea of democracy for them is separate from the national idea (especially the Russian [russkaya] idea). Today they have taken one more step away from the national idea, objectively contributing to the rise in antifederalist and, therefore, anti-Russian [antirossiyskiye] attitudes in the so-called national republics. **I hope that this has happened as the result of the predominance of political dilettantes among them, and not for other reasons.**

In connection with the problem that is under discussion, at the meeting of the aforementioned Expert Analytical Council I made several practical proposals that I do not want to make "state secrets" out of, especially since that would be impossible under present conditions! First of all, in my view it would be a good idea to hold, with the leaders of the republics comprising the RF, first at the level of the leadership of the Presidential Administrative Staff, and then at a meeting between B. N. Yeltsin and the heads of the republics, a serious discussion of the subject of bringing their constitutions into conformity with the Russian Federation Constitution. Naturally, the focus of such a discussion should be the idea of sovereignty and a rational understanding of it that accords with both theory and actual practice. But that is not to rule out the possibility of a reciprocal process of clarifying certain articles of the RF Constitution within the framework of the Basic Law.

And second. We need to take an unequivocal stand with respect to the signing or nonsigning of intrastate treaties with the components of the Federation, the possibility of which is provided in our Constitution. In my view, the signing of treaties must be suspended until a federal law on the general principles of the delimitation and reciprocal delegation of powers is adopted. In this sense I support the analogous proposal that S. M. Shakhray made a while ago in his memorandum to the president, which has already become widely known because of the sort of information leak from state structures that has now become traditional. And if such treaties are to be signed (considering the "promptness" of our Federal Assembly in passing laws), they must, without fail, include a clear point to the effect that the republic constitutions are required to be brought into accord with the Russian Federation Constitution. Especially since that Constitution so stipulates.

One may "like" or "dislike" the Constitution, but everyone must obey it.

Regional Leaders' Attempts To Achieve Sovereignty Criticized

954E0567A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Petr Syugurin: "An Independent Prince, but With His Own Oil; Concept of 'Sovereignty' Conceals Economic Interests of Republic Authorities"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The territorial-national formations which received "as much sovereignty as they could take" have in essence proceeded in the direction of being transformed into national-feudal princedoms (not by standard of living and production, but by the method of distribution of the social product and the arrangement of their own state power).**

This tendency, which even quite recently was in the realm of political obscurity, seemed not so apparent also because the jumble of concepts of "internationalism" and "friendly family of peoples" was still fresh in the minds of our citizens, who for the most part are peace-loving and law-abiding people. The greatest efforts of such usurpation were made by Chechnya. In the meantime, other leaders of national-territorial formations are

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still quietly digging the moats around their feudal holdings and looking to see how decisively the authorities intend to defend the integrity of the federation. The "feudal holdings" are certainly not simply a metaphor. In the middle ages, when feudal rule led to the greatest number of sovereign princedoms, (even the nominal) vassal received from the suzerain (who was already not nominal) the land "with the predestine and with all duties." Here, for example, is an excerpt from the deed of a Belozerskiy prince (from the year 1400): "1) I need not tribute, nor any other such duty. 2) No one is to administer justice upon me. 3) And those men are known and judged by Kiril himself." Is it difficult to imagine such an agreement concluded today between the Center and Chuvashiya or Bashkiriya? De-jure, in its purest form, such an agreement corresponds to the relations of Russia with the Baltic countries. De-facto, this was almost the status of relations between Russia and Chechnya prior to the start of suppression of the revolt. What this has led to is known to all. And this is the very time to think, is it worth testing the strength of the Russian state for those who are openly aggressive, utilizing forceful methods, and have "usurped the sovereignty," as well as by those who have elected the more refined, Asiatic-diplomatic approach. Let us turn to the facts.

The mass media did not give much attention to the ITAR-TASS announcement regarding the fact that President of Bashkiriya M. Rakhimov signed an edict analogous ("but much broader") to the edict of President of Chuvashiya N. Fedorov, which took under juridical protection the military servicemen refusing to serve in Chechnya. The reaction followed immediately: Yeltsin quickly put the jurist Fedorov in his place. The edict of M. Rakhimov on 23 January of this year, "On Measures for State and Social Protection of citizens of the RB [Republic of Bashkiriya] Who Have Suffered in Connection With the Events in Chechnya," speaks, in general, about very beneficial matters: Aid to families of military servicemen who have suffered in Chechnya. It provides monetary compensation in the sum of 5 million rubles (R), improvement of housing conditions, free passage to Chechnya by relatives to see the deceased, prisoners and wounded soldiers, as well as medical aid to the volunteer brigades.

But further, Rakhimov's edict takes on an ever greater political shading: It states that the "social associations and labor collectives of the republic are extremely concerned about the continued development of events, and demand an end to the combat operations and to the bloodshed"... Moreover, the "citizens called up from Bashkiriya are being used in Chechnya without proper legal grounds and in violation of the constitutions of the RF [Russian Federation] and the RB, and the laws of the RF, and without the appropriate edict of the RF President, and are in need of protection."

M. Rakhimov, with eastern ornateness, but also without any ambiguity, expressed his attitude toward the actions of the federal authorities: Recalling the agreement on delineation of subjects of administration and mutual delegation of powers and authorities between the organs of state power of the RF and the RB, he assigned the Cabinet of Ministers the task of concluding an agreement with the RF Minoborona [Ministry of Defense] on the fulfillment of military service by draftees from the RB in its bordering military districts. If we add to this the command to conduct an inspection of arms and weapons which Bashkiriya has at its disposal, this already begins to be reminiscent of preparations for mobilization. At the end there are lines which most clearly state Bashkiriya's position in the conflict between the Center and Chechnya: "We must bring to the attention of the federal organs of state power the fact that, without a legal resolution to the question of utilizing military servicemen of the Armed Forces of the RF, the VV MVD [Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs] on the territory of the RF, military servicemen may not bear the appropriate legal duties and responsibilities." Note: The discussion is already about the Armed Forces of the RF and Russia in general! Perhaps the agreement on delineation of subjects of administration and mutual delegation of powers and authorities gives Rakhimov the right to this?

The dream of getting "land with its predestine and with all duties" is realized behind the guise of the agreement "on delineation of subjects of administration" and in spite of it. On 21 October of last year, M. Rakhimov issued an edict which placed at the forefront the tasks of "concluding the construction of the system of state power, courts and law enforcement organs, and the legislation of the RB." Paragraph 2 clearly states: "The organs of state power and administration of the republics, enterprises, institutions, judicial and law enforcement organs shall henceforth by guided by constitutional principles on supremacy of the laws of Bashkortostan over the entire territory of the republic." There is, however, a stipulation which looks more like a taunt: "With the exception of cases of the effect of standard statutes of the RF on regulation of powers and authorities voluntarily handed over to administration of Russia." Although, specifically, the arrangement of the courts and law enforcement organs relates exclusively to the administration of federal power.

And while Chechnya, in order to realize its "sovereign policy," has immediately placed its stake on armed force, Bashkiriya is following a different course toward the same goal. The RF Ministry of Internal Affairs received a notification from the republic which points out that "the course toward sovereignization of the republic pursued by the current leadership of Bashkiriya conceals efforts to create a nationalist regime which is anti-democratic in its essence. These processes are developing not without the influence of criminal groupings. The desire to formulate new power structures predominantly by means of persons of the same nationality in a multi-national republic threatens serious exacerbation of inter-ethnic relations. On the basis of the agencies of the

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MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] of Bashkiriya, punitive forces are being created which are called upon to resolve certain political goals of the republic's supreme leadership. For this purpose, the President of the RB and those closely surrounding him have done everything possible to bring themselves fully out from under the control of the MVD of Russia."

We must note that the national movement itself is found only at the political level of leadership. It is fitting to recall the words of one philosopher: "Artificial nationalism is just as dangerous, since it, in essence, is the forced state of emergency and siege which the few establish over the many, and which requires cleverness, lies and violence. It is not the interest of the people, as is usually said, but the interest of the ruling dynasties that leads to nationalism." Is this not an accurate description of that which is going on today in Chechnya?

Exactly in accordance with this scenario, the tightening of the screws of sovereignty in Bashkiriya began with the dismissal of Prime Minister A. Kopsov from his duties. It seems he turned out to be a hindrance in the realization of the plans and interests of M. Rakhimov and those surrounding him. After the intervention of the Federation Council, the leadership of Bashkiriya unleashed a campaign to discredit a number of officials and remove them from state agencies under the guise of the struggle against corruption.

However, let us return to the "delineation of subjects of administration:" In Bashkiriya there are two edicts in effect—that of President M. Rakhimov and that of the Presidium of the RB Supreme Soviet—permitting the detainment of any objectionable person for a term of up to one month for suspicion of committing serious crimes. These have nothing at all to do with the edict of President Yeltsin directed at the struggle against banditism and organized crime. In order to justify the removal of political and economic leaders, the focal points of corruption selected are, as a rule, enterprises of AO [joint-stock companies] and entrepreneurial structures. Therefore, there is no other way to explain the detainment of the director of "Energostroyremont," I. Zakharov, the chairman of the ZhSK [house-building combine] "Futura" G. Overchenko and the chief bookkeeper A. Fofanova. The former chief bookkeeper of "Bashkirenergo," S. Melnikova (currently employed at the RAO [Russian joint-stock company] "EES Rossii") was taken in a car by MID of Bashkiria associates and driven from Moscow to Ufa. The latter also detained the trade union committee chairman of the "Bashuralenergostroy" Trust, F. Sharapov, the manager of the trust, A. Tukhtarov, and the chief of the Ufa Administration of "Uralenergomontazh," V. Myasnikov.

In Chechnya, undesirables simply vanished without a trace. Bashkiriya has established its own sovereign "procedural standards," which in fact testify, as the edict of M. Rakhimov states, to the "provision of the right of conforming activity in the republic." This is expressed in the fact that attorneys are not allowed to see detained persons right away, and when they are finally allowed to do so, for some reason the associates of the militia wish to be present at the conversations. To justify detainment for a period of 30 days, as a rule, the person is arbitrarily incriminated in committing a "felony" crime. "Without any proof, and with equal success," testifies defense lawyer S. Makarenko, "they could have chosen any article of the Criminal Code for detaining Sharapova. For example, 'treason against the homeland' or 'application of biological weapons.' The agencies even respond to complaints. They recognize that there is insufficient proof for filing an accusation, but they do not drop the cases. All this represents encroachment on the legislative statutes of the Russian Federation which regulate criminal and criminal-procedural relations. We should think about the fact that, as of the status for December of 1994, out of 2,500 persons who were detained for a period of 30 days, less than half were arrested. Why did the others sit for a whole month together with criminals in the so-called 'press-chambers'?"

Wherein lies the interest of the ruling circles (or—the ruling dynasties), which are turning the political millstones?

In Bashkiriya, as in Chechnya, nationalism and usurpation of soverignty have an underlying economic interest. And it is based primarily on oil. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA has already published several materials which demonstrate the not unselfish participation by persons among those closely surrounding M. Rakhimov, who together with him have unleashed the struggle with corruption, in deals which should primarily interest the fighters of corruption. The entire foreign economic activity, and especially the export of oil, is controlled by Minister of Foreign Relations R. Garifullin. Perhaps he knows how the SP [joint venture] "Epek", under the guise of processed oil by-products and under fictitious documents, supplied its foreign partners with crude West Siberian oil. Altogether, 163,000 tonnes of crude oil were sold to the Japanese "Irochu" company, the Swiss "Savoil L.R.," and the Belgian "Nafta." According to information received from a source in the RF Federal Service on Currency and Export Control, West Siberian oil is taken from the main oil pipelines, and the "leak" is compensated with local Bashkir oil, which has a high sulfur content. The change in grade and quality also makes it possible to obtain hidden "discounts" and "mark-ups" to the official price.

In March-April of 1992, the "Vladiana General Trading Company," registered in Cyprus, promised to supply 100,000 tonnes of grain to the republic at a price (the indicated price, we might add, was marked up by 15-20 percent) of $120 per tonne. The result: First 60,000 tonnes of oil were sent to the address of the company, and then 26,800 tonnes of grain were received (although, under the conditions of the contract, the oil should have been shipped after receipt of all the grain). The text of the contract does not bear the official seal of the firm,

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and the tariff sanctions are not specified. The debt—$8 million (taking into consideration the use of the funds abroad) was not fully returned to Bashkiriya...

The deputy director of foreign economic relations of the AO [joint-stock company] "Salavatnefteorgsintez," R. Abdulin, has disappeared from life forever, it seems. At one time, the AO "SNOS" was part of the complement of the German-Bashkir SP "Gerbash." With the active participation of R. Garifullin, $6 million appeared in a special account of the association, opened by the SP at the "Dresdner Bank." This money was from the sale of export products. However, the SP put a freeze on these funds, and repeated appeals to R. Garifullin by the representative of the RB asking the SP to use these funds in the interests of the republic have had no effect. The investigation which had been undertaken has already bogged down. As, it seems, has the investigation of the activity of the advertising-commercial enterprise "Bashkultinvest," whose "godfather" is the RB president's head of administration, S. Aminev. This despite the fact that the results of the investigation, according to the directive of M. Rakhimov, were to have been presented prior to 31 December 1994.

Now, when it is coming to light that over 20 million tonnes of Russian oil have leaked out of Chechnya, headed in an unknown direction, (as yet, the valve has not be completely shut), there is no need to present analogies. They are apparent. And we may repeat with assurance: The first of "Dudayev's falcons" have begun dying not for Allah and freedom, and not in Chechnya, but in far-off London for oil dollars, in an inter-clan war. We can now see with our own eyes what the "usurpation of sovereignty" has led to. The fact that oil was behind this, as in Bashkiriya, is also a parallel, and also understandable... But what could have been done?

There is a didactic tale by Borkhes. Its main character began reading the Bible to the Indians. They listened to him with great, almost strange, attention. Then they asked: "Christ accepted death to save mankind? And those who crucified him will also be saved?" "Yes," replied the hero. The next day, his light sleep was interrupted by the sound of hammering. They were hammering together a crucifix from rafters torn off the roof...

It seems to me that this parable is rather current to the issues of the day. In just this way, Russia may find itself crucified on the cross of sovereignties, and then resurrected as an independent Moscow princedom, with boundaries along the "Golden Circle," and with unruly Ryazan and Tversk as principalities.

Bashkortostan on Results of Signing Federal Treaty

954F1348A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 7 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Todres, SEGODNYA correspondent; place and date not given: "Bashkiriya for the Time Is Pleased With the Sovereignty Achieved: President Rakhimov Consolidates His Successes"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Division

While analysts are discussing whether the "Chechen Lump" is the first in the collapse of the Russian Federation, one of the leaders of "peaceful sovereignty," Bashkiriya, already has existed more than a year under its new constitution and for exactly six months under the "great treaty" with the Russian Federation.

Six months ago, coming out of the ceremony where the treaty was signed, Bashkir President Murtaza Rakhimov looked quite pleased and said that "Bashkortostan obtained even more items of authority than Tatarstan by a similar treaty," having included in the document practically all points of "special application" to the 1992 Federation Treaty.

For the time the mood in Ufa has not changed since then. "The scope of sovereignty that we are realistically ready for has been attained today," Mikhail Bugera, head of the Bashkir parliamentary commission on the economy, told SEGODNYA.

Property

The local leadership really has a basis for being pleased with the results of the long litigation with Moscow over division of possessions.

According to the treaty and the local constitution, all natural resources, including petroleum became the exclusive "property" of the multinational people of the "Republic of Bashkortostan." With the division of industrial facilities, the former autonomous Republic succeeded in retaining, among other things, all petroleum processing and petrochemical enterprises (divided into stock shares, naturally, according to "the second version," which leaves control over them in the hands of the state, in this case, the Bashkir state). Moscow retains strategically significant fields, but hopelessly unprofitable ones - defense and the coal industry.

At the same time the Bashkir side turned down a single-channel tax system, which it de facto used: With general evasion of payment of taxes, such a system is good as an instrument of political blackmail, but its economic benefits are quite questionable. As the Ufa authorities admit, "A maximum of 70 percent is collected of what should be."

It is very probable that even less taxes will be collected. Indices of the slump in industrial production - around 20 percent in the last year - are greater than the RUSSIAN AVERAGE.

The pro-Russian opposition here BLAMES policy. Defense makes up about three-fourths of the whole Bashkir machine-building industry. "Bashkiriya still has no military orders because of its separatist policy,"

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contends economics institute director Khamid Zizatullin [as transliterated]. "It is not we who are getting them now, but Perm, Sverdlovsk, and Chelyabinsk. The central authorities prefer regions that aren't fighting with Moscow."

Here is the present plan for allotment of taxes: 75 percent of the NDS [value-added tax] collected is transferred to Moscow, and 100 percent of the profits from external economic activity (i.e., duties). Of the 38-percent tax rate on profits, the federal treasury receives 13 percent.

They maintain in Ufa that on the whole money does not flow in the opposite direction - from the federation to the republic. "More than a dozen sources of revenue are set in our budget, but the federal treasury is not one of them," declared Mr. Bugera.

However, local opposition maintains that official Ufa acts against its conscience. Bashkiriya did not take subsidies, but then it has not paid all its taxes, and now the Republic owes the federation about 1.5 trillion rubles.

"This depends on how you calculate it. Russia has not given money to those who are subordinate to it, and they appealed to us. Federal money came sometimes then, but it was already eaten up by inflation. So we have not only covered our debt, but Moscow owes us," Mikhail Bugera says in response to this question.

The Republic's leadership has every opportunity now to "roll up" this quarrel. Against the background of the Chechen crisis, Moscow would much prefer not to exacerbate relations with a region that it has finally managed to pacify.

Power

Speaking to his parliament after signing the treaty in August, Murtaza Rakhimov said incidentally that "it is not just a question of the Russian Federation's recognizing our constitution." Ufa "considered that the RF [Russian Federation] Constitution is, as a whole, accepted around Russia,... despite the negative results of the voting in Bashkiriya." In a translation to ordinary language, we made a mutual agreement not to trouble each other.

President Rakhimov now, especially after the retirement of the premier and his rival in the presidential elections, Anatoliy Kopsov, is in fact in complete control of the Bashkir power elite. The whole executive vertical is surviving the "change in cadres."

The change is occurring rather peacefully: The Republic has become accustomed to obeying the higher leadership, and only in the large cities - Ufa, Blagoveshchensk, and Sterlitamak - have squabbles with the mayors turned into public scandals. However, the degree of their publicity is also rather limited - after the newspaper EKONOMIKA I MY, the largest of the independent press organs was closed "for economic reasons." Its former staff say that publishing costs outgrew the paper's capacities after the Bashkir printing houses, under pressure from the authorities, refused to print it, and it had to be printed in Sverdlovsk Oblast.

"Primitive Bashkir leadership of the Republic is taking place in a republic in which, according to official data, Bashkirs make up 22 percent of the population - much less than the Tatars and Russians," asserts Mr. Gizatullin [as transliterated]. However, in the assessment of the majority of observers, selection goes by loyalty and not nationality.

The position of the present elite will doubtless be strengthened by the spring re-elections to the parliament of the Republic. According to the election law, more than two-thirds of the deputies of the lower house will be elected in the villages (i.e., 30 percent of the population), while the relatively disobedient city dwellers will elect only one-third.

By a special decision of the VS [Supreme Court] of Bashkiriya, those elected are permitted to combine their mandate with duties in executive authority. So it is almost probable that the most influential "faction" in the parliament will be made up of deputies who are subordinate to the president in their jobs.

Tatarstan Program To Attract Foreign Investment

954F1341A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 9 Feb 95 p 2

[Report by Galina Pechilina and Marat Salimov: "The Investment Policy of Regions: Kazan Creates Its Own Gosinkor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **A press conference was held in Kazan yesterday where a plan was presented for attracting foreign investments to the region with the help of the Investment-Finance Corporation of the Republic of Tatarstan, which was created by edict of the President Mintimer Shaymiyev. This structure, which is similar to the Russian State Investment Corporation [Gosinkor], should take a virtual monopoly position in the sphere of investment activity in the republic.**

The quest of Russian regions to secure the necessary volume of foreign investments has now led to the creation under state organs of investment companies which are given the monopoly right to realize investment projects. A typical example of such a company is the Investment-Finance Corporation created in Tatarstan. As experts from the apparat of president Mintimer Shaymiyev announced, the Law on Foreign Investments in the Republic of Tatarstan and the Edict on Stimulating the Attraction of Foreign Investments still are not ensuring the necessary flow of capital, since the degree of risk for investors remains at the maximum—they do not have guarantees of the return of the capital invested.

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The Investment-Finance Corporation will now offer these guarantees. Its jobs include ensuring credit security, providing insurance and reinsurance of foreign investors' risks, reviewing applications for the right to offer concessions, and providing price quotations for and distributing the corporation's securities on foreign stock markets. The Republic's Cabinet of Ministers will become one of its founders. The cabinet will also exempt the corporation from Republic taxes.

As the representative of the organizing committee for creating the corporation and president of the international association "Volga Region-Germany," Azat Khafizov, reported at the press conference, in addition to the government, the founders will include 36 banks, insurance companies, joint ventures, and republic industrial enterprises. The proposed capital stock of the corporation will be 1 trillion rubles. It will be formed by the founders' transferring their own stock, real estate, and financial resources.

An insurance company with headquarters in London or Brussels will be one of the first structures created within the framework of the corporation. Its capital stock should be adequate to insure fairly large investments. It is contemplated that the company will begin operations as early as the fall, and the most respected insurance companies of Tatarstan and Russia will be among its founders. The edict establishes the following plan for insuring investments. The stock of those enterprises where the investments are being made will be presented as guarantees.

Work with banks will be a most important area of the corporation's activities. Understandings have already been reached with the most reliable and well known Russian and foreign banks in whose accounts the corporation intends to place its deposits at a preferential rate of interest, on the condition that the banks issue and service credits for investment projects.

As practice shows, regardless of how attractive the plan created by the government of Tatarstan is, the republic probably cannot count on substantial capital investments in the form of portfolio investments in the very near future. Taking into account the high degree of risk, foreign investors prefer to invest capital in the Russian economy in the form of direct investments with the right to dispose of the output produced. The activities of Gosinkor are evidence of this conclusion: during the entire period of its operation, the corporation has been unable to realize even one major investment project.

[Box]

Proposed Partners of the Investment-Finance Corporation of Tatarstan

In Russia:

- Inkombank [Foreign Commercial Bank], Alfa-bank, and Menatep

Abroad:

- Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank of America, Banque Commerciale de France, Faisal Islamic Bank, Dresdener Bank, Union Bank of Switzerland

Krasnoyarsk Deputy Scores Kray Economic Policies

954E0564A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 2

[Interview with Svetlana Andronova, director of the Kray Legislative Assembly and secretary of the Permanent Commission on Legality, Law and Order, and Protection of Citizens' Rights, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent Vitaliy Pyrkh; in Krasnoyarsk, date not given: "Help! Experiments on Human Beings: Continuation Follows..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] *All reformers of Krasnoyarsk wanted at least something to show to Russia, and since the favorite thing among the local authorities, as a rule, is still percentomania, they decided to reach the 60-percent mark in paying for housing and municipal services ahead of schedule.*

RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent Vitaliy Pyrkh asked Svetlana Andronova, director of the Kray Legislative Assembly and secretary of the Permanent Commission on Legality, Law and Order, and Protection of Citizens' Rights, to discuss the new experiment on human beings.

[Pyrkh] Let me start with introductions: Svetlana Mikhaylovna is our only deputy who was a trade union worker in the past.

[Andronova] Yes, I worked as chairman of the trade union committee of the Lesosibirsk lumber mill No. 2 and participated in the creation of the council of chairmen of trade union organizations of the city.

[Pyrkh] That is why I cannot but share the fact that I and many others were surprised that the trade unions were not invited to the recent celebrations devoted to the [word illegible] anniversary of the founding of Krasnoyarsk Kray. What was this—a desire on the part of the administration to put their constant opponents in their places?

[Andronova] I share your misgivings. Just take the elections to the local self-government organs. They were held long ago in Chita, Irkutsk, and Novosibirsk Oblasts but not in Krasnoyarsk Kray. The governor "cut down" the law adopted by the Legislative Assembly, even though it is the constitutional right of Russians to choose local administrative organs. And the motivation was surprising: Since things are more or less moving along in the kray there is no need for elections.

Another example happens to fit in with the subject of our conversation. In the triple agreement annually concluded by the kray administration, the trade unions, and

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the employers it is clearly written that the most socially important decisions may be made only with the consent of each of the three parties. But the administration adopted a decree: Even this year the residents will pay more for housing and municipal services than they pay in any other region of Russia—60 percent of the actual costs of maintaining and servicing the apartments. And they are brooking no objections.

[Pyrkh] Perhaps because recently in the local "corridors of power" one has more and more frequently had occasion to hear that the incomes of Siberians considerably exceed those of the average Russian.

[Andronova] I have analyzed food prices in nearby regions and I came to the conclusion that Krasnoyarsk comes second after Novokuznetsk in terms of rising costs. And they try to convince us that we are rolling in clover.

Back in the summer, when the kray administration had just begun to discuss raising payments for housing, we requested information on the incomes of Siberians. It turned out that the average wage in the city of Krasnoyarsk is R255,000, and in rural areas—114,000. The number of people who are not receiving wages or are receiving them three or four months late is 345,000. In the fall 100,000 were forced to take leave and another 142,000 worked part time. In a word, there is no economic boom: As is the case throughout Russia, the production recession in the kray is continuing, the incomes of the population are declining, and the enterprises are shutting down.

[Pyrkh] Incidentally, according to the government decree, by 1998 Russians will have to switch to 100 percent reimbursement for the cost of maintaining housing, and by the end of this year—only 40 percent. Our administration has decided to get "ahead of all Russia." Why?

[Andronova] It is difficult to give a simple answer: As they say, everyone has his own interests. The kray administration, for example, asserts that this is the only way to improve the quality of services for the population. But practice shows that this is not happening. There has been a flood of letters and telegrams—residents of Krasnoyarsk Kray are confused about why they are being placed in unequal conditions even with their neighbors—the people of Irkutsk, Kemerovo, and Omsk, where the current "rung" in apartment rent is the same as the mark indicated by the government—40 percent. A sharp protest was raised by the trade union committees of the Borodino and Nazarov coal mines, the combine plant, the workers of Sibelektrostal, Sibtyazhmash...

[Pyrkh] What awaits the Siberians who have "benefited" from the local administration?

[Andronova] As specialists assert, our incomes are not likely to rise, but our costs will very appreciably. The overall sum of payments for housing during the first quarter will be (by a decision of the governor, they were broken down into quarters: first quarter—30 percent, second quarter—40, third quarter—50, and fourth quarter—60 percent): for a single-room apartment—R24,700, two-room—with three people living in it—R50,700, and if it is a family of four—R66,000, and for a family of five living in a four-room apartment—R82,990.

And this is for state or municipally owned housing and for privatized apartments. And in the so-called private built-up sector and buildings of housing construction cooperatives the payment must include 100-percent reimbursement for all costs of services.

[Pyrkh] This year?

[Andronova] Even in the first quarter of this year! For a single-room apartment it is necessary to invest R67,500, two-room—141,000, three-room—192,000, and four-room—R246,000! In buildings equipped with gas stoves the rates are even higher.

[Pyrkh] Well, well... I read in the local press the arguments of the deputy chief of the administration of Krasnoyarsk Kray, Nikolay Glushkov, in support of the decree that was adopted. He writes: "There is a decree of the government of the Russian Federation of 23 December 1993, No. 1329, which actually removed the responsibility of the Government of the Russian Federation for the transition to the new system of payment for housing and municipal services without social strain, placing this responsibility on the kray administration. There the references (of a number of deputies of the kray's Legislative Assembly—V.P.) to the decree of the Russian Federation No. 935 in view of the decree of the Russian Federation No. 1329, frankly, are from the devil." There you have it. And I, in my naivete, assumed that the government of the Russian Federation, like the administration of Krasnoyarsk Kray, by the very fact of its existence was responsible for a transition "without social strain" not only in payment for housing but also everything else that pertains to people's lives.

But, Svetlana Mikhaylovna, they can respond to us: There is nothing to worry about, just raise the payment for housing to 15 percent of the total family income and make up the difference. It seems that is what was promised.

[Andronova] Only in theory so far. The kray does not yet have either the compensation system or the necessary service. True, the governor's decree stipulates allotting 15 billion in preferred credit for its creation, but this is not included in the budget, so where will they get the money? Out of that same apartment rent? Did they increase the payment just in order to create one more bureaucratic structure.

[Pyrkh] So is there any reason to make a fuss?

[Andronova] One must remember who is in charge of this land. If not the working man, then who.

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Krasnoyarsk Authorities on Nuclear Fuel Regeneration Plant

9541333A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 9 Feb 95 p 9

[Article by Sergey Fedorchenko: "The Chelyabinsk Mayak Plant Will Soon Have a Brother in Krasnoyarsk—The RF President has Signed an Edict on Construction of a Second Nuclear Fuel Regeneration Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Krasnoyarsk learned that a nuclear waste storage facility has begun operations several tens of kilometers from residences, and a plant to regenerate nuclear fuel (RT-2) was under construction at practically the same time as the enterprise was launched, in December 1985. This was thanks to the glasnost that had become fashionable. Set in motion by the "greens," the problem of nuclear safety filled the airwaves and kray newspapers, starting an 8-year debate.

Nuclear power plants produce about 30 percent of the electricity consumed by the European part of Russia today. Seventy tonnes of nuclear fuel, enriched to a 4.4 percent content of U-235, support the operation of a VVER-1000 water-cooled reactor for 3 years, after which the fuel, which is 50-60 percent spent, as well as the products of decay—uranium, plutonium-239, and others—must either be regenerated or stored. The so-called open cycle has been adopted in the United States; AES [nuclear power plant] waste is buried. In the former USSR they chose a closed cycle that envisioned regeneration and recycling of uranium. The pioneer in Soviet regeneration of nuclear fuel was the Chelyabinsk Mayak Combine (RT-1).

The government program for the development of nuclear energy, which is oriented to the use of VVER-1000 reactors, envisioned construction of a nuclear waste storage facility and the RT-2 plant at Krasnoyarsk-26; they were expected to serve the reactors. Krasnoyarsk-26 was not chosen by chance. In the first place, it already had a high-powered plant for the manufacture of weapons-grade plutonium, whose primary production is shut down today in connection with the conversion program. The plan was for the highly experienced personnel and the material technical facilities of the plant to be converted smoothly from the military-industrial complex to the civilian RT-2. In the second place, there were strong construction organizations there: Sibkhimstroy [Siberian Chemical Industry Construction] and Sibkhimmontazh [Siberian Chemical Equipment Installation] with unique experience building similar structures. And in the third place, the Chelyabinsk Mayak Plant, in taking its first steps, had made such a "radiation mess" in its densely populated region that it would have been simple insanity to build a second monster there.

The storage facility received its first so-called "assemblies"—465-kilogram containers of spent fuel—in December 1985. The huge pool shielded on all sides with stainless steel, granite, and concrete, where the zircon containers are resting under many meters of water, is a fearsome site. About 1,000 tonnes of AES waste from the former USSR are stored here today. Its potential is "significantly greater than in Chernobyl," as specialists working here evasively explain. For now, though, this "wealth" does not present any danger, and it will not for another 20 years. Veniamin Yershov, chief of the storage shop, demonstrated the safety of his plant during Boris Yeltsin's visit here last year by dipping a glass of this water out of the pool in front of the president and drinking it. But even Mr. Yershov, who has worked with uranium and plutonium all his life and has picked up about 300 roentgens in his 37 years of labor at Mayak and Krasnoyarsk-26, is filled with horror, to use his words, at what will happen in 20 years when the walls of the containers begin to disintegrate.

There is one way out—regenerate the waste. But construction of RT-2, which was begun at the same time as the storage facility, was frozen in 1991, partly from lack of money and party because of the uncompromising protests of the Krasnoyarsk community. The people in Krasnoyarsk understand that construction of RT-2 will actually make the region less safe; incidentally, this is just as any large production facility would, not only a nuclear one. But there is no escape. No one is ever going to take those 1,000 tonnes of waste resting in the storage facility away from Krasnoyarsk. New deliveries of waste from both Ukrainian and Russian AES's have been stopped primarily for lack of money—in the summer of 1994 transportation of just one "assembly" from the European part of Russia to Krasnoyarsk in a special container car would have cost 300 million rubles. The AES's were forced to store used fuel at their own plants. But for one, this cannot go on for long, and for two, it greatly multiplies the danger for the European part of the country as well.

On 25 January the RF President signed the Edict on Structural Reorganization and Conversion of the Nuclear Industry in the City of Zheleznogorsk (the Former Krasnoyarsk-26) in Krasnoyarsk Kray. This document orders continuation of construction of RT-2 after the mandatory ecological expert study. According to the edict, 25 percent of the income from the payment for processing the fuel will remain in the kray. The edict also authorizes the acceptance for processing of waste from foreign plants built according to domestic designs, with mandatory return of the processed products to the customer.

Realization of the project promises significant profit for the kray—there are many, many suppliers of AES waste in the world, and regeneration of fuel means millions of dollars of net profit. Krasnoyarsk-26 was recently visited by Americans, who are encountering great difficulties storing their own waste today, and talks have begun with South Korea. The attitude of the public toward the edict is far from one-sided. The inhabitants of Krasnoyarsk-26 are glad that conversion of the ailing production facility will give the city a "second wind," new jobs, and much

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more—this edict envisions a whole program of medical and social support and housing construction. The attitudes of inhabitants of the kray center are less optimistic, but after the edict was made public no mass protest actions were observed in Krasnoyarsk or in the kray.

As for the professional ecologists, they are not pleased with the presidential edict. At the recent annual collegium of Minprirody [Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources] minister Viktor Danilov-Danilyan mentioned the edict as an example of the government's inconsistent ecological policy. According to all the rules the ecological expert study should precede the edict, certainly not come after it. It is perfectly obvious that in this case the reversal of places can have a fundamental impact on the result.

Novosibirsk's Economic, Socialpolitical Situation Analyzed

954F1356A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 5

[Article by Yuriy Ivanov: "Manokhin Writes to the President... Will They Draw Conclusions in the Kremlin?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK has obtained a copy of an analytical memo which Anatoliy Manokhin sent to the office of the President of the Russian Federation. This document describes in sixteen pages the economic and sociopolitical situation in Novosibirsk Oblast in 1994. For the reader's convenience we have broken down the material into chapters provided with subheadings.**

No More Payments on Credit...

The President's authorized representative lists insolvency and reciprocal debts of enterprises as the main causes of the disastrous situation in our industry. As regards insolvency, the analytical memo notes that its orientation has changed significantly over the year. Thus, whereas during the first six months outstanding debit indebtedness had increased by 35 percent, and credit indebtedness by more than 150 percent, over five months of the second half-year the increase was 173 and 70 percent, respectively. The ratio had reversed. However, Manokhin explains, the more than two-fold decline in the rate of increase of credit indebtedness does not mean stabilization of the financial status of enterprises, but indicates that the possibility of obtaining raw and primary materials and goods from suppliers on credit has been virtually exhausted. At the same time, the five-fold increase in the growth rate of debit indebtedness is an indicator that some enterprises (or rather, enterprise managements) consider it advantageous to provide credit against goods.

The author suggests that in such a situation the thing to do would be to take effective steps to facilitate claims and suit actions and enhance the authority and capabilities of territorial agencies of the Federal Insolvency Administration and the State Property Management Committee. It would also be advisable to introduce legislatively supported measures (geared to the declining share of state property): replacement of the management of insolvent state enterprises; review contracts with managers; calling a general meeting on the insolvency of an enterprise.

There are Nonpayments and Nonpayments

The presidential representative distinguishes two types of reciprocal nonpayments of enterprises. The first is objective nonpayment: payment default on a state order, shortage of circulating assets, absence of demand for a product, inability to work in market conditions, etc. The cause of the second type of nonpayment is self-interest. And, Anatoliy Manokhin reports, the self-interest component of nonpayment is of a massive and systemic nature. An example is AOOT "Novosibirskneftеprodukt" [Novosibirsk oil products open-end stock company]. Briefly, the essence of the case is as follows. Debit indebtedness of the company was around 13 billion rubles already half a year ago. Whence the huge debt of a company whose output is not just in demand but sells like hot cakes? Some 5.3 billion was actually transferred in the form of financial and commodity credit to various private structures; 1.2 billion went to the Trans-Blok Corporation (origination fees, free and preferential credits).

Who Is To Blame for the Military Industry Crisis?

The analytical memo gives special attention to problems of the military-industrial complex [MIC] and conversion: "The concentration of MIC enterprises in Novosibirsk is the highest in the country. It is the crisis of precisely this industry that has contributed to the sharp drop in the living standards of Novosibirsk Oblast residents." The president's representative explains that the grave financial situation of the defense industry is due to the fact that the state is not paying for state orders filled by those enterprises. How this happens can be seen on the example of the factory imeni Kominterna. To fulfil a state order for the Ministry of Defense, the plant must obtain credit for circulation assets and wages. After the plant had already begun to implement the order the government suddenly reduced the credit by more than one-half. And since the production cycle for the manufacture of defense items is more than seven months, the plant was hamstrung with work in process to the tune of 25.5 billion rubles. Moreover, 11.7 billion rubles' worth of completed orders have still not been paid for. As a consequence, "Plant workers have not been paid since July, the psychological climate among the many-thousand collective has reached the lower limit. Families where adults work at the plant have no money for even bread and commuting. The best personnel, highly qualified specialists are leaving. Failure to take urgent measures will lead to the complete collapse of the enterprise."

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The author goes on to stress that this situation is characteristic of all Novosibirsk MIC enterprises. Moreover, "this state of affairs with defense orders discredits the government in the eyes of the population."

This Is Not How the Village Should Be Supported

The Agrarian Policy section stresses that the policy of ineffective financing of agricultural enterprises continues. The fact is that last year, on the basis of a government decree, 140 billion rubles of credits were virtually written off in our oblast (extension for 10 years at 10 percent annual interest). "An analysis of the financial status of specific agricultural enterprises and meetings with specialists confirm the obvious and long known conclusion: granting credits with subsequent cancellation of debts is the worst and least effective method of supporting agricultural production. Such an approach stimulates not efficient work, but lobbying for credits and their wasteful spending. Objectively, it is farms and collectives that operate thriftily, intensively, with reliance on their own efforts that are punished."

Manokhin's proposals on this score can be summarized as follows: Abandon the practice of allocating centralized credits to agricultural enterprises for sowing and harvesting. Provide credits to oblast administrations with designated objectives: advance purchases of grain for regional and federal reserves (i.e., providing credits for production to be paid for with output), and subsidies for milk and meat to maintain prices at a certain level. Such an approach would make it possible to firmly link funding with food production.

Novosibirsk People Live Worse Than Many

Describing the living standards of Novosibirsk, the presidential representative reports that in this respect Novosibirsk Oblast occupies one of the last places in Russia and is behind every oblast and kray of the Urals, Siberia and the Far East, where natural conditions similar. The most vivid and convincing indicator of the "discriminatory" state of financing the oblast is the ratio of the median income to the subsistence minimum. Appended to the analytical memo is a table showing living standards in our oblast in comparison with the Russian Federation as a whole, Moscow, the West-Siberian economic region, industrially developed regions, and depressed regions. So, in October 1994 (the month for which the last data of the State Statistical Committee are available), the subsistence minimum in Novosibirsk Oblast was R88,200 (for comparison, in Moscow it was R136,300), while the median income of Novosibirsk people was R111,500 (for Muscovites, R554,400).

On the basis of these and other data, Anatoliy Manokhin proposes that our oblast be rated as a depressed region requiring special support at the federal level. In addition, he considers it necessary to draw up measures of financial support for the oblast, bringing average budgetary support per person to average Russian indicators, to provide priority financing of conversion programs at Novosibirsk MIC enterprises, and also priority placement of defense orders with local defense industry enterprises, and their timely financing.

An Interesting Question, of Course...

Finally, the section of the analytical memo called "Opinions About the President of the Russian Federation." Judging by the fact that actually this is what the document starts with, this question is of greatest interest to Boris Yeltsin's administration. Thus, Manokhin informs the Kremlin: "Last year there was an apparent persistent trend of falling support of the RF President in Novosibirsk Oblast. Thus, compared with July, in December 1994 (before the movement of troops into Chechnya) the number of outspoken opponents of the President increased from 40 to 60 percent, while the level of support in the second half-year dropped below the 20 percent level and in December reached 12 percent. Thus, at present the number of supporters of the RF President is 4-5 times less than the number of his opponents." The analytical memo gives the following main reason for Yeltsin's declining prestige and level of support: "Absence of positive shifts in the economy, falling living standards of the population; greater depth and acuteness of the crisis as compared with other regions of Western Siberia, the RF government's ignoring of the oblast's specific features when formulating and implementing budgetary policies; massive abuses by executives of different levels, their irresponsibility and impunity."

Well, one must give Anatoliy Manokhin credit for his unflattering description of the state of affairs in the oblast and Novosibirsk people's attitudes towards the president. It is all as it really is. Whether they draw any conclusions in the Kremlin and heed the suggestions of the president's representative in our oblast or not is an entirely different matter. Time will show.

Novosibirsk Mayor Comments on City Budget, Taxes

954F1355A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 7

[Article by Vadim Yuryev: "Viktor Tolokonskiy: 'We'll Tax to the Hilt'. Why the Mayor Shifts His Eyes When Talking to Bankers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The mayor's office is preparing a drastic decree which will probably spell serious trouble for many of those who avoid paying taxes or underpay certain sums to the budget.**

"What I am not afraid to call a criminal minimum of municipal expenditures has been approved for 1995." That is how the Novosibirsk mayor characterized the local budget at an administration conference.

Municipal budget receipts for all of last year totalled 458.8 billion rubles. To help understand whether this is

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a lot or a little I will cite another figure for comparison: 145.2 billion (30 percent of budgetary funds) was spent to prepare for the winter heating season. So judge for yourselves whether there is enough to subsidize municipal transport, public health and education, help the indigent, maintain housing, and so on. The list could be continued at length.

The main source for increasing municipal budget receipts is, naturally, taxes. That is why the mayor's office decided that one of the administration conferences would be devoted exclusively to the work of the tax services and a discussion of what should be done to collect more taxes this year.

Various ideas on this score were broached at the conference. For example, Igor Lyuzenkov, administration chief of the Central Rayon, declared indignantly:

"We say that enterprises here have keeled over. But is there a single director who sits without a salary? Most flower vendors in the market place are foreign citizens. And we take from them, as from foreigners, 25 minimum wages each! But no one knows what their daily income is."

Aleksandr Babkin, chief of the Kirov Rayon administration finance department, added:

"Right now most sales are for cash, on which no one pays taxes. I propose that special people be appointed to track down such advertisement and announcement organizations in the mass media."

Total registration and control is an unrealizable dream even for American tax services, so what can one say about us! According to Valentin Prokhorenko, chief of the municipal tax inspection, his staff can monitor no more than 15 percent of organizations contributing to the budget (and as of 1 January there were 35,197 registered in Novosibirsk).

So who else could be taxed? Valentin Prokhorenko considers that it's high time to tax "shuttles."

"Last year more than 200,000 so-called commercial tourists passed through customs," he said. "These are 90 percent 'our' people. But we can't register them: the customs people don't let us set up a computer in the airport. We offered customs to check jointly at Tolmachevo, but they wouldn't agree."

Viktor Tolokonsky responded to this that it was easy enough, all that should be done was to make it impossible for tourist groups to fly out without submitting lists of names, addresses and passport data to the tax service.

And in general, the mayor was in an almost fighting mood. When the administration chief of one rayon tried to draw Tolokonsky's attention to Novosibirsk's "unfriendly" attitude toward foreign legations (in Moscow, it seems, they are not taxed, while we tax them for some reason). Viktor Aleksandrovich interrupted the "defender": "If they don't like it, let them go to Moscow. But we'll tax them to the hilt..."

Summing up the administration conference, the mayor outlined three main sources for replenishing the municipal budget. First, collect back taxes ("Accounts of enterprises with arrears have not been closed, to say nothing of the fact that no one has been taken to court"). As of today the aggregate arrears of the oblast and federal budgets total 160 billion. If they are collected the oblast, Tolokonsky hopes, will share with the city. The second source is nonbudget medical insurance, employment and pension funds. ("Huge sums comparable with the budget are 'circulating' there. We should utilize the moneys from those funds more rationally.") The third source is to learn how collect taxes from those from whom we don't collect. ("Massive control is necessary. Do you think the police unit that deals with economic crimes is overworked?")

So it seems that the municipality will eventually get to the design and R&D institutes that lease entire stories to commercial organizations and live on that. At the conference Tolokonsky said:

"I can't make myself take money from the budget for City Day or the New Year tree, yet celebrations ought to be held anyhow. In such cases I invite bankers and executives of other rich organizations and ask them to foot the bill, while trying at the same time not to look away. But the last two times the bankers replied: 'We don't mind, but why is our rent collected by the design institute, not the municipal budget?'"

The mayor had nothing to say to that. As yet. Because it is already planned to prepare a municipal ordnance in February on the results of the administration conference.

US Ambassador's Novosibirsk Visit, Press-Conference Noted

954F1354A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 1

[Article: "Ambassadors Wake Up Early..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] **We don't know about other parts of the world, but in Novosibirsk yesterday's press-conference held by Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. ambassador to Russia, clearly aspires to a record.**

Never has such an activity been conducted so early in the day.

It was scheduled (and held!) at 7:30 a.m. Of course, not to test the mobility of Novosibirsk journalists. Simply, the schedule of his stay in our city was compressed to the limit. Besides, the ambassador had arrived later than planned, because the airplane was late. "However, this is a fairly common thing in Russia," he remarked calmly.

He said that each month he tries to set aside time to visit one of Russia's regions to see the situation on the spot. It

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was especially interesting for him to visit Siberia,a region of great importance for Russian-American business partnership.

In response to a question from a VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK correspondent, he assessed the results of his visit to our city and the impression created by representatives of the local administration with whom he had met. Mr. Pickering said that despite the flight delay he had spent some five hours in talks with representatives of the local authorities. They discussed questions of their serious interest in the further development of relations. The parties agreed that the only criterion of success was genuine progress in the development of business relations. The ambassador appealed to the oblast leadership to spare no effort to help overcome obstacles arising on the road to cooperation, for both sides to facilitate the development of Russian-American relations, and in particular relations between the United States and Novosibirsk Oblast. The fact that it is planned to open an American business center in Novosibirsk, the Ambassador said, is indicative of the desire to develop and expand ties between our countries.

Oblast's Alcoholism Rate Profiles

954F1354A Novosibirsk VECHERNIY NOVOSIBIRSK in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 1

[Article by Sergey Bobrov: "The Soul Cries for 14 Liters"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **According to data from the oblast drug addiction center, Novosibirsk Oblast has 49,000 registered alcoholics.**

There were 46,000 in 1991, that is, the number has remained virtually unchanged. But we are dealing with official data, which lag significantly behind reality. According to the most modest estimates there are at least 120,000-150,000 people suffering from alcoholism, of whom only one in twenty undergo treatment. The rest drink.

And alcohol consumption is constantly rising. Here too, official statistics keep presenting bright pictures which do not correspond to reality. Judge for yourself: In 1980 we consumed 10.5 liters of pure alcohol per capita per year; at the beginning of the antialcohol campaign the figure dropped to 8.47 liters, and by 1990 we seemed to have all but stopped drinking (5.53 liters). But alternative statistics now quote the figure 14 liters per person, and it is clearly understated.

Indeed, we are not only drinking more, but also more drastically in terms of consequences. In the last three years the number of alcoholic psychoses increased 4.5-fold, and the number of deaths from alcohol poisoning, 4.4-fold. What can one say when up to 90 percent of high school seniors drink?

Drinking is not only harmful, but also dangerous. Especially today, when unmonitored alcohol is all over the place, enough to fill a lake. Last year workers of the municipal public health epideiologic service conducted 1,005 surveys of the quality of alcoholic beverages, and in 16 percent of all cases vodka was bad and dangerous to the health. "So think about it," Ravil Terkumov, oblast chief drug addiction specialist, concluded this sad information. "Otherwise every drinker will get to look like the character in this photographic collage [not shown]."

Novosibirsk Oblast Deputy Candidates Listed

954F1374A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 1

["Listing of Candidates for Deputy of the Novosibirsk Oblast Soviet of Deputies for Electoral District No. 36, Registered by the District Commission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Sunday 5 March 1995, the election of a deputy to the Novosibirsk Oblast Soviet of Deputies for Electoral District No. 36 will be held.

The following candidates are registered with the district electoral commission:

Anatoliy Ivanovich Ivanov, born 1954, chief engineer of the Sibelpro closed variety joint-stock company, nominated by the Kirovskiy Rayon organization of the Russian Federation Communist Party, independent candidate residing in the city of Novosibirsk.

Aleksey Petrovich Manannikov, born 1956, deputy chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly, nominated by a group of district voters, independent candidate residing in the city of Novosibirsk.

Vladimir Ivanovich Nagibin, born 1936, professor, deputy director of the Scientific-Research Institute for Trauma and Orthopedics, nominated by the social organization Semipalatinsk Union, independent candidate residing in the city of Berdsk.

Aleksandr Vladimirovich Presnikov, born 1954, assistant representative of the Russian Federation president in Novosibirsk Oblast, nominated by the Novosibirsk branch of the Russia's Choice political movement, member of the party Democratic Choice of Russia, residing in the city of Novosibirsk.

Sergey Pavlovich Talalayev, born 1958, director of Kompleks, High School No. 196, nominated by a group of district voters, independent candidate residing in the city of Novosibirsk.

Kamchatka Unprepared for Earthquake Predicted for 1995

954E0572A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Mikhail Zakharychev: "Emergency Situations: Will the Ministry of Finance Get Moving Before Kamchatka Starts Shaking?"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] **Recently the earthquake in Japan took more than 5,000 lives. And that was in a country which considered itself ready for earthquake tremors. But what if, God forbid, the same thing happens in Kamchatka? Are we ready for such a jolt?**

Undoubtedly, if an impending disaster is forecast, we can alleviate its consequences at least by evacuating people in advance. But is the forecasting realistic?

"In Japan we are very much involved in studying the problem of forecasting," says the Japanese government's science advisor, Mr. Suehiro, "but, alas, we are still a long way from predicting ahead of time where and when they will occur. In the absence of forecasting, the best we can do is learn how to be completely ready for an earthquake."

The head of the Ministry for Extraordinary Situations [MChS], Sergey Shoygu, referred to experts' studies at the Ministry entrusted to him and announced an 80-percent probability of destructive tremors on Kamchatka and the Kurille Islands which may occur at some point from February through September of this year. There is no reason to doubt these words. On Kamchatka, the interval between earthquakes with a force of more than 7 is 15-20 years. And the last destructive tremors occurred there on 24 November 1971, that is to say, more than 23 years ago. According to the director of the institute of seismology, Gennadiy Sobolev, we should expect a disaster on Kamchatka this year for the additional reason that the northern part of the Pacific Ocean has been dangerously active in recent months.

But none of our seismologists can even name the exact month, let alone the day of the earthquake. There are two reasons for that. To this day science has not identified truly consistent predictors of earthquake tremors. So short-term seismic forecasting is in principle built on a lot of possible but by no means obligatory predictors and, consequently, is not always right. The second reason is the disintegration of Russia's seismic tracking system. One-third of the seismic tracking stations have been shut down for lack of financial capital to operate them.

On 3 November of last year, Russia's government adopted the federal program "Development of a Federal System of Seismological Tracking and Forecasting of Earthquakes for 1995-2000." Financing it requires 70 billion rubles [R]. However, according to the chief of the seismology administration under the RF MChS, Mikhail Shakhramanyan, the state budget for this year envisions only R5 billion, and that is not certain.

"If that money is not allocated either, there will be no earthquake forecasting to speak of at all," claims Gennadiy Sobolev. "Since even now there is virtually no information gathering. And analysis of the spotty information which somehow comes in all the same is very much delayed. That is for now, but what about later? A complete breakdown? For now we must above all put our hopes on builders, who (I would hope) built things to last for centuries."

"About 10 buildings equipped with earthquake insulation have been built in Kamchatka in expectation of natural testing," says the chairman of the Russian National Committee for Earthquakeproof Construction and Seismic Engineering, Yakov Ayzenberg. "The wait has already lasted 3 years. But yet this system of inexpensive earthquake insulation was developed in Russia and is possibly one of the solutions to the challenge of creating indestructible structures at relatively low cost."

From these words we can draw the conclusion that Kamchatka is fairly well prepared for a possible jolt and is even considered a kind of testing ground. Not only the municipal structures but even the rescue teams are ready. As Mikhail Shakhramanyan said, the rescue teams are prepared to begin their duties at any moment and their professional training and technical support allow us to expect this service to perform successfully and efficiently.

But analysis of the life support system of the city of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy in the event of an emergency, conducted under the guidance of the engineer from the Kamchatcha Center of Minstroy [Ministry of Construction], A. Gromov, showed that despite the civil defense work being done by the city administration and headquarters, not all services are prepared for a natural disaster.

According to specialists' data, only 43 percent of the people who need medical aid will be able to obtain it within the first 24 hours after an earthquake. Besides that, very few of Kamchatka's inhabitants have the skills to provide emergency medical aid. So it is very important to reinforce the oblast hospital building on Pogranichnaya Street, which is not earthquakeproof, very soon; but for now there is no money to do so. I would hope only for now.

But in the first 24 hours after an earthquake, according to experts' predictions, the question of providing the population with food will be critical. Above all because the city food combine and city dairy are located in the city's most earthquake-prone rayons.

The public water supply system is based on the use of mobile supply equipment in the event of an emergency. Because all of this equipment belongs to different organizations and its technical condition is at the very least questionable, there is reason to assume that a large number of the vehicles will not arrive at the assembly points at the set times.

The potential for Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy to provide housing is limited. According to specialists' estimates, only one-third of the people left without shelter can count on aid from the city authorities on this matter. The rest will have to move to their own dachas and to garages.

It is also frightening that by no means do all inhabitants of Kamchatka know what to do in the event of an

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earthquake. Civil defense headquarters are teaching the public, but not effectively enough. Now, when the possibility of a disaster is high, it would certainly be useful to step up these activities.

Everyone knows that capital intelligently invested in preventing the consequences of earthquakes pays for itself many times over. Kamchatka is located in an earthquake-prone zone. Twenty percent of Russian land may be subjected to destructive tremors. And it would be more useful to reinforce all this land in advance rather than to restore ruined land and mourn the thousands of people who are gone forever. Whose cause of death would not only be the elements...

Provisions of Three Local Self-Government Draft Laws Viewed

954E0572B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 14 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by Irina Smirnova under the rubric "Local Authorities": "Local Self-Government Is an All-Russian Matter"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Three draft laws on the organization of local self-government are under review in the State Duma profile committee. One of them was submitted by the president of the Russian Federation. The second is being submitted by deputies I. Muravyev (deputy chairman of the Committee on Questions of Local Self-Government), Z. Sayetgaliyev, L. Oleynik, and others. The third was developed by a group coordinated by Deputy A. Dolgopolov. The last draft has been revised with consideration of the views of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who recently has often expressed the opinion that the principles of the organization of local self-government must take in those positive traditions which Russian society produced even before the revolution and are embodied in the Zemstvo system. That is precisely the form of organization, in the writer's opinion, which gives room for Russia to be reborn.

But translating good wishes into the dry form of a law which essentially encompasses the complete range of the organization of the life of the Russian interior has not proven to be easy. And the draft which was submitted with due regard for A. Solzhenitsyn's comments proceeds from the need to create a unified system consisting of organs of state power and local self-government. In the opinion of legal experts, the two different systems are thereby joined, which in principle is a juridical mistake. In establishing a standard structure for organs of local self-government in all subjects of the Federation, the draft law regulates the procedure for forming them in detail, which violates the public's right to self-government and limits the jurisdiction of the subjects of the Federation. And that not only violates Article 131 of the Constitution, but even infringes upon the public's right to self-organization. Many of the Constitution's provisions which regulate local self-government are also not developed in it.

The draft of the law submitted by I. Muravyev's group, in contrast, prescribes the principles of organization of local self-government in detail, and in so much detail that there is virtually nothing left for the subjects of the Federation to add or correct. The draft law clearly defines questions of local and state significance. For example, local self-government is based on the system of administrative-territorial division which has already become established, and in doing so the draft law makes it impossible to eliminate any territory from the sphere of local self-government. And that means that whether the inhabitants want to or not, they are required to form an organ of local self-government or to self-organize somehow. Moreover, the draft law orders administrative-territorial units (rayons, cities of republic, kray, oblast, or rayon significance, rayons in cities, and settlements) to have organs of both executive and representative power. And the document not only prescribes the powers of these organs in some detail; it even establishes that elections in them must be based on single-mandate districts.

The draft of the law submitted by the president, unlike the previous ones, prescribes the mechanism of interaction of organs of local self-government with organs of state power and outlines not only the financial-economic bases of local budgets, but even proposes the mechanism for the state to guarantee minimum social standards. In other words, if a normal life is not ensured in the "subject of local self-government" through the local budgets, then the state or the subject of the Federation allocates the necessary capital (for which it is held responsible later) to correct the situation or assume the responsibility itself. The temporary delegation of powers between the organs of state power and local self-government also established by the draft law is especially important during the transition period of the life of our society in order to support the Russian interior. But even this draft cannot be called flawless. In experts' opinions, it does not lay out the questions of forming the local budgets and dividing up property broadly enough. And that, as everyone knows, is a sore point when questions affecting the delimitation of powers between the organs of state and local power are being discussed. But these questions, like those affecting the rights of organs of local self-government in regard to securities, property, and other things, must be resolved in laws of an economic nature.

One gets the impression that no matter how good the draft law submitted is, it does not cover all the problems of local self-government, including its place in the structure of Russia's state organization. Questions of the territorial order and of interrelations with the organs of state power and economic questions must also be resolved; the principles of the mechanism of self-government must be directly defined; and Russian traditions must not be forgotten. Most likely all these questions can be taken into account in preparing a whole package of draft laws. But there is one more important feature. The particular must not be resolved without

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resolving the general. We must not deal with the problem of local self-government without taking a stand on the blueprint for Russia's regional policy as a whole. The All-Russian Conference which will be held on 17 February in the Kremlin will be devoted to this question. It is also supposed to give new impetus to law-making work.

Interview With Former Democratic Party of Russia Leader Travkin

954F1386A Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No 5/81, 2-8 Feb 95 p 8

[Interview with Nikolay Travkin, former chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia, by Irina Velikanova; place and date not given; under the rubric "Gallery": "When You Become Minister, It All Becomes Clear"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **If one is to believe rumors (and what else is there to believe?), Nikolay Travkin intends to become Moscow Oblast governor. For this he is willing to sacrifice his Duma mandate, the status of federal minister without portfolio, and the job of Shakhovskiy Rayon head. "Just talk," was Travkin's brief comment to this news.**

[Velikanova] In this case, what does the future hold for Nikolay Ilich Travkin?

[Travkin] Shakhovskiy Rayon. I have built myself a house, and I have two dogs. The only inconvenience is that I have to travel to Moscow often.

[Velikanova] But you appeared to be a person whose plans in life were all linked to Moscow. Now you are gradually disappearing from the capital city horizon. Many people are puzzled as to how Sergey Glazyev has managed to "steal" from you the party you founded.

[Travkin] I do not see anything denigrating in that. Especially considering that in principle I did not have any objections. Even a day before the congress, had I decided to boost my position and get rid of the opposition, including Glazyev, the congress would have put everything in its place. Trust me, this is elementary—I have experience in conducting congresses. But I made a different decision: to leave, and also leave with minimal losses for the DPR [Democratic Party of Russia]—without smashing dishes, without a scandal, but, on the contrary, supporting Glazyev.

[Velikanova] But why did you decide this?

[Travkin] I realized that one cannot sit on two chairs—be head of a rayon administration and head of a party. I have worked in Shakhovskiy for two years, only interrupting it for four months—after the elections. These were months of contemplation; I will be honest—I regretted that I had to leave the rayon. And when I went back, I went back for good. I am not a politician; my involvement in politics was a forced move.

[Velikanova] Almost all politicians say this.

[Travkin] But, unlike many, I was not a child of perestroyka—in 1985 I was already known as a construction worker, and my team has worked in market mode since 1979. Can you imagine the degree of resistance we had to overcome to gain the right to work in a new way? That is why I am saying that I got into politics out of desperation. I generally do not understand those who like working in politics. They probably did not like what they did in their previous jobs.

[Velikanova] So you are saying that your departure from party affairs was only your gain?

[Travkin] It depends on what you consider a gain. I did not set for myself the goal of reaching the federal level—becoming, for instance, Duma chairman or prime minister—and neither did I want to run for president. In 1990, when we organized the DPR, we had only one task—to create an alternative to the CPSU. Forget about going for the presidency!... Right now there are probably more than 10 parties of a democratic orientation. Accordingly, they have different goals, the main among which is the struggle for power and positions. But if I did not set such a goal for myself in 1990, why should I do so now? By the way, this is how the first frictions began in the DPR—they started telling me: If you do not plan to run for president, we still need to announce that you will, otherwise how can we work in the regions, for whom should we go out of our way?

[Velikanova] You are remembered, especially from your election campaign speeches, as a determined opponent of the government. However, your angry speeches stopped as soon as you became part of this government. Forgive me, but this invites certain thoughts.

[Travkin] You cannot accuse me of changing my convictions after obtaining a certain status. Yes, I was in opposition to the government, but at the same time I was always in healthy opposition, not just for the sake of being "against." I do not agree with everything now either. I still disagree, as I did in the past, with the contention that the only way to reform our agriculture is to raze to the ground everything the way it was. The president makes a lot of decisions, and you agree with some and disagree with others. In the final analysis... In the final analysis I support market reform, and radical reform at that.

[Velikanova] How did your appointment to the government come about? Whose idea was it?

[Travkin] When I decided to give up my deputy seat and return to being head of the rayon administration, I went to Rybkin. Ivan Petrovich said that he would rather not weaken the democratic wing in the Duma and that we needed to find a way to combine my work in the rayon and my deputy work. This could be done by raising the status of the administration head to the rank of minister. Chernomyrdin arrived at the same conclusion. I know that Filatov, Zaveryukha, and Soskovets supported the idea. The final decision, of course, was the president's.

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[Velikanova] Now that you have worked in the government, how do you appraise its work?

[Travkin] It has to maneuver continuously. On one hand, because of the economic situation that has developed—among other things, this is its fault; on the other hand, it has to take into account the peculiarities of the political disposition of forces. Besides, every government has a certain reserve of public trust. Unfortunately, the current government has very little of it, and therefore will not be able to see the reforms through to the end, although both Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin understand now what they have to do. Today nobody will support unpopular decisions—on the contrary, opposition will reach such dimensions that society will explode and the current authority will be simply swept away. Its political capital has been exhausted, and it no longer has the trust of the people. So the government is operating on the brink, careful to just survive, to maintain the support of the Agrarians in the Duma, to avoid tipping the fragile compromise...

[Velikanova] You have already realized that the government is unpopular, that one cannot expect much of it, but you still stay in it. Why?

[Travkin] Because I have also understood that there are limits to what is possible; I have understood what one can ask of the government and the president, and what one cannot. Moreover, to step over a certain limit means for the country to slide back. I am convinced that if the current authority is overthrown, it will only get worse.

[Velikanova] Your colleagues in the faction think differently.

[Travkin] But they also have different goals: They still need to realize themselves; they need to prove that the current authority is more stupid than they are. You know that one can only build a career in politics on the bodies of others.

Moscow City Duma on Housing Construction

954F1307A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Viktor Belikov: "Moscow Is Now Building More Housing Than Ever Before"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **One of the toughest social questions, the housing question, attracted special attention at the meeting of the Moscow government with deputies of the city Duma held on 8 February.**

The report by the mayor of the capital, Yu. Luzhkov, noted that the capital's construction complex, which has a high level of industrialization of production, switched to market relations several years back. Its subdivisions have become economically independent joint stock societies, firms, and companies. Because of that, "they survived in a time which was difficult for the country's economy and are now increasing the number of buildings and sociocultural and domestic service objects under construction in the capital each year. One might say that a regime of expanded reproduction of housing has become established in Moscow."

This year the city will receive slightly more than 3 million square meters of housing space, more than at any other time. This will make it possible, among other things, to finally resolve the problem of resettling war veterans, who up to now have been living in communal apartments, in individual apartments.

Responding to the IZVESTIYA correspondent's question, Yu. Luzhkov specified that the city program envisions offering comfortable individual housing in new modern-series buildings to the last of the 5,800 families of veterans in the 1941-1945 war who wish to move from their crowded apartments. This is one of the social benefits which the city authorities are establishing on the eve of the 50th Anniversary of Victory for the protectors of the Fatherland who are from Moscow .

City Budgetary Problems for '95 Assessed

954F1416A St. Petersburg SANKT PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 16 Feb 95 p 1

[Report by Yelena Dolgopyatova: "The City Budget: More Expenditures Than Income"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Yesterday the mayor's report on the execution of the city budget for 1994 was heard in the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly and the draft law on the budget for 1995 was examined in the first reading.**

Last year's budget was adopted with a deficit of 41 percent. But it finished with a 9.7 percent deficit.

But the 1995 budget of the government headed by Anatoliy Sobchak proposes to approve a deficit of 15 percent. In that case, the expenditure part of the budget will come to 5,475 billion rubles [R], while the income part will come to R4,654 billion.

For 1995 the mayor proposed to increase the tax on banking, brokerage, and intermediary activity by 3 percent and to use the income from this for housing construction. The plan is to build a children's infectious diseases hospital, an infants' home, two polyclinics, four schools, five preschool institutions, and a monument to Marshal Zhukov. The repair of the Bolsheokhtinskiy Bridge will be extended in the amount of R60 billion, while R180 billion is needed for its complete reconstruction.

The problem of supplying free medicines to Petersburg citizens is critical in the city. There are 1.5 million people who have a right to this, but realistically it is impossible to supply them with medicines at state budget expense. So the government proposes to differentiate this benefit.

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The reduced rates on the lease payments for enterprises and organizations, most of which contribute only a small part of the total cost of the land to the city budget, will also be reviewed. In this connection, the mayor proposes to create a working group composed of deputies and mayor's office employees to work out the most fruitful and fair decision.

The chairman of the economics and finance committee, Aleksey Kudrin; the chairman of the municipal services committee, Vladimir Yakovlev; and the deputy chairman of the committee on social questions, Nina Shubina, also spoke before the deputies of the Legislative Assembly yesterday. The deputies themselves also expressed their opinions on the results of the execution of last year's budget. They decided to take the mayor's report under consideration, since according to existing legislation, it is still too early to assess the past year. The city's financial services will summarize the year's final results by 15 March, and in April the Legislative Assembly will again return to this question. But let us note at once that even now a draft decision prepared by deputies Aleksey Vorontsov and Yuriy Terentyev where it is proposed that the execution of the budget be declared unsatisfactory has been submitted for examination.

As for the mayor's budget message for 1995, it was not adopted in the first reading yesterday, but a break was taken to discuss it in deputy commissions and to put deputy corrections and comments into a single document.

National Security Official Reflects on Crime

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[Interview with A. Aleksandrov, by Vladimir Alekseyev: " 'Today We Are Farther From a Law-Governed State Than We Were Five Years Ago': That Is How Aleksey Aleksandrov, chairman of the State Duma Subcommittee on National Security, Feels"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **Aleksey Aleksandrov is a graduate of the LGU [Leningrad State University] Law School. He worked as a researcher and, after defending his candidate's dissertation, engaged in work as an instructor and lawyer.**

In 1992 Aleksandrov became vice-president of the Association of St. Petersburg Jurists, and a year later a deputy to the State Duma, where he headed the Subcommittee on National Security. On Aleksandrov's initiative, an expert-consultation council is being created under the Duma Committee on Security, on the basis of the St. Petersburg University Law School. That council will include the heads of all the law-enforcement agencies in the city and oblast.

[Alekseyev] Aleksey Ivanovich, at the end of last year the State Duma Committee on Security sent the Russian General Procuracy an inquiry, asking why the not unknown Aleksandr Ivanovich Malyshev has been in an investigation solitary-confinement cell for so long (since October 1994). Malyshev had been accused in accordance with Article 77 of the RF UK [Criminal Code] (gangsterism), and, as was stated in the inquiry, the press had already pronounced its sentence long ago. What comments can you make on the appearance of that inquiry?

[Aleksandrov] First of all, I would like to say a few words in general about the fight against gangsterism. In my opinion, the State Duma Committee on Security has been doing rather a large amount to intensify the fight against dangerous phenomena. In the summer of last year there was a meeting of the executive council of the Russian MVD, that was devoted to problems of fighting gangsterism. Members of our committee took part in the work of that council. The council considered the question about the fact that the procuracy's investigators have not been coping with the investigation of cases involving Article 77 of the RF Criminal Code. We proposed making that jurisdiction an alternative one, that is, making it such that the agency that would investigate them would be the agency in the law-enforcement system that initiated the corresponding criminal case. That proposal was adopted by the State Duma, and literally three weeks later the president signed a law on the basis of which the MVD agencies have the right to investigate criminal cases involving gangsterism.

Incidentally, previously, when that was the purview only of the procuracy, where, in general, there is an insufficient number of investigators, and especially of specialists with regard to crimes pertaining to gangsterism, the number of criminal cases involving Article 77 was very small, the procuracy workers were, one might say, afraid of carrying out the investigation of cases in those categories. Between the enactment of law and the end of 1994, the number of criminal cases initiated in accordance with that article tripled for the country as a whole. I want to say that that was the concrete result of the promptly enacted law.

And now with regard to the inquiry on the Malyshev case. I heard that that inquiry was being prepared in the Duma. Incidentally, it is a very important question when, by means of a specific example, it is possible to analyze the fight against crime in general and organized crime in particular. The fact of the matter is that all of us are in favor of a sharp intensification of the fight against crime, but at the same time we are against any violation of legality. The more rights we give the militia, the stricter the oversight must be, to assure the observance of the laws when carrying out that fight. Otherwise there will be arbitrariness and corruption, that is, things will be even worse. Our position in this question is that the fight against crime must be waged not at the expense of legality. I personally am in favor of intensifying operational work—agent work and technical work—and in favor of taking a harsh attitude toward gangsters who put

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up resistance, and that means up to and including annihilating them during detention. But when a procedural figure appears—a suspect, an accused, or a defendant—their rights definitely must be observed. All the deadlines—for investigation, maintenance under guard, presenting testimony—must be within the state's strictest oversight. In the event of deviation from those rules, the state's officials themselves become criminals, and for society this is no less dangerous than gangsterism.

It is difficult for me to analyze the testimony in the Malyshev case, since I do not know that testimony. But there is something that I would like to direct attention to. It is very important that no illegal influence on anyone's part should be exerted with regard to this case. Neither on the part of the defenders of Malyshev or others, nor on the part of the prosecutors or investigators. This case is too well known to the public, and therefore, in my opinion, it is extremely undesirable to drag it out. It is completely obvious that attempts will be made to exert an influence on it from all sides: on the one hand, there is very big money, and, on the other hand, there is the desire by various structures to demonstrate the results of their work. As for the deputies, in their inquiries they can ask only about one thing—the observance of legality. If Malyshev is being detained illegally—that is, he has served his time, but is not being released—that is an outrage, and the general procurator must immediately release him, or send the case to court, that is, he must observe the law with respect to Malyshev in exactly the same manner as to Ivanov, Petrov, and Sidorov.

[Alekseyev] For four years we have already constantly heard about so-called organized crime. With regard to the question of just what that concept means, there exist the most diverse answers. What do you think that the term "organized crime" means? And is there any consideration being taken of providing the citizens with normal information about that phenomenon?

[Aleksandrov] According to a legislative draft that is currently being prepared in our committee, organized crime is a system of formations that were created for criminal activity. I would add to that—on a professional basis, that is, for these individuals crimes are the basic and extremely substantial source of income. Organized crime definitely represents an exceptional danger for the country, and it can be fought only by means of a series entire series of measures. I think that a very important feature in it is the general national ideology which, at the present time, in almost completely absent in our country. That is, the niche that formed after the collapse of the Communist ideology was immediately filled in by another one, that is not monitored by anyone. In other words, the moral principle has been lost, and violence and money are becoming the top of a kind of state pyramid,and they are poisoning and destroying everyone and everything. Without the resolution of this question, it is fundamentally difficult to fight crime, and especially organized crime. That is the first feature.

The second is: a law-governed democratic state. Unfortunately, today we are still farther away from it than we were five years ago. What we need is the taking of all steps to reinforce the state principle, demandingness, and responsibility. It is completely obvious that our state is currently ailing. Where should the treatment begin? Certainly with the intensification of the responsibility borne by managers of all ranks. If the officials in your apparatus are working poorly and stealing, you must bear the personal responsibility for them, up to and including criminal responsibility.

Third: corruption in the law-enforcement agencies, primarily the militia. As is generally known, this phenomenon does much to help organized crime. How should we fight it? I see the need to introduce rigid operational monitoring of the activities of the militia on the part of the security agencies. That is, special, secret work among the employees of the law-enforcement system with the purpose of uncovering any instances of corruption. There is nowhere to go to get away from this. It is a classic practice. This practice is employed through the world: in the United States, for example, the FBI monitors its officials, and they do not become offended by that. To put it figuratively, if you want to sweep the floor in a room, make sure you have a good broom...

Fourth: to limit as much as possible the authorizing and distributive functions of officials, that is, those who, properly speaking, give rise to bribery.

[Alekseyev] Doesn't it seem to you that it is high time to recognize as a fact the existence of organized crime in the form of a kind of state within a state? Incidentally, in a recent motion-picture film about Dmitriy Yakubovskiy it was unambiguously stated that he was an intermediary among official state structures and the "shadow state." Why, then, do we still have a situation in which no clearly expressed state position with regard to organized crime can be discerned?

[Aleksandrov] I do not feel that organized crime today is stronger than the state. Although, unfortunately, there has been a tendency toward a situation in which an offended citizen seeks help not from the state, but from criminals. This pertains not only for arbitration cases, but also for certain others. Gangsters are in favor of resolving a question "according to life." They will take a little bit of money from the citizen, but will shake down the offender for most of the amount. Although it is the state, rather than the criminals, that ought to engage in resolving the question "according to life" and according to law. And this happens because, in the state structures, the red tape, the indifference, and the militia frequently seem not to listen to justified complaints. There is also the psychological factor. The Mafia structure will feel sorry for you, will help you, and today it cannot even take money in exchange for this. But if that citizen is approached by gangsters who ask him about a certain debt... This is an example of how crime is penetrating into our real life.

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Incidentally, there still exists today the opportunity to resist. Here I would like once again to return to the legislative draft about the fight against organized crime that is being developed by our committee. In and of itself, the idea of creating this law is good. It contains a very large number of positive features that especially pertain to operational-investigation work, but the very concept of the law leaves much to be desired. At one time, speaking in parliament, I made this comparison: if you want to get rid of rats, it is not necessary to burn down the house. I want to say that the entire law was constructed according to the principle of "the end justifies the means." One can completely understand the statements made by the militia employees, who assert: give us this law and in two months we will not have any crime! That's right. There won't be any crime, but there won't be anything else either. The fact of the matter is that the concept of this document is seemingly directed at the very broad and imprecise application of the law. Watered-down formulations make it possible to bring God knows whom to criminal responsibility. Take, for example: "Criminal activity is a system of acts that are previously thought out deliberately with the purpose of preparing, attempting, or perpetrating one or more heinous crimes... or the creation of other favorable conditions for perpetrating crimes." You realize that "other favorable conditions" is so broad and vague a concept that practically anyone can be brought to criminal responsibility for creating those conditions, and then let him try to defend himself. And one more example: "A criminal organization is the union of three or more individuals, or two or more organized groups, for combined criminal activity... or for guaranteeing the functioning of criminal organizations." That is, here too it is possible to bring anyone you want to criminal responsibility.

It is very dangerous to give our law-enforcement agencies this kind of law: they will put absolutely everyone in jail. Thee are not enough prisons, so they say, "We'll put a tarpaulin over Petrovskiy Stadium and 'protect' all of you from the criminals." That makes me very upset. But the document is literally saturated with features like this. The law contains an article that reads as follows: "If a militia employee who is carrying out a special assignment in a criminal organization has committed a crime other than premeditated murder or serious bodily harm, none of his actions will be criminal..." In other words, if a militiaman who is carrying out a special assignment has deliberately broken someone's arm (this is less than serous harm) or has raped a child without causing any serious bodily harm, or has even betrayed his Homeland, there is no *corpus delicti* here. For me, as a practicing jurist, all of this seems to be some kind of nightmare that threatens to have large repercussions for the country and society.

And, finally, something that is especially difficult—special judges. Yes, incidentally, from the very beginning I spoke out against this legislative draft in the form in which it was presented for discussion. Its authors asked what should be removed from the document, and on our recommendation they actually threw out ten positions, including the three-man special courts, and many other things, but that spirit remained in the law and so did the special judges. Then I asked them not to touch the court at all. We'll let you have free rein—you can put people in the Black Marias and special railroad cars, you can take them to the stadiums and do with them what you want in the name of that great goal, the fight against crime, but don't touch the court. Let's make the court with a jury, and let people judge our testimony impartially.. "No," the authors of the law replied, "let's have special judges"... Imagine that a special judge like this is operating. If he is "special," then someone will necessarily have to protect him against gangsters. That is correct, but then they will dictate to him: "Listen here, good friend. You pronounced one bad sentence, and then another one. We will protect you in such a way that you won't live long..." And you have to agree that this kind of situation is completely possible. Although the judge does not have the right under any circumstances to take anyone's side, he has to think about himself, God, and justice.

[Alekseyev] In the opinion of many employees of law-enforcement agencies, last year's presidential Edict, entitled "Protecting the Citizens From Gangsterism and Other Manifestations of Organized Crime" is no more than a declaration, and after its appearance very little changed on the front of the fight against crime.

[Aleksandrov] I feel that an Edict like this cannot be effective. The obvious violation of the Constitution that was carried out with the appearance of this Edict was scarcely justified. Especially since any violation of the Constitution hinders people's awareness of the law. Because, if one speaks about a law-governed state, one of its attributes is the equality of the citizen and the state before the law. But in our country the president can violate the Constitution, and an official can violate the law. Naturally, this forces the man in the street to wonder: "Why can't I? Why can't I do a lot of things, like, for example, murder someone? If I have killed some son of a bitch and, by doing so, have broken the law, I have the right to do that."

Many years ago, here in Leningrad, there was the notorious Balanovskiy and Zelenkov case. They had stabbed some enlisted sentries to death and then stolen the weapons from them in order to commit other crimes later on. Balanovskiy, a physically strong and strong-willed person, wrote a letter to Yuriy Andropov after receiving the death sentence. He wrote, "Get me out of this situation secretly. Say that I have been executed by firing squad, and, then, under an assumed name, I will carry out any job you assign to me anywhere in the world..." This is a graphic example of the psychology of the criminal, who does not consider himself to be a "trembling creature." He is convinced that he is much more important for society and the state than the life of any old woman or three young soldiers.

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I want to say that it is currently very important to construct a law-governed state on strong moral principles. I am convinced that this is a hundred times more important than everything else. Because our country is very large, and as soon as we move the slightest bit forward, everything in our society will be all right: money, housing, transportation... There is nothing hindering us now except our own fools...

[Alekseyev] What specific steps is the State Duma Committee on Crime taking to change the existing legislation in such a way that people will not deliberately break the law? Because one involuntarily gets the impression that, as strange as it seems, the powers that be have a self-interest in the law of order in the country.

[Aleksandrov] Our committee is continuing to work on an entire package of laws that are very important for the country. They include the Criminal Code, the law on the Federal Security Service, laws on the protection of judges and victims, as well as the previously mentioned law on the fight against organized crime which, although we criticize it conceptually, does contain a large number of positive features. It is necessary to work in an especially intensive way on the concept of national security.

I would like to draw your attention to a few of what I consider to be the important principles in the law on the Federal Security Service, the enactment of which is possible within the very near future. That law is directed both at the fight against crime, and at against stopping the activity of foreign intelligence services on the territory of Russia, as well as outside its confines. It is interesting that, in conformity with the law, our special [intelligence] services will not have the right to use as their agents such individuals as deputies, lawyers, judges, priests, or minors. I see in this the moral principle that is so necessary for our state.

[Alekseyev] The 24 January issue of IZVESTIYA published an article under the headline "Shady Kremlin Advisors Intensify Their Influence." The article dealt with a plan for creating a National Guard. What is your opinion of that plan, if it actually exists?

[Aleksandrov] To tell you the truth, I did not read that article, but I know that the president gave A. Korzhakov (Ed. note: head of the Service for the Safety of the President of the Russian Federation) the responsibility of analyzing the state of all the law-enforcement agencies and reporting to him his views concerning what has to be done in order to protect the country against the rampant crime. The fact of the matter is that this service is not a law-enforcement agency of the executive authority. It is a special structure, the basic function of which is simply to guarantee the safety of the president and his family. As everyone knows, the country's safety is entrusted to the Federal Counterintelligence Service, and also to certain other structures, including the procuracy with respect to oversight of the legality during the carrying out of an investigation. So I think that, if there does indeed exist a plan for creating the National Guard, it will not be supported by the State Duma. Moreover, the Duma does not even support the special structure for fighting organized crime. A person who has stated his opposition to the creation of this agency as yet another special agency is Viktor Yerin himself, the minister of internal affairs, who feels that we already have a sufficient amount of all kinds of other structures to which it is necessary simply to assign tasks and whose interaction should be organized. If they want to give the name of National Guard to some detachment of special fighting men, to yet another "*spetsnaz*" [special-purpose detachment], then that disturbs me, since all this is outside of the legal framework. I am worried about these boys wearing masks. If you feel that these masks are vitally necessary for you, then that is incorrect. It gives rise to irresponsibility. Why do you need a mask? Are you afraid of something? If so, then go into another service where you don't have to be afraid. Incidentally, there have already been masks. In Russia the executioner used to wear a mask. I would not want the National Guard that you have asked me about, or any of our people who are protecting the law, to be called executioners because they are wearing masks. Everyone must know that a specific person has shot him, and that that person can later be found and asked to explain his action. Otherwise the person is depersonalized, and it is impossible in real life to figure out which one of the people wearing masks had done a good deed, and which had done a bad one...

[Alekseyev] According to your data, are any agencies in Western intelligence services currently active on Russian territory? Is there any truth to the information that, in addition to Western agents, there have appeared in Russia employees of the intelligence services from the former Soviet republics (the Baltic countries, Ukraine, etc.)?

[Aleksandrov] Very frequently at conferences I hear loud indignation or some kind of concern that foreign intelligence agencies have been increasing their activity rate on our country's territory. And at such time they talk about this as though it is something that is widespread. But I feel that it would be strange if this were otherwise. Just imagine a large village in which strange things are happening in one of the houses. The people have begun rebuilding the house, various people are coming and going, unsupervised children are playing with matches next to a haystack, someone is arguing with someone else... I think that in a situation like this everyone in that village would get together and, after conferring with one another, would send their representative to that house, so that he could find out what was happening. Because the more order and clarity exists there, the calmer all the neighbors will feel...

So the interest that foreign intelligence agencies have in Russia today is obvious and normal. The attitude that the entire world takes toward us is, on the whole, kindly, but that does not mean that someone might make the attempt, for example, to intensify his influence on Russia or quietly try to grab something. It is completely

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obvious that our country has a self-interest in stopping any penetrations that are dangerous to it, and in stopping the collection of information that is a state secret. Incidentally, practically all the former republics of the Union, and especially the Baltic countries, are showing interest in us. Unfortunately, everything that we have that pertains to the Baltic states is for some reason stamped "Secret." Because, with respect to Russia, they have been behaving in what could be called, in mild terms, an unseemly manner. And this is despite the fact that they owe their independence only to the Russian democratic position. By making their contribution to the destruction of our country and by frequently carrying out a hostile policy, the Baltic states might achieve a situation in which a different person will suddenly appear at the helm of leadership in Russia, after which the Baltic republics will live in independence not more than three days. Then no America will help them.

As for detentions of employees of intelligence services, including those from the former Soviet republics, so far as I know, there have been a few criminal cases that were initiated as a result of instances of intelligence activity on the territory of Russia. But, unfortunately, most of the materials presented to us by intelligence and counterintelligence is secret and cannot be divulged. These may be used by us only for analysis. Obviously, there cannot be any discussion of any statements or subsequent publications.

I asked to have submitted to me fresh and interesting materials on cases that had been concluded, so that those materials could be publicized. Because it is insufficient just to have my theoretical views, although that is much more important than any specific "tasty bits." Of course, scandalous cases are interesting, but no more than that—we have already been sufficiently sated with them. Or maybe people want to know whether the secrecy behind the Yakubovskiy case will be revealed. This is definitely not a simple case. It has a big story behind it, an entire history linked with foreign countries, people's political philosophy, etc.

[Alekseyev] But are you convinced that this case will be revealed? Is there a danger that Yakubovskiy knows too many "Kremlin secrets" and definite circles will not allow those secrets to be revealed?

[Aleksandrov] Yes, that danger does exist.

[Alekseyev] Do the events in Chechnya represent any threat to Russia's national security?

[Aleksandrov] Yes, of course. In general, everything that pertains to these regional events, despite their apparent remoteness, results in very serious consequences for national security in the most immediate sense. From my point of view, first, it is necessary in a very strict and stern manner to demonstrate one's force, to be well-principled and consistent, and at the same time to do everything that we are supposed to do in order to prevent possible negative consequences from the Chechen conflict. It is necessary—not, of course, for the president himself, but through other individuals—to meet with people in the attempt to come to some kind of understanding. In any case to know that you are being responsible for the consequences. It is necessary to seek a way out of this problem. But, Chechens, you will burn Moscow down, you will burn Russia down. Chechnya also will not continue to live perpetually on the earth... The most important thing is to come to an understanding calmly, without hysterics. And, of course, there must be no innocent victims.

It is certainly understandable to everyone that a number of serious mistakes have been made in resolving the Chechen problem. When issuing assignments to the power structures, they should have been required to carry out actions efficiently, in order to keep the number of human victims to the minimum, without even mentioning the innocent sacrifices among the civilian population. Prior to the carrying out of an operation, it should have been necessary first of all to study carefully the state of affairs in Chechnya, to have a complete picture of the entire situation, and to prepare a large package of analytical information. Then certain actions with respect to Chechnya should have been planned, after warning them in the mass media about that mighty preparation. That is, it was extremely necessary to create a definite public opinion: to demonstrate the crimes perpetrated by the Chechen bandits; the fact that they were armed with weapons that represented a danger not only for Russia, but also for the entire world; and the fact that they were involved in deals involving counterfeit money, drugs, and petroleum; etc. Then a criminal case should have been initiated against Dudayev and others and a decree should have been promulgated concerning the charging of them as defendants, as well as a decree concerning their arrest. That should have been the basis for issuing the assignment to the operational services. Then it would have been possible to announce that the election there was illegal. Everyone would have realized that the country is strong, that it has preserved the integrity of its borders, and has started to move farther ahead in its development... Because we are all Russians and we understand by the term "national" a country, a society, rather than a nationality. Russia must be united.

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